Power v Greater Manchester Police Authority by Al-Astewani, Amin

The Manchester Review 
of 
Law, Crime & Ethics 
 
The University of Manchester‟s 

















The Manchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics is a 
student-led, peer-reviewed journal founded at the 
University of Manchester, School of Law. 
The journal exhibits the best academic work in law, 
criminology and ethics, on both the undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels, publishing it annually. 
VOLUME III OCTOBER 2014 
 
 
The Manchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics 
 
©The Manchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics, 2014 
All rights reserved 
 
 
TheManchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics and its 





No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form 
without the express consent of The Manchester Review of 








All enquiries should be addressed to: 
 
Manchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics 
Williamson Building, School of Law 







Typeset in Baskerville Old Face 
Printed in United Kingdom  
 
The Manchester Review 
of 



















Honorary Advisory Board 
Lesley Anderson QC 
Dr Nicholas Braslavsky 
HH Judge Nigel Bird 
Dinah Crystal OBE 
Professor Geraint Howells 
Paul Lowenstein QC 
Gerard McDermott QC 










This year‟s edition was generously funded by Jones Day. 
 
The entire editorial team are sincerely grateful for  
Jones Day‟s support. This project would not have been 
possible without them.   
VI   
VII 
 
Preface from Jones Day 
The Law Society of England and Wales reports that, as at 
31 July 2013, 158,644 individuals were admitted to the Roll 
of solicitors of England and Wales in 2013.  Each one of 
those solicitors is subject to the first mandatory principle set 
down by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, to "uphold the 
rule of law and the proper administration of justice".  The 
Bar Standards Board of England and Wales places the 
obligation similarly highly on its own list of objectives, as do 
many other international legal bodies and organisations.  
Jones Day has an equally strong commitment to the 
development of the rule of law in countries around the globe 
including, but not limited to, the 19 countries where our 
offices are located. 
The range of subjects and complexity of the issues 
discussed in this volume of the Review reminds us that 
upholding the rule of law also means seeking to develop it 
through debate and practical application. In a fast-changing 
world, we must continually meet the challenge of new and 
difficult issues head on, whilst upholding the fundamental 
principles which underlie our legal systems.  Reading the 
detailed contributions to this review also reinforces our 
strong belief that complexity is not always a vice, when it is 
accompanied by clarity of thought. 
In that context, we are delighted to support this volume of 
the University of Manchester Review of Law, Crime & Ethics 
and to congratulate each and every contributor to the 
publication of this journal.  We include in that group not just 
the writers, editorial team and Faculty members but every 
librarian, colleague, friend, flatmate or significant other 
whose support is an essential part of undertaking a project 
such as this one.    
We particularly commend the writers and editors for their 
personal role in developing the rule of law with this volume 
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of the Review, and look forward to seeing their further 
contributions to their chosen field of law, business or study at 








Preface from the Head 
of the School of Law 
It is my pleasure to welcome the third edition of this 
review. What started out as an idea from the student body 
has now become of feature of the Law School. It involves all 
disciplines of the School and students on all programmes as 
well as staff. 
The papers show the keen interest of our community in 
exploring cutting edge issues, I hope all readers find 
something to reflect upon and many in our community are 
encouraged to contribute in the future. 
The authors are to be congratulated, but so is the editorial 
team who have put in many hours of work. I step down as 
Head of School this summer, but am very pleased this review 
was launched during my tenure. I look forward to reading 








Preface from the Editor-in-Chief 
Editor-in-Chief‟s Foreword 
At roughly the same time that I was appointed as Editor-
in-Chief of this Review, Philip Burton, a fellow doctoral 
student within the School of Law at the University of 
Manchester as well as a fellow editor of this review, drew to 
my attention an article by Professor David Kennedy. The 
article – entitled „When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against 
the Box‟1– arrived in my inbox shortly thereafter. Being a 
mere English public lawyer interested in what public lawyers 
are generally interested in, I was, in truth, a little unsure of 
how much I would enjoy this article, which I was assured by 
Philip was a modern masterpiece of international law 
scholarship. This article, adding to the challenge of its rather 
alien content, stretched from page 335 to page 500 of the 
New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics. I almost immediately closed the file and went on 
concerning myself with that which an English public lawyer 
ought to be properly concerned. I eventually got around to 
reading Professor Kennedy‟s article on a long train journey 
and did so, I must admit, with the likelihood of returning to 
the book I was reading (about English public law) within a 
few minutes clear in my mind. The first thing that must be 
said of the article is trite to anybody who knows more about 
international law than I: Professor Kennedy‟s article is a 
lucidly written observation of the nature of the discipline in 
which he operates and it undoubtedly deserves to be held in 
the high esteem which it is. However, it was the early 
passages of the article – which, probably to Philip‟s dismay, 
                                                                
1 David Kennedy, „When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box‟ 
(2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
335. 
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had very little to do with international law – that caught my 
attention. 
Professor Kennedy‟s article is a response to an invitation 
from the board of editors‟ at the New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics – all of whom, as is 
often the case in the US, were students – to write a piece for 
their „millennium issue‟. This piece, they hoped, would set 
out both “new thinking” and Professor Kennedy‟s thoughts 
about the legal issues he expected to “shape the parameters 
of international law in the new millennium.” 2  Professor 
Kennedy, aged 45 at the time, articulated his view on that 
invitation in the following terms: 
“It may sound like a cop out, but I would be 
interested in the editors‟ response to their own 
initiative; in my experience students are often far 
closer to the next wave than older colleagues, 
and I have gotten a lot by picking up on the 
threads of their interests… there is something 
odd in a student editorial board asking people 
half again to twice their age what issues we think 
will become relevant in our careers – as if we 
were just starting out and they were situated too 
far along to be able to see that far forward.”3 
I thought this was a brilliant sentiment. One person I 
recalled who had made a similar observation is our School‟s 
very own Rodney Brazier, when writing in his foreword to the 
hisConstitutional Reform book.4 The sentiment that young 
lawyers, untainted by the weariness of experience, can bring 
fresh ideas is one I have kept in mind whilst overseeing this 
project and one, to my mind at least, it is worthwhile for 
anyone who works within the walls of a University to 
remember. There is much learning by students, both 
undergraduates and postgraduates, that goes on within the 
walls of the University and it is, in many ways, a matter of 
                                                                
2 ibid 335. 
3 ibid 336. 
4 Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Reform: Reshaping The British 
Constitution (3rdedn OUP; Oxford 2008) Foreword. 
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great shame how much of it never finds its way out. The 
Review of Law, Crime and Ethics strives to show the best of 
student scholarship within the Law School at the University 
of Manchester – which also incorporates the disciplines of 
criminology and medical ethics. This third issue of the 
Review, along with preceding issues, ultimately demonstrates 
all that is good about the community at the University of 
Manchester. Academics, students and practitioners coming 
together on a project that simultaneously demands and 
celebrates the hard work of those starting out in the law. 
Amongst these pages you will find articles on topics ranging 
from the proposed Common European Sales Law to the 
relationship between gender and crime. I hope you find 
them as enjoyable to read as I did. 
I have reserved the most important issue until last: the 
settling of debts of gratitude. In producing this Review I have 
accrued many such debts to far too many people than I could 
possibly mention here. Those mentioned here are simply 
those who are due the most. Firstly, all the members of the 
editorial team have been committed, diligent and survived 
my, at times, extensive e-mailing. I hope many of them 
continue to work on the Review and I wish the best of luck to 
those moving onto new challenges. In particular, I would like 
to offer special thanks to Emile Abdul-Wahab, the Deputy 
Editor of the Review. Emile has been involved with the 
Review since its inception andmuch of what is best about the 
Review can be attributed to him. Dinah Crystal OBE has 
been a great source of support to the Review and, moreover, 
tolerant of my common unplanned excursions into her office 
in order to ask various questions. Thanks are also due to 
each member of the faculty at Manchester who advised on 
articles. This year has seen greater involvement from the 
faculty than ever before and the quality of the Review 
increases exponentially with their increased involvement. 
Kirsty Hawksworth, our web designer, has been a fantastic 
help in getting the review „out‟ on the web – a much-needed 
expert for a near-luddite such as myself. Maureen Barlow‟s 
assistance throughout the year on various parts of the Review 
XIV 
is also genuinely appreciated – it is often criminally 
underestimated the cumulative contribution she make to the 
production of the Review. A huge thanks is also due to our 
sponsors, Jones Day. Without their support the Review 
would not be possible. In particular, it has been a pleasure to 
work with Diana Spoudeas and Keran Sandhu towards to 
successful competition of the Review. 
Lastly, next year's Review will be edited by Amelia 
McGrath. Amelia has been an outstanding member of the 
editorial team for this year's issue and I look forward, with 
full confidence, to a fourth issue which surpasses, no doubt 
by some distance, this one. 
Joe Tomlinson 
Editor-in-Chief 
August 2014  
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 Britain‟s Pursuit of a Codified Constitution 
Arvindh Rai1 
Abstract 
This article attempts to flesh out some of the most important 
arguments for and against the codification of the British 
constitution. They are considered in the context of two 
distinct forms of codification, the first being the restatement 
of the UK‟s existing constitutional arrangements and the 
second being the reform of the British constitution. At the 
heart of these arguments lie assessments of parliamentary 
sovereignty and its compatibility with a codified constitution. 
This article also addresses the international peculiarity of the 
UK‟s position as the only European State without a codified 
constitution and its relevance to the pursuit of a codified 
constitution for the UK. It its concluded that, as things 
currently stand, there is no sufficiently cogent reason for the 
UK to pursue a codified constitution. 
I. Introduction 
The constitutional reform programme of the first New 
Labour Government of 1997-2010 gave rise to tidal waves of 
reform, some of which are still working their way through 
Britain'sconstantly morphing constitutional landscape. 2  The 
notion of a codified constitution for the UK appears to have 
ridden these waves, with both Labour and the Conservatives 
having indicated their commitment towards the production 
of a codified constitution 3  and a British Bill of Rights 
respectively.4 The primary focus of this article is to assess 
                                                                
1 Thanksare owed to Amin Al-Astewani and Professor Rodney Brazier 
for editorial support. 
2 Robert Hazell, „The Continuing Dynamism of Constitutional Reform‟ 
[2007] ParlAff 3. 
3 Gordon Brown in a speech on new politics at Centre Point: “And let 
me say to you today, that Labour‟s manifesto will include our commitment 
to charting a course to a written constitution.” 
4 David Cameron in a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies: “The 
Conservative Party, under my leadership, is determined to provide a hard-
nosed defence of security and freedom.And I believe that the right way to 
do that is through a modern British Bill of Rights that also balances rights 
with responsibilities.” This proposal was subject to wide criticism – see  
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whether the codificationof the British constitution is a 
justifiable pursuit for the UK. This discussion will entail an 
outline of the main features of the British constitution, an 
assessment of its idiosyncratic nature and the implications of 
its, “essential unwrittenness”.5 
At the outset, it should be noted that the codification of 
the UK constitution presents the analysis of two distinct 
forms. 6  The first is the restatement of the UK‟s current 
constitutional arrangements and fundamental constitutional 
principles in a single document.7 Conversely, the codification 
of the constitution could also be seen as an opportunity for 
extensive constitutional reform in the UK.8 This article shall 
discuss the significance, merits and limitations of both forms 
of codification. 
II. Features of the British Constitution 
The most fundamental feature of the uncodified British 
constitution is arguably the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Traditionally, as defined by Dicey, it is 
Parliament‟s constitutional right above all other institutions to 
legislate, amend or repeal any law of the UK.9As Bogdanor 
noted, it is also the principal reason for the absence of a 
codified constitution. 10  A codified constitution curtails 
Parliament‟s legislative powers and is thus irreconcilable with 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.11 
                                                                                                                      
Peter Munce, „The Conservative Party and Constitutional Reform: 
Revisiting the Conservative Dilemma through Cameron‟s Bill of Rights‟ 
[2014] ParlAff 80. 
5 Michael Foley, The Politics of the British Constitution (Manchester 
University Press 1999) 186.  
6 Nicholas Barber, „Against a Written Constitution‟ [2008] PL 11. 
7 ibid 12. 
8 ibid 11-12; see also Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution 
(Hart 2009) 14. 
9 AV Dicey in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing 
Constitution (7th edn OUP 2011) 40. 
10 Bogdanor (n 8) 13; see also Vernon Bogdanor, TarunabhKhaitan and 
Stefan Vogenauer, „Should Britain have a Written Constitution‟ [2007] 
Political Quarterly 499, 501-502.  
11 This presupposes, foremost, that Parliament is sovereign. Criticism of 
this view is considered at pages 4-5. 
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The post-1997 constitutional reforms brought to light two 
other features of the British constitution, which are to be now 
considered. First, the disjointed manner and procedural 
failings of the reforms epitomised the British Parliament‟s 
cumulative, piecemeal approach towards constitutional 
matters.12 Second, and more significantly, one of the greatest 
paradoxes of the reforms was that the inherent issue of 
precisely what the British constitution is precisely never came 
to the fore.13 
To the likes of Griffith, the British constitution was purely 
political, consequent upon the balance of political power 
over time.14 Hennessey describes the constitution as a rich 
interplay of history and politics but makes no mention of the 
law.15 Johnson goes the furthest, lamenting the lack of legal or 
jurisprudential scrutiny as to what comprises the British 
constitution. He concludes that the British constitution“is not 
expressed or understood primarily in legal 
categories”. 16 Beatson however asserts that this is akin to 
sweeping aside the academic contributions of not only 
constitutional scholars but also the judiciary. 17  Finally, 
Bogdanor plainly sums up the British constitution on the 
basis of one fundamental rule: “What the Queen in 
Parliament enacts is law.”18 
                                                                
12 Rodney Brazier, „How Near is a Written Constitution‟ [2001] 52 
NILQ 1, 17.  
13 Stephen Hockman QC and Vernon Bogdanor et al, „Towards a 
Codified Consitution‟ (2010) 7(1) Justice Journal 74, 75. 
14 John Griffith, „The Political Constitution‟ [1979] 42 Modern Law 
Review 1; see also Jowell and Oliver (n 9) 3.  
15 Peter Hennessey, The Hidden Wiring: Understanding the British 
Constitution (Victor Gollancz Ltd 1995) 30; see also Jack Beatson, 
„Reforming an Unwritten Constitution‟ [2010] LQR 48, 49. 
16 Nevil Johnson, Reshaping the British Constitution (Palgrave Macmillan 
2004) 10; see also Beatson (n 15) 49. 
17 Jack Beatson alludes to scholars varying from AV Dicey to Geoffrey 
Marshall as well as decisions including Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 
807 and Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 
[1985] AC 374 (HL) – Beatson (n 15) 49.  
18 Bogdanor (n 8) 13. 
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III. Restatement of the UK‟s Constitutional 
Arrangements 
The first form of codification that shall be considered entails 
the formalised restatement of the UK‟s existing constitutional 
arrangements. Bogdanorputs forward this enterprise for three 
main reasons. Bogdanor‟s first assertion revolves around the 
post-1997 constitutional reforms of the Labour government.19 
He perceives these radical, far-reaching reforms as a 
precursory step towards the codification of the British 
constitution, seeing that many of our constitutional 
conventions have been legislated. 20  He thus perceives the 
codification process as a fitting consolidation of the 
piecemeal constitutional reforms since 1997.21 
Secondly, Bogdanor cites the decline of the historical and 
conceptual reasons behind the absence of a codified British 
constitution. He perceives the post-1997 constitutional 
reforms as a “constitutional moment”, which perhaps calls 
for the codification of the UK constitution.22  The Labour 
government in 2007 emphasised the need to determine what 
is meant to be “British” in the 21st century and indicated that 
a codified constitution may resolve this, hence further 
strengthening Bogdanor‟s belief that the UK may now be 
near a “constitutional moment”.23 Similarly, Bogdanor opines 
that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which stands 
as an obstacle to codifying the UK constitution, is in 
decline.24 This would mean that parliamentary sovereignty is 
no longer a dominant principle in the UK and thus 
constitutes an opportunity to redefine our constitutional 
principles and, accordingly, enact a codified constitution. 
                                                                
19 Bogdanor (n 8) 215; see also Bogdanor, Khaitan and Vogenauer (n 9) 
500. 
20 Hockman and Bogdanor (n 13) 75. 
21 Vernon Bogdanor and Stefan Vogenauer, „Enacting a British 
Constitution: Some Problems‟ [2008] PL 39. 
22 Bogdanor (n 8) 215. 
23 HM Government, „The Governance of Britain‟(Green Paper, Cm 
7170, 2007) 10, 40, 57, 62; see also Bogdanor (n 8) 216. 
24 Bogdanor (n 8) 215; Bogdanor and Vogenauer (n 21) 55-56. 
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Thirdly, Bogdanor laments the ambiguity behind what 
precisely the UK constitution entails. He likens it to the 
hypothetical scenario of someone joining a golf club only to 
be told that the rules are to be found in a myriad of 
committee and historical decisions and opines that this is 
precisely the position that UK citizens find themselves in 
today.25 
Conversely, Barber argues that the inherent ambiguity in 
parts of the UK constitution is indeed beneficial. 26  He 
highlights the ambiguous relationship between, firstly, the 
Westminster Parliament and the European Institutions and, 
secondly, the British Courts and the European Court of 
Justice. Barber points out that none of these legal and 
political institutions have unparalleled authority to determine 
the force of European laws and legislation. 27  He thus 
perceives this ambiguity as a beneficial compromise, i.e. an 
implicit “agreement to disagree”, and a framework in which 
conflicting views can co-exist.28 
Barber moves on to the feasibility of codifying the UK 
constitution and, specifically, the inherent difficulty between 
codifying what the constitution is and what it ought to be.29 
He opines that simply restating the constitution is impossible 
because it would inevitably incorporate some element of 
reform too.30Bogdanor and Oliver themselves acknowledge 
problems of scope (i.e., which constitutional principles and 
conventions are to be included in a codified 
constitution) 31 and authority (i.e., who has the authority to 
formulate a codified constitution). 32  All things considered, 
                                                                
25 Bogdanor (n 8) 216; see alsoHockman and Bogdanor (n 13) 74. 
26 Barber (n 6) 15. 
27 Barber (n 6) 16. 
28 Barber (n 6) 17. 
29 Barber (n 6) 12. 
30 Barber (n 6) 13. 
31 Bogdanor (n 8) 216-217; Dawn Oliver, „Written Constitutions: 
Principles and Problems‟ [1992] ParlAff 135, 146-148. 
32 Bogdanor (n 8) 217. 
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Barber sees little benefit in the enterprise of codifying the 
existing constitution.33 
It is submitted that Barber‟s final point regarding there 
existing little benefit in codification (or rather, the lack of it) is 
inaccurate. The benefits of a codified British constitution are 
obvious. Codification provides a clear and coherent account 
of existing constitutional arrangements. 34  Even Dicey, who 
was against codification, acknowledged the enviable position 
of countries that have their constitution enshrined in an 
overarching document.35 Baker perhaps states what Barber 
may have meant to say in a cogent and plausible manner: 
constitutional reform should take precedence over 
clarification of existing rules as the primary goal of 
codification.36 
Moving on to Barber‟s belief that ambiguity is beneficial 
in “certain circumstances” and “parts of constitutional law”,37 
the question that begs an answer is: what about parts of 
constitutional law where ambiguity is not beneficial? Barber 
himself admits that there are uncertainties in the UK 
constitution that need to be resolved, for example the reform 
of the House of Lords. 38  Barber‟s argument is only 
applicable to certain parts of the UK constitution. This 
undermines an otherwise astute point, especially in the 
context where the entire British constitution is to be 
addressed. 
We now address Bogdanor‟s assertion that declining 
parliamentary sovereignty constitutes an opportunity to codify 
the constitution. The irony of this argument lies in the fact 
that it undermines an alternative argument for the 
codification of the constitution: curtailing the unrestrained 
legislative powers of Parliament. To say that parliamentary 
                                                                
33 Barber (n 6) 12. 
34 Bogdanor, Khaitan and Vogenauer (n 10) 499. 
35 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(10th edn Macmillan Press 1959) 4. 
36 Sir John Baker QC, „The Unwritten Constitution of the United 
Kingdom‟ (2013) 15(1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 4, 19. 
37 Barber (n 6) 15. 
38 Barber (n 6) 18. 
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sovereignty is in decline implies a shift towards legal 
constitutionalism, which weakens the case for codification of 
the constitution, thus rendering Bogdanor‟s point self-
contradictory. 
The crux of the argument against codifying the existing 
British constitution revolves around its feasibility. The 
problems of scope and authority are admittedly daunting. 
Nonetheless, as Bogdanor noted, there is no reason to 
believe they are unconquerable. 39  However, it would be 
premature to make any conclusion at this stage without 
considering, perhaps, a more preferred attitude towards 
codification: reform of the UK constitution. 
IV. Reform of the British Constitution 
Lord Scarmanadvocated the reform of the UK constitution 
through codification for two reasons: the lack of existing 
checks and balances in the British constitution and the 
inadequate enforcement of rights of all members of British 
society.40Scarman lamented the loss of power by the state and 
the Lords to the Commons due to increased democratisation 
and the modern party system, which consequently handed 
the Commons supreme legislative powers. 41  He further 
lamented the meagre protection of the rights of minority 
groups in the UK and attributed it to the enjoyment of power 
by a parliamentary majority. 42  He therefore called for a 
codified constitution to shackle the legislative power of the 
Commons and secure the legal protection of the minorities. 
Barber, conversely, argues that the shift towards legal 
constitutionalism has already occurred in the form of political 
and legal threats to parliamentary sovereignty (e.g., European 
Union membership and devolution), rendering 
Scarman‟sargument archaic. 43  Baker further suggests that 
                                                                
39 Bogdanor (n 8) 230. 
40 Lord Scarman, „Why Britain Needs a Written Constitution‟ (1993) 19 
Commw L Bull 317, 319. 
41 ibid 320-321. 
42 ibid 321-322. 
43 Barber (n 6) 13-14. 
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judges are unsuitable for policy-making authority which a 
shift towards legal constitutionalism would entail.44 
It is pertinent to note that Scarman made his assertions 
before the post-1997 constitutional reforms. We have now 
seen a radical shift towards legal constitutionalism in the form 
of enacted legislation (e.g., Human Rights Act 1998). This is 
notwithstanding existing parliamentary constraints prior to 
1997, e.g., European Union membership. The question that 
advocates of a codified constitution must thus answer is: are 
we in need of further reform, to the extent where codification 
of the constitution is the sole answer?45Indeed, there appears 
to be little need for suchextensive reform. Furthermore, the 
courts have recently recognised potential “constitutional 
legislation”, 46  and even indicated limits to parliament 
sovereignty. 47  This casts the perception of Parliament‟s 
unconstrained legislative powers in great doubt. Whilst we do 
not have the legal protection of a codified constitution, 
Parliament is sufficiently shackled to address Scarman‟s 
concerns: the adequacy of checks and balances in the UK 
constitution, and the protection of minorities. 
V. Conclusion: The Wider European Perspective 
We now consider if being the only European State without a 
codified constitution is an adequate reason for embracing 
codification. In this respect, it is submitted that 
incrementalconstitutional development possibly leading to 
the codification of the UK constitution is a better alternative 
than the conscious desire to codify the constitution because 
other countries have a codified constitution. Furthermore, 
the legitimacyof any constitution is only as good as its content 
and the sacrosanct regard and respect accorded to it by its 
                                                                
44 Baker (n 36) 19-20. 
45 Barber (n 6) 18. 
46 Thorburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (admin) [62]-
[63] (Laws LJ). 
47 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 [102], [104], [159]. 
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governors.48 Whilst the Italian Constitutional Court‟s striking 
down of Berlusconi-backed legislation49  highlights the legal 
protection a codified constitution provides, the subversion of 
the USSR Constitutions of 1936 and 1977 by the Communist 
Party50 and the controversial 2004 Belarusian Referendum51 
indicate that a codified constitution is not necessarily 
impenetrable. Therefore, the burden is on proponents of a 
codified constitution to not merely show the benefits of 
codification but to prove that the UK is in need of an entire 
constitutional overhaul that justifies codification. 52  It is 
submitted that this contention is premature. As such, there is 
no sufficiently powerful reason for the UK to pursue a 
codified constitution as things currently stand. 
                                                                
48 Harold Laski, Liberty in the Modern State (Faber & Faber 1937) 76; 
Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (Yale University Press 1925) 103-
104. 
49 HadaMessia, „Court strikes down key parts of Berlusconi law‟ 
(CNN,13 January 2011) 
<http://www.cnn.com.sg/2011/WORLD/europe/01/13/italy.berlusconi.im
munity/index.html> accessed 4 November 2013. 
50 Oliver (n 31) 139. 
51 Carolynne Wheeler, „Belarus face EU wrath for disputed poll result‟ 
(The Guardian, 19 October 2004) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/19/eu.russia> accessed 4 
November 2013. 
52 Barber (n 6) 11. 
 The „Constitutional Straightjacket‟ and 
inadequate rights-protection: a proposal for 
limited judicial empowerment in the 
Human Rights Act 
Dalton Hale 
Abstract 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”) does not 
sufficiently protect fundamental human rights. In order to do 
so the HRA must command the status of a “sacred charter”, 
but parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom (“UK”) 
is a hindrance to adequate protection. The current scheme of 
rights-protection in the HRA compensates by means of two 
effective, but ultimately inadequate, forms of protection: a de 
facto „strike-down‟ power, in the form of declarations of 
incompatibility; and „moral entrenchment‟, which is founded 
on certain political disincentives that constrain outright repeal 
of the HRA. To remedy the shortfalls of these partial 
defences, the UK should follow the Canadian example and 
empower the judiciary with a limited, but de jure, strike down 
power. It is argued that such a re-distribution of power as 
between the judiciary and Parliament is not inconsistent with 
democracy, but admittedly is a limited abrogation of 
parliamentary sovereignty. It is however a necessary step if the 
rights contained within the HRA are to command the status 
of sacred rights beyond the reach of government; rights-
protection is better served when the judiciary acts as the 
guardian of individual rights and as a check on the powers of 
government. 
Introduction 
This essay, written before December 2012,1 aims to consider 
whether the Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”) 
sufficiently protects fundamental human rights. It begins in 
                                                                
1 And therefore before publication of: Commission on a Bill of Rights, 
A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (2011-12, Volume I); 
Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before 
Us (2011-12, Volume II). However, effort has been made to address some 
of the implications of this throughout. 
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Section I with the premise that in order to do so the HRA 
must command the status of a „sacred charter‟, and describes 
the „constitutional straightjacket‟ within which the HRA 
operates.Section II explains how the current scheme of 
rights-protection in the HRA compensates by means of two 
effective, but ultimately inadequate, forms of protection: a de 
facto „strike-down‟ power and „moral entrenchment‟. Further, 
in Section III, it will challenge the view that a re-distribution 
of power as between the judiciary and Parliament is 
inconsistent with democracy and make a brief comparative 
analysis culminating with a proposal to empower judges by 
means of a limited, but de jure, strike-down power. 
Section I 
I. Entrenchment and the „Constitutional Straightjacket‟ 
What distinguishes a Bill of Rights from an ordinary rights-
protecting statute is that it includes “some attempt to 
entrench their provisions as an attempt to establish them as a 
form of higher or fundamental law”.2 This usually manifests 
itself in two ways: (a) by a degree of entrenchment, and (b) by 
conferring power on the courts to override ordinary 
legislation.3 
The effectiveness of this genus of rights-protection, it is 
submitted, stems from the public, judicial and parliamentary 
perception of the right-conferring instrument as a „sacred 
charter‟ beyond the reach of government. Such sentiment 
can be seen from Hanna J in the Irish case A-G v 
McBride:“…the constitution is a sacred charter not to be 
lightly, vaguely, or equivocally tampered with…. The rights of 
the people should not be obscured by the facile pen of the 
draftsman”.4 
                                                                
2 JosephJaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press 
1980). 
3 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? 
(2007-08, HL 165-II, HC 150-II) Ev 137. 
4 A-G v McBride [1928] 1 IR 451. 
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The central hindrance with which the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) must grapple, stems from Dicey‟s propositions of 
parliamentary sovereignty: no Act of the Queen-in-
Parliament may be held invalid by a court of law; no 
Parliament can bind its successors as to the form or content 
of subsequent legislation.5 Implicit within these propositions 
is the conclusion that if two Acts of Parliament conflict, the 
later statute will repeal the former; this doctrine has received 
judicial recognition. 6  It is clear then, that most traditional 
forms of entrenchment, or the conferral of judicial strike-
down powers, will plainly constitute a breach of 
parliamentary sovereignty. This is the constitutional 
straightjacket within which rights-protection in the UK must 
operate. 
Section II 
I. The HRA 1998: Core Provisions 
The HRA was enacted in a way that does not sacrifice the 
supremacy of Parliament. By allowing the HRA to be 
repealed in the ordinary way, it has been given no special 
legal significance. 7  This has been the source of much 
criticism.Of particular relevance is the view that the HRA is a 
merely “quasi-constitutional” piece of legislation that does 
not truly protect fundamental rights. 8  Indeed it is argued, 
along these lines, that the provisions of the HRA do 
encompass a degree of protection; the question is whether 
this is enough. 
                                                                
5 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (10thedn, Macmillan Education 1987). 
6 Vauxhall Estates v Liverpool Corporation[1932] 1 KB 733; Ellen 
Streets Estates v Minster of Health[1934] 1 KB 590. 
7 In principle, a simple majority in the House of Commons will be 
enough to force legislation through the House of Lords via the Parliament 
Acts of 1911 and 1949. Royal Assent is granted by constitutional 
convention. 
8 John Wadham, „Bringing Rights Half-Way Home‟ (1997) European 
Human Rights Law Review 141. 
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The HRA is an enabling statute, which incorporates 
Articles 2 to 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) into UK domestic law. The core provisions 
pertinent to the scheme of rights-protection in the HRA are 
sections 2, 3, 4 and 19. Section 2provides that when applying 
human rights law in a case, the judge must “take into 
account” the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). It is important to note that this does 
not mean that the ECtHR cases are binding on the judge.9 
More significantly, section 3contains an„interpretative clause‟, 
so that in human rights related cases, judges must interpret 
the law compatibly with the ECHR “so far as it is possible to 
do so”. In other words, the judge must not artificially 
construe or strain the meaning of the law in order to make it 
compatible with the HRA. 10  Section 4 introduces 
“declarations of incompatibility” and Section 19 in brief, 
imposes an obligation on Ministers to „flag-up‟ legislation 
enacted that is inconsistent with the scheme of rights-
protection in the HRA. It is submitted that these provisions 
have developed two mechanisms of protection for the HRA 
which this essay dubs respectively, a de facto „strike-down‟ 
power and „moral entrenchment‟. The existence and 
effectiveness of both are discussed in turn. 
II. The de facto „strike down‟ power:the interpretive 
clause and declarations of incompatibility 
If it is not possible to interpret legislation so as to be 
compatible with the ECHR, the courts can strike down 
legislation – if it is subordinate legislation. However, they 
have no power to strike down primary legislation, for to do 
so would infringe parliamentary sovereignty. The 
compromise made by the HRA is that the courts may instead 
make a declaration of incompatibility.11 Such declarations do 
                                                                
9 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 553. 
10 It is worth pointing out here that this puts some strain on the system of 
precedent in the UK, as lower courts can effectively overrule higher courts 
on the basis of section 3. 
11 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) s4. 
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not invalidate the law; they are designed to give a clear signal 
to Parliament that the particular legislation is incompatible 
with the HRA scheme of rights-protection and by implication 
should be brought into line.12 The Commission on a Bill of 
Rights expressed its settled view that section 4 strikes a 
“sensible balance” between the “ultimate sovereignty of the 
UK Parliament” and the “duty of courts to declare and 
enforce the law”. 13Indeed,this mechanism, in combination 
with the „interpretive clause‟, gives a significant degree of 
primacy to the ECHR and can be regarded as a de facto 
„strike-down‟ power. Nonetheless, it might be contended that 
this mechanism is still too weak and a de jure judicial power 
to override incompatible primary legislation might be 
regarded as a more effective enforcement mechanism. There 
is some bite to this argument, in that Parliament is under no 
legal obligation to take any notice of declarations issued by 
the courts. A rebuttal to this concern is that within the 
context of British constitutionalism the difference between 
the power to strike down legislation and the power to declare 
it incompatible with the Convention “may be merely a 
technical one”.14 For, as Lord Hoffmann has observed, "if the 
courts make a declaration of incompatibility, the political 
pressure upon the government and Parliament to bring the 
law into line will be hard to resist”. 15  Furthermore, if the 
Supreme Court issues a declaration of incompatibility and 
the government fails to respond, this is likely to trigger an 
application to the ECtHR. The applicant will then argue that 
their Convention rights have been violated and that the UK 
Government has nonetheless failed to remedy the violation. 
It is highly likely that the ECtHR would consequently find 
that Convention rights have been violated, resulting in the 
                                                                
12 Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4thedn, Oxford University Press 
2004) 47. 
13 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice 
Before Us (2011-12, Volume I) 35. 
14 Douglas Vick, „The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution‟ 
(2002) Texas International Law Journal 37. 
15 RtHon Lord Hoffmann, „Human Rights and the House of Lords‟ 
(1999) 62 MLR 159. 
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UK Government being subject to an obligation under 
international law to change the offending legislation in light of 
that ruling, adding even greater political pressure.16 
A pertinent example of the relative success of the system 
can be found in A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 17 where 10 appellants were detained under 
section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001, which provided for the indefinite detention without 
trial, and for the deportation of, non-British nationals 
suspected of terrorism. The judges in this case issued a 
declaration of incompatibility and three months later the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 repealed the provisions.18 
Unfortunately the case also represents the shortfalls inherent 
within the current system. Indeed, Professor Rodney Brazier 
has described this as possibly an Act passed to try to get 
around the declaration. 19  The new legislation, which 
introduces „control orders‟, has been described by Amnesty 
International as “a grave threat to human rights and the rule 
of law in the UK”, 20 which suggests that the effect of the 
section 4 declaration in this instance was completely 
undermined. 
Another shortfall of the current system, as expressed by 
Professor Bogdanor in a 2006 lecture, is that it “might work 
in peaceful times, but in times of moral panic, Parliament 
and government might simply ignore a declaration of 
                                                                
16 Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights 
Act (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
17 [2004] UKHL 56. 
18 See also: R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners[2003] EWCA Civ 814; Blood and Tarbuck v Secretary of 
State for Health(unreported); R (on the application of Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department[2002] UKHL 46; 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department[2002] EWCA Civ 158. 
19 Email from Professor Rodney Brazier to author (16 November 2012). 
20 Amnesty International, The Prevention of Terrorism Bill: A grave 
threat to human rights and the rule of law in the UK (AI Index:EUR 
45/005/2005, 28 February 
2005)<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR45/005/2005> accessed 
10 November 2012. 
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incompatibility”.21 Indeed, history has revealed that in times 
of crisis governments have “tended to overreact”.22 Thus, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that this de facto „strike-down‟ 
power, although generally effective, may fail to perform in 
certain circumstances. 
Unfortunately, there is another, more substantial, flaw in 
the equilibrium between the protection of fundamental rights 
and the retention of parliamentary sovereignty. Even if a 
declaration is made and the offending legislation remedied, 
the individual injustice in the particular case before the court 
remains unaltered, primarily because legislation is not 
generally retrospective in application. To cite an example, in 
Bellinger v Bellinger,23 Mrs Bellinger's victory in obtaining a 
declaration that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was a 
violation of her rights under Article 8 of the ECHR may have 
instigated the enactment of amending legislation,24 but it had 
no effect whatsoever on her petition that her marriage to her 
husband was valid. Claimants may therefore have no 
incentive to bring their claims to court, as there is no 
opportunity to overturn the law in their favour. The result is a 
multiplicity of un-litigated claims, and thus numerous 
unresolved rights violations. 
III. „Moral entrenchment‟: the HRA and section 19 
The second mechanism, „moral entrenchment‟, rests on the 
political disincentive to enact legislation contrary to what are 
perceived to be universal human rights. Section 19 HRA 
forces the heads of incompatible government initiatives 
above the parapet to face the furore of the electorate. The 
section sets out the obligations incumbent on Parliament 
when enacting new legislation by providing that a Minister of 
the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House must, before 
                                                                
21 VernonBogdanor, „The Judges and the Constitution‟ (Gresham 
College, May 2006) <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-
judges-and-the-constitution> accessed 15 November 2012. 
22 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2011). 
23 [2003] 2 AC 467. 
24 Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
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the second reading of the Bill, state that the provisions in the 
Bill are compatible with the ECHR. 25  If the Minister is 
unable to do so, a statement must be made to the effect that 
although incapable of making a statement of compatibility, 
the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed 
with the Bill. 26  Not only does this ensure that Parliament 
always takes ECHR rights into consideration when enacting 
new legislation, but it also means that politicians will be 
reluctant to use section 19(1)(b), which requires Ministers to 
expressly state when there is inconsistency – something which 
will undoubtedly be unpopular with the electorate.27 
This kind of political constraint also entrenches the HRA 
in a more general sense. Although the HRA is an ordinary 
Act of Parliament, “it has already acquired such prestige in its 
short life that, politically speaking, repeal is out of the 
question”.28 Indeed even before the enactment of the HRA, 
commentators recognised its political significance and the 
political disincentives which would make it unthinkable that 
“such a basic constitutional document could be overtly 
repealed”. 29  This is perhaps the most significant safeguard 
that the HRA has; it forms part of its „moral entrenchment‟. 
Although David Cameron has proposed, and the 
Conservative Party will promise again in its 2015 manifesto, 
to repeal the HRAand replace it with a British Bill of Rights, 
such a move might require the abandonment of Britain‟s 
international obligations to the ECHR, along with the vast 
body of case law that has firmly integrated the ECHR within 
English common law. Much care must be taken therefore, to 
avoid causing more harm than good. A sensible way forward 
                                                                
25 s19(a) HRA 1998. 
26 s19(b) HRA 1998. 
27 In fact this has only been used once – when introducing the ill-fated 
House of Lords Reform Bill, Nick Clegg was unable to make a statement 
of compatibility under section 19(1)(a)HRA in respect of the provisions of 
that Bill relating to the laws on entitlement to vote at House of Lords 
elections, including the rules which prevent prisoners serving sentences 
from voting. Mr Clegg nevertheless wished to proceed with the Bill. 
28 Cane, Administrative Law (n 12). 
29 Jaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights(n 2). 
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might be for any replacement statute to reflect the substance 
of Convention rights – there is nothing preventing additional 
„home-grown‟ rights then being integrated. It is crucial, 
however, that no less protection be provided under a new 
Bill. This suggestion is consistent with the conclusions of the 
Commission on a Bill of Rights.30 
For these reasons, it is not outright repeal that threatens 
the HRA 31  but rather the potential for its “gradual and 
surreptitious erosion” 32  by the implied repeal of its 
provisions. Section 19 may be incapable of militating against 
this kind of threat; implied repeals, insufficiently explained or 
overlooked by the Minister in charge of the Bill will likely 
pass by the electorate unnoticed. 
The upshot of all of this is that in the end the rights 
contained within the HRA may not always be “rights beyond 
[the] reach of government”.33 The importance of this point 
cannot be understated. According to Forest J of the Court of 
New Brunswick, the key psychological difference between, 
for example, the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights34 and the 1982 
Canadian Charter35 was the way that the latter was perceived 
by the judiciary and parliamentarians alike: it was seen to be 
beyond the reach of government. 
                                                                
30 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice 
Before Us (2011-12, Volume I) 30. 
31 Although, of course, it could be. David Cameron‟s proposals tell us 
that much, but he still aims to replace it with something of at least 
equivalent virtue. To make rights protection worse or indeed repeal and 
not replace the HRA would be very unlikely indeed. 
32 Jaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights(n 2). 
33Gérard La Forrest, „The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An 
Overview‟ (1983) 61 Canadian Bar Review 19. 
34 This endeavour was particularly unsuccessful. See Gerry Ferguson, 
„The Impact of an Entrenched Bill of Rights: The Canadian 
Experience‟[1990] Monash University Law Review 12. 
35 Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
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Section III 
1. The Judiciary, Parliament and Democracy 
Many who are loath to accept entrenchment of the HRA 
point out that such a change would amount to a 
constitutional re-distribution of power from the legislature to 
the judiciary. This, they contest, is not in the interests of 
democracy, as it is Parliament who is elected by the majority 
to govern, not the judiciary.36 
But if judges were to have a more significant role in 
human rights protection, would this necessarily be a bad 
thing? Would it even be inconsistent with democracy? The 
right of the majority to rule according to Majoritarian 
theorists is the embodiment of the fundamental value of 
democracy, 37  but Dworkin asserts that Majoritarian 
procedures are but one contributing factor towards the true 
value of democracy: equality. As such, Majoritarian 
procedures can be flouted in the interests of respecting the 
democratic conditions of equality. 38  One democratic 
condition could be that every citizen is entitled to the same 
rights equally, and that these should be firmly secured within 
the constitution. 39  Thus, if judges could invalidate 
incompatible legislation and as a result, provide that any 
reform that has the implicit support of the majority alone40 
cannot bypass an entrenched Bill of Rights.The re-
distribution of power is not inconsistent with, but furthers, 
democracy. It is also worth noting that the judges are subject 
                                                                
36 See discussion in Keith Ewing, „The Human Rights Act and 
Parliamentary Democracy‟ (1999) 62 MLR 79. 
37 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 
1999). 
38 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom‟s Law: The Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution(Oxford University Press 1996). 
39 For the moral case for this, based on social contract theory, see John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2003). 
40 At the exclusion of everyone that forms part of the minority. The 
dangers of Majoritarian democracy are particularly acute where there are 
indigenous minorities, see discussion in Geoffrey William GeorgeLeane, 
„Enacting Bills of Rights: Canada and the Curious Case of New Zealand's 
"Thin" Democracy‟ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 152. 
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to a democratically enacted list of rights, rather than being 
entirely free to develop the common law unconstrained by 
such a text.41 This acts as a sufficient limitation on judicial 
power. 
In any event, it may be questioned whether it is truly in 
the interests of democracy that the state is the omnipotent 
arbiter of its citizens‟ fundamental rights, when it is protection 
from state interference of those rights that a Bill of Rights is 
designed to protect.Perhaps it is best to assign roles to both 
Parliament and the Judiciary in the protection of ECHR 
rights, rather than putting rights-protection exclusively in the 
hands of one institution – it is worth remembering that it is 
only in the event of litigation alleging a rights-violation that 
the courts can intervene in order to articulate what those 
rights require in the context of a particular case; as such, the 
courts provide a “corrective mechanism” which forms a part 
of the system of rights-protection but “they are not, cannot 
and should not be the whole of that system”.42 
II. Proposal for additional protection: the Canadian 
experience 
The most significant aspect of the Canadian Charter is the 
fact that it puts into effect a “realignment of the balance of 
power” as between the legislature and the judiciary43 – the 
courts have been given the power to determine whether 
government can legitimately pursue its legislative policies, 
and may accordingly invalidate legislation that is incompatible 
with the Charter. 
Crucially for current purposes, the Canadian Parliament 
retains part of its legislative sovereignty by virtue of section 33 
of the Charter. This allows the Canadian Parliament to enact 
any law that expressly declares that the enactment operates 
“notwithstanding” a potential violation of the Charter. 
                                                                
41 Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights 
Act (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
42 ibid. 
43 Gerry Ferguson, „The Impact of an Entrenched Bill of Rights: The 
Canadian Experience‟[1990] Monash University Law Review 12. 
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However, its use may be limited by the practicalities of 
politics,44 as politicians will generally be reluctant to use it 
since they must expressly admit that their proposed 
legislation is in violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
something which would undoubtedly be unpopular with the 
electorate. 
This seems to be a particularly robust system of rights 
protection. Parliamentary sovereignty is left largely intact by 
including the possibility of express abrogation from the 
Canadian Charter, while the political reluctance to do so, in 
combination with the judicial power to strike down certain 
legislation, gives such rights the requisite “sacred” status. This 
is broadly similar the current situation in the UK, withsection 
19(1)(b)45 acting as the UK counterpart to section 33. Thus, 
the key reform proposal is that the UK courts should be able 
to declare any legislation unaccompanied by a section 19 
statement invalid. 46  The attraction of this proposal is that 
parliamentary sovereignty would ultimately be retained by 
virtue of section 19(1)(b) and government would only use it 
where absolutely necessary, through fear of public 
outrage.Yet where government fails to acknowledge the 
incompatibility, the courts would be permitted to conclude 
that Parliament has overlooked the human rights 
implications of the enactment and can therefore treat it as 
invalid. It is not a strike-down power in its traditional sense; it 
is more subtle and heavily circumscribed as it only applies 
when government does not comply with the basic 
requirements of section 19. One may ask what this proposal 
adds to the UK system, and may regard such a de jure 
judicial power as merely a declaration of incompatibility “on 
steroids” – but its significance is that it would militate against 
                                                                
44 Or, „moral entrenchment‟. 
45 Human Rights Act 1998. 
46 There was no appetite in the Commission report for conferring a 
power on the judges to strike down legislation. But there was also no 
consideration of this more limited kind of power – whereby Parliament 
can retain ultimate power. See The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK 
Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (2011-12, Volume I) 35.  
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the gradual and surreptitious erosion of the HRA, 
compelParliament to reform the law in accordance with 
section 19,47 and also allow the courts to remedy individual 
injustices. 
Conclusion 
Although there exist two substantial protection mechanisms 
in the HRA, there remain significant shortfalls in the current 
system. The de facto „strike-down‟ power is often 
undermined when Parliament „legislates around‟ declarations 
of incompatibility and further, such declarations do not allow 
individual injustices to be rectified. Further, „moral 
entrenchment‟, whilst militating against outright repeal of the 
HRA may fall short of safeguarding the HRA from gradual 
and surreptitious implied repeals which do not attract the 
critical eye of the electorate. By taking inspiration from the 
„Canadian experience‟, and empowering the judiciary with a 
limited, but de jure, strike-down power, it can be ensured 
that: a) the HRA is protected against gradual, implied repeals 
that may go unnoticed; b) where an implied repeal has been 
exposed by the court the government is compelled to 
adequately deal with it, and follow the section 19 mechanism 
correctly, rather than simply „legislating around‟ a declaration 
of incompatibility; c) individual injustices can be rectified; 
and d) the democratic conditions of equality are better 
respected. The proposal constitutes a limited48 abrogation of 
parliamentary sovereignty but is a necessary step if the rights 
contained within the HRA are to command the status of 
sacred rights beyond the reach of elective dictatorship; rights-
protection is better served when the judiciary acts as the 
guardian of individual rights and as a check on the powers of 
government. 
                                                                
47 Unless it chooses not to replace the invalidated legislation at all, in 
which case there will be a victory for human rights. 
48 Limited because Parliament can still expressly legislate contrary to the 
HRA if it uses section 19(1)(b) – it is only when this process is not used 
that this judicial power will be engaged. 




Germany is frequently lauded as an example both 
economically and socially, with its stable trade surplus, 
progressive industrial relations and a strong sense of civic 
duty. There is certainly much to be admired. However, one 
area which British politicians seem unwilling to seek 
inspiration from is the role a fair electoral system plays in 
creating these conditions. 
The British First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) System has received 
substantial criticism in recent years which gave rise to a 
referendum in 2011. 1  The referendum revealed public 
discontent with the present voting system, but also that the 
Alternative Vote was not the answer. 2  Modelled on the 
German constitution, I will propose a form of proportional 
representation, the Additional Member System. In part I, I 
will highlight the weaknesses of the UK voting system, before 
demonstrating in part II why a purely party list based system 
of proportional representation is not desirable either. In part 
III, I will endorse the German Additional Member System 
(AMS) as a compromise and remedy for FPTP‟s shortfalls. 
I. The First-Past-the-Post System 
In this section I will discuss how FPTP ensures a close 
connection between voters and the electorate, and its 
historical effectiveness for small constituencies.In today‟s 
multicultural society, however, it is reductive, 
unrepresentative and leads to overly powerful governments. 
                                                                




used-to-elect-MPs (accessed 14/04/2014). 
2 Electoral Commission (2011) Referendum on the voting system for 
UK parliamentary elections: Report on the May 2011 referendum. 
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Under FPTP voters mark an „X‟ against a single candidate 
on the ballot paper.3 In order to win, a candidate must collect 
more votes than any other candidate in the constituency. 
Hence, a plurality of votes is needed, not a majority. The 
very name of the voting system is therefore misleading, as it 
appears to require the winner to meet a certain threshold. 
Those who support FPTP emphasise that it is a simple voting 
system that rarely results in hung parliaments and produces 
one-member constituencies with a potentially strong link 
between Members of Parliaments (MPs) and constituents. 
However, FPTP regularly produces disproportionate 
results at general elections. Governments can be formed with 
a comparatively small proportion of the popular vote and can 
even form a majority with less overall votes than the 
opposition. Until the last election, all governments since 
World War II have been formed by single parties that gained 
less than 50 per cent of the vote4. On two occasions, in 1951 
and 1974, the dominant party in the House of Commons has 
earned fewer votes than the runner up. In the general 
election of 2001 Labour won 64 per cent of the seats in 
Great Britain on 42 per cent of the votes cast. The turnout at 
the election was 59 per cent, so the vote for Labour 
represented only 25 per cent of the registered voters.5 This 
raises questions about the legitimacy of government and has 
discouraging effects on the electorate. In the following 
paragraphs I will discuss how these discrepancies, 
demonstrating a relatively low effective vote, result in „wasted 
votes‟, entry barriers to parliament for independent 
candidates,smaller parties, and a low election turnout. 
On 6 April 2010, the Electoral Reform Society estimated 
that of the 650 constituencies, 382 (59%) were „safe seats‟ for 
                                                                
3 Martin Linton and Mary Southcott, Making Votes Count:The Case for 
Electoral Reform(Profile Books Ltd1998) 134. 
4 Dawn Oliver,Constitutional Reform in the UK(Oxford University 
Press 2003) 138. 
5 Electoral Commission Election 2001. The Official Results. (London: 
Politico‟s, 2001) 220. 
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individual parties.6 Constituents who are not supporters of 
the prevailing party in their area have virtually no chance of 
making their vote „count‟. Likewise, voters backing the 
dominant candidate might feel that their ballot papers merely 
act as increasing an already large majority. Shifting opinion 
can also be easily exaggerated through considerable swings in 
seats from one major party to another. Landslide majorities 
might not closely reflect choices made by the electorate. 
Once elected with an extensive majority, the party in 
power may neglect opinion in Parliament and among the 
electorate. Smaller parties are generally precluded from 
Parliament aside from those with a strong footing in a 
particular region such as Plaid Cymru in Wales or, lately, the 
Green Party in Brighton. Niche parties with a fairly even 
geographic distribution of supporters, on the other hand, 
have dim prospects of entering the House of Commons. 
Independents tend to have little hope of election; prominent 
exceptions include George Galloway and Dr Richard Taylor. 
This limits the variety of voices in Parliament and silences 
those who do not endorse one of the major parties. 
In constituencies where the majority of the electorate did 
not support their MP in the election, voters can feel 
unrepresented in Parliament and a sense of alienation and 
injustice amongst disenfranchised sections of the electorate 
emerges.7 This disempowerment of voters reflects badly on 
the turnout. Elections in Britain compare unfavourably with 
other EU countries: the general election in 2010 had an 
unusually high turnout of 65.3 per cent, 8  whereas the last 
German national election in 2009 noted a turnout of 70.3 
                                                                
6 Electoral Reform Society (2010) <http://www.electoral-
reform.org.uk/safe-seats/>accessed 17 April 2013. 
7 Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK(n 4) 133. 
8 John Walton „Election 2010: Turnout mapped‟ BBC News (10 May 
2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8672976.stm> 
accessed 16 April 2013. 
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per cent.9 This outcome reflects previous years, when British 
participation tended to be even lower and German turnout 
higher. Although this may be attributed to factors such as 
trust in government, the competition between parties, media 
coverage and apathy in respect of voting as civic duty,10 the 
peculiarities of the British FPTP itself appear to negatively 
impact voter turnout. 11  Other forms of proportional 
representation do not have the same setbacks. 
II. Proportional Representation 
As the term suggests, „Proportional Representation‟ (PR) 
means that the purpose of the electoral system is to ensure 
that each party wins a proportion of seats in the elected body 
that closely reflects their popularity with voters,enhancing 
fairness between the parties. 12  Many Western European 
countries, for instance, adopt party list systems, whereby 
voters select one party list with a given order of candidates 
(closed-list system) or rank the listed candidates according to 
their preference (open-list system). 
A pure form of PR, however, would be unlikely to enjoy 
wide support in the UK. Party list systems generally require 
dividing the country into bigger regions (or even the entire 
country, as in the case of Israel and the Netherlands), as 
opposed to the relatively small constituencies in the UK. 
Each of these constituencies is provided with a number of 
seats usually depending on its population and the parties 
submit lists with their candidates. Although independents are 
allowed to run without party endorsement, again, in practice 
they have little chance of being elected. 
                                                                
9 BildungszentralefürpolitischeBildung (2009) 
<http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/wahlen-in-
deutschland/55588/nach-bundeslaendern>accessed 14 April 2013. 
10 Catherine Bromley, JohnCurtice and BenSeyd, „Political engagement, 
trust and constitutional reform‟ in A Park et al (eds) British Social 
Attitudes: The 18th Report (Sage, 2001). 
11 Electoral Commission Election 2001. The Official Results. (Politico‟s 
2001) 13. 
12 Dawn Oliver,Constitutional Reform in the UK(n 4) 133. 
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One consequence of this feature is that the party list 
system increases the distance between the elected 
representative and the constituency. Unlike FPTP, there is 
no easily identifiable MP for one region with the same direct 
relationship to the electorate. This would abolish the concept 
of the „Constituency MP‟, which is deeply embedded in the 
political culture of Great Britain 13  and perceived as an 
important link between Westminster and local communities. 
Furthermore, closed-list systems transfer considerable 
patronage and power to the party leadership, who select and 
rank their candidates. This system limits voters‟ choices and 
allows unpopular candidates to merit from the party label. 
Although open and partially open lists allow for a greater 
choice and more personal vote, their effectiveness depends 
on the size of the list.A long list with about twenty names 
requires the voter to be familiar with all the candidates in 
order to express a preference and would tempt the party 
leadership to recommend candidates, which would 
undermine the objective of the exercise. 
In sum, pure party list systems enable a highly effective 
vote by placing at least one, and potentially several, 
representatives of one‟s preferred party in Parliament. This 
would decrease the amount of “wasted votes” 14  and 
potentially encourage turnout; however, it would sever the 
direct relationship between the voter and the MP. 
Furthermore, this variant of PR would still be unfair to 
independents and potentially result in a multiplication of 
parties causing a ruptured parliament.15 
                                                                
13 John Curtice and Ben Seyd, Wise after the Event? Attitudes to Voting 
Reform Following the 1999 Scottish and Welsh Elections(Constitution 
Unit 2000). 
14 Stephen Fisher „The Wasted Vote Thesis: West German Evidence‟ 
(1973)5(2)Comparative Politics 293. 
15 John Curtice, Stephen Fisher and Laurence Lessard-Phillips, 
„Proportional Representation & the DisappearingVoter‟ in British Social 
Attitudes, 23rd Report (Sage Publications 2007) 129. 
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III. The German Additional Member System 
The Additional Member System (AMS) currently used for 
Bundestag (national Parliament) elections in Germany 
attempts to marry single member constituencies with 
proportional representation, and provides both a remedy for 
the weaknesses and a combination of the strengths of both 
FPTP and PR. The German example appears useful, as 
Germany is a Western European democracy of comparable 
size and similar socio-economic structure to the UK. 
Furthermore, the AMS has been the electoral system of 
choice for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and 
the Greater London Assembly, showing its compatibility with 
British political culture. 
The growing use of the AMS across the globe16 supports 
the claim that this system provides the “best of both 
worlds” 17 : locally, it ensures a direct relationship between 
constituents and their representatives, while nationally it 
ensures parties enjoy a share of power which is proportionate 
to their share of the vote. The nature of the electoral system 
combines the different perspectives of the negotiating parties 
in post-war Germany. The Western allies endorsed a 
majoritarian system, which featured their own MP-constituent 
nexus. The Länder (regional) governments in contrast, which 
had to design their own electoral laws, unanimously 
advocated proportional representation. 18  These conflicting 
principles are not just represented in the general framework 
of the German AMS, but also in the specifications of the 
system. 
Under AMS, each voter is awarded two votes – one for a 
candidate, and one for a party. In the style of FPTP, each 
constituency returns a single candidate. The votes for the 
                                                                
16 UK, New Zealand, Mexico, Bolivia and Lesotho. 
17 Robert Johns,AMS in Germany – and in Britain(Democratic Audit) 
<www.democraticaudit.com/download/C-German-AMS.doc> accessed 14 
April 2013. 
18 EckhardJesse, „The electoral system: More continuity than change‟ in 
Ludger Helms (ed)Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal 
Republic of Germany(Macmillan2000). 
2014] ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM 29 
party list are then divided amongst the party‟s candidates and 
added, in addition to their constituency seats, to their 
number of seats in Parliament. These are the “additional 
members”.19 
In Germany this translates into two categories of seats in 
the Bundestag: 50 per cent of the MPs are selected in single-
member constituencies; the remaining 50 per cent are 
derived from party lists. Similarly, electors are awarded two 
votes every four years: the first (Erststimme) for their 
preferred constituency representative, the second 
(Zweitstimme) for a regional party list. The list element 
serves to counteract the disproportionality inherent in the 
constituency component. 
In the paragraphs below I will outline how the German 
AMS allows for a wider variety of voices in Parliament 
without providing a stage for radical movements. 
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the AMS increases 
gender diversity, and creates stable and efficient 
governments. 
Before the 2011 referendum, proponents of FPTP 
regularly argued that a move away from our existing voting 
system would carry the danger of inviting extremist parties 
into the legislature. Under Germany‟s AMS, a party has to 
gain at least 5 per cent of the popular vote to access the 
Bundestag, even if it is unsuccessful in securing any directly 
contested seats. This feature of the German electoral system 
was introduced to eliminate fringe movements, which 
spawned during the Weimar Republic, whilst enabling 
inclusion of smaller parties. The pro-business Free 
Democrats, the Greens and the Left Party usually meet this 
threshold.20However, when the NPD, an extremist right wing 
party, loomed in 1969 it was obstructed from entering the 
                                                                
19 Electoral Reform Society (2010) <http://www.electoral-
reform.org.uk/additional-member-system/> accessed 14 April 2013. 
20 Leon Mangasarian,„How Germany‟s Election System Works: What to 
Watch for Tomorrow‟ Bloomberg(25 September 
2009)<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBSH
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Bundestag by not meeting the minimum threshold. Even if 
extremist parties should overcome the 5 per cent hurdle, this 
can serve to galvanise the centre parties and force them to 
address extremist trends with policy, since fringe movements 
are generally a symptom of deeper entrenched problems in 
society, such as youth unemployment or increasing class 
divides. 
A major concern in the UK in recent years has been the 
disproportionately low number of women that have been 
elected into office.21 After the general election in 2010, only 
22 per cent of MPs were women.22 This is because parties 
face a dilemma in the selection process and must deliberate 
between selecting the candidate they think potential 
supporters are more inclined to support – traditionally the 
middle-aged white male – or to be unbiased and risk losing 
the constituency. Consequently, the marginal representation 
of women in elected bodies may result in a negative effect on 
turnout, because the concerns and perspectives of female 
voters will not be adequately addressed. 23  In Germany, 
female representation in Parliament totalled 32.8 per cent 
after the last election in 2009.24 Although this still falls short 
of equality, it is 10 per cent higher than in Britain and shows 
that AMS with its list component facilitates the selection and 
election of more women. This is supported by evidence from 
the Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies, which have 
achieved better women‟s representation compared to 
Westminster.25 
                                                                
21 John Morrison, Reforming Britain. New Labour, New Constitution? 
(Reuters 2001). 
22 House of Commons Information Office Factsheet M4,„Women in the 
House of Commons‟(House of Commons 2010). 
23 Fiona MacTaggart, Women in Parliament: Their Contribution to 
Labour‟s First 1000 Days (Fabian Society 2000). 
24 BildungszentralefuerpolitischeBildung (2011) 
http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/gender/frauen-in-
deutschland/49418/frauenanteil-im-deutschen-bundestag(accessed 15 April 
2013). 
25 The Review of Voting Systems, Cm. 7304 (2008) <http://www.official 
documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7304/7304.asp>accessed 14 April 
2013. 
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The most frequent argument against AMS is that it will 
produce weak and unstable coalition governments, which 
outweighs discrimination against small parties and their 
supporters in the UK‟s electoral system. As with the current 
government, voters would regularly have to accept a 
combination of parties they did not vote for and a policy 
patchwork that was not proposed to them. However, this 
does not need to be a burden; in the Federal Republic of 
Germany coalitions have been the norm for most of the post-
World War II era. They invariably included at least one of 
the two main parties (the SPD or the CDU/CSU) and the 
FDP (the small liberal democratic party) or the Green Party. 
Prior to each election, the FDP and the Greens respectively 
stated which other party they would form a coalition with and 
set out their conditions for joining this party. Whilst the SPD 
and the CDU/CSU name „chancellor-candidates‟, the smaller 
parties generally do not propose a candidate, as it is very 
unlikely for them to be elected. Alternatively, they name one 
or two politicians who will lead their parties‟ campaign and 
will usually receive one of the most important ministerial 
posts if the party gets elected. 
If both the small and main UK parties affirmed their 
preferred coalition partner, or the terms on which they would 
join or include another party, then the British public would 
know what they were deciding for (or against) when making 
their cross on the ballot paper. 
The argument that one-party governments are more 
desirable is often based on the perception that they are strong 
and effective, compared to weak and indecisive coalition 
governments. 26  However, a single-party government is not 
inherently either strong or effective. From 1974 to 1979 the 
Labour government did not accomplish their policies of 
defeating inflation and rebuilding the economy; however they 
only enjoyed a narrow majority after the second election of 
1974. This government was not only ineffective but also 
                                                                
26Michael Dummett, Principles of Electoral Reform(Oxford University 
Press 1997) 178. 
32 REVIEW OF LAW, CRIME AND ETHICS [Vol 3:23 
indecisive, reversing its policies of high public expenditure 
and adopting austerity measures. 27  Interestingly, the 
subsequent Conservative government demonstrates the 
dangers of the other extreme. In terms of adopting legislation 
and presenting strong leadership, the „Iron Lady‟s‟ 
governments certainly succeeded. But what if we do not 
understand „strong government‟ in terms of determination 
and resistance to pressure and criticism? If we acknowledge 
the Thatcher government‟s close proximity to 
authoritarianism28 and lack of accountability, this era might 
quickly turn it into a case for coalition governments. A 
government that possesses a secure majority under the 
current system tends to be insensitive to concerns from 
inside Parliament. Only its own backbenchers might be able 
to have some impact but the concessions to prevent a 
backbench revolt are likely to be marginal. The Thatcher 
government, for instance, was able to adopt the poll tax, 
privatise the water industry and execute other unpopular 
policies during their legislative period. 
Despite this, some people still maintain that a coalition 
would result in patchwork policies and instability but this is 
less problematic than it appears. In reality, voters do not 
endorse every single policy of their preferred party and might 
even welcome a considerable number of points in the 
programme of the rival party.29 This also helps to eradicate 
unpopular and controversial policies that are mixed into a 
mainstream party‟s manifesto. 
Against the current coalition government‟s initial 
difficulties and deep controversies about the introduction of 
tuition fees, it is not less effectively functioning than previous 
governments. Under the Cameron/Clegg leadership, earnings 
                                                                
27 Michael Artis et al „Social democracy in hard times: the economic 
record of the Labour government 1974-1979‟ (1992) 3(1)Twentieth 
Century British Century33. 
28 Bob Jessop et al „Authoritarian populism, two nations and 
Thatcherism‟ (1984) 147New Left Review 32. 
29 Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government (Penguin Books, 
1976) 305. 
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have caught up with inflation and unemployment fell below 
seven per cent for the first time in five years, a remarkable 
achievement for a “weak” coalition government.30 
Similarly, it would be unjustified to characterise the 
coalition governments derived from AMS as unstable. 
Between 1949 and 2013, Germany saw only eight 
Chancellors, who were (with the potential exception of Kurt-
Georg Kiesinger) powerful statesmen in their own ways. 31 
Every government or Parliament existed at least three years 
whilst in Britain there were 14 Prime Ministers, including 
three parliaments which did not survive even two years. 
IV. Conclusion 
Rather too much than too little stability then seems to be a 
weakness of the German system. Yet the 1989 election 
completely replaced the government as a result of the 
electorate‟s dissatisfaction just as it happened in Britain in 
1997, however, without the exaggerated discrepancy, which is 
characteristic for FPTP. More importantly, the German 
electoral system has not only contributed to stable but also, 
altogether, excellent government. In terms of economic 
success, a liberal and tolerant regime at home and a peaceful 
and responsible foreign policy, it is hard to find a country of 
similar size and influence, which has performed better or as 
well over the last 60 years. Particularly in view of Germany‟s 
preceding history, it is a great achievement. It would be 
unreasonable to credit all this to the Additional Member 
System, however, there is powerful evidence to suggest that 
adopting a similar system in the UK would carrymany of its 
benefits.
                                                                
30 BBC, „ONS: After six years, wage rises match inflation‟ (16 April 2014) 
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31 Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System (The 
Jenkins Report) Cm 4090 (October 1998)Ch 4. 
 The Nature of the State 
Xian Liang Yuen 
Abstract 
The determination of statehood is structured around legal 
and factual approaches. Rather than arguing for the sole 
domination of either approach, this article aims to show that 
attainment of statehood is a process involving both law and 
fact. This article shall examine the Montevideo Convention 
and other criteria perceived to be essential for gaining 
recognition in order to underline how law and facts lead to 
state recognition. 
I. Introduction 
When ascertaining whether an entity is a state there are two 
main methods: statehood can be determined by reference to 
facts1  or by law.2  It is submitted that neither of these two 
approaches can single-handedly account for explaining 
statehood in international law. This paper aims to study these 
methods in order to show that the nature of the state is a 
complex amalgam of legal and factual implications, and that 
the complete disregard of either one will result in a circular 
understanding of statehood. Much of the discussion of 
statehood revolves around the idea of state recognition; both 
the conditions for granting recognition and the consequences 
to be attached from it are controversial. The article begins 
with a discussion of the prevalent theories of recognition 
followed by an examination of the Montevideo Convention 
and other criteria for recognition. 
                                                                
*The author would like to thank Professor Jean d‟Aspremont, Philip 
Burton and Janus Lim for their helpful comments. Any errors found in 
this article are made by the author only. 
1 Formation of a new state is largely a question of fact rather than law: 
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, Vol 1 (1st edn) 264; Law is 
secondary to factual decisions: Carl Schmitt, Political Theory: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty(University of Chicago Press 1985) 
31. 
2 Hans Kelsen, „Der soziologische und der juristischeStaatsbegriff - The 
Sociological and Legal Concept of the State‟(1928) ScientiaVerlag 1. 
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II. Constitutive and Declaratory 
There are two main theories regarding the consequences 
attached to state recognition: the constitutive and declaratory 
theories.3 The declaratory theory places emphasis on the pre-
existing state of affairs. Recognition is understood as a 
willingness to enjoy diplomatic relations rather than a 
statement about the nature of the entity in question. 
However, facts alone cannot speak for themselves and must 
be interpreted through legal processes before legal 
consequences can arise. As Kelsen noted, a purely 
declaratory view will “confuse”facts with law.4 
The constitutive theory holds that an entity attains 
statehood only after other states on the international plane 
decide to recognise it.5 However this stance opens the door 
for subject identification to become a political process. Since 
states are free to grant recognition as they see fit based on 
whatever reasons or incentives they have, the law seems to 
have no control over the determination of the primary legal 
subjects. However as noted above, the purely legal approach 
will not fly. The nature of the state has to be studied wearing 
the lens of both theories if one is committed to 
understanding statehood. 
III. The Montevideo Convention 
This section covers two criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention (the „Convention‟) in order to argue that, despite 
having this legal conception of statehood, the nature of the 
state is in fact an amalgam of the legal and factual elements. 
Despite its many critics,6 the Convention is commonly used 
                                                                
3 Martin Dixon, R McCorquodale and S Williams, Cases and Materials 
in International Law(5th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 158. 
4 Hans Kelsen, 14 RCADI 1932/IV 309-310 (Recuil des Cours de 
l‟Academie de Droit International). 
5 Thomas Grant, „Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention 
and its Discontents‟ (1998-99) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
404. 
6 See generally, Grant (n 5); Jean d‟Aspremont, Participants in the 
International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in 
International Law (Routledge 2011). 
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as a starting point in the determination of statehood7 as it 
provides a succinct and convenient standard to assess 
whether a community is a state.8 Article 1 of the Convention 
notes that the state as an international person should possess: 
a permanent population; a defined territory; government; 
and capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
The criterion of having the capacity to enter into foreign 
relations means independence. 9  Independence in its plain 
meaning evinces the ability of a state to be able to dictate and 
determine its choices and not be subject to the will of another 
state. This translates into effective control –only then can a 
state have the capacity to engage in relations with other states. 
However, this creates difficulties. A country may be legally 
independent but factually not so long as another state 
contests its sovereignty. Taiwan, having already met the 
criteria in Article 1 of the Convention, is legally independent. 
However, since her independence and sovereignty are still 
disputed, Taiwan‟s status remains ambiguous. This criterion 
is also deemed problematic because the Convention 
construes it as a constitutive element of statehood but it can 
be argued that it is in fact a consequence of statehood. If a 
state withholds recognition, the entity in question will be 
deprived of diplomatic relations with that state. An excellent 
example is the case of Israel in relation to states contesting 
her statehood. Here we can see again that the Convention is 
not a straitjacket in the sense that it leaves states considerable 
discretion when choosing whether or not to recognise states, 
which downplays the need for an entity to meet a legal 
criterion to become a state. 
Another legal criterion is to have an effective government. 
It is impossible for any entities to communicate with other 
                                                                
7 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 111. 
8 Grant (n 5) 414. 
9 DapoAkande, „The Importance of Legal Criteria for Statehood: A 
Response to Jure Vidmar‟ (10 August 2013)<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
importance-of-legal-criteria-for-statehood-a-response-to-jure-
vidmar/>accessed 28 February 2014. 
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states if there is no functioning government. Rather than 
being „effective‟, it is a „functioning‟government that allows 
an entity to become a state – such is the nature of a state. 
History and current developments have shown that 
ineffective governments can be characteristic of states. 
Attempts by states to attract recognition by providing 
economic incentives (e.g., training of doctors and foreign 
direct investment) shows that statehood is not a depoliticised 
process. It appears that despite the efforts to construct a non-
political definition of statehood, public international law is 
unable to provide a purely legal determination. Hence it 
would be a fallacy to exclude facts (political or historical) that 
contribute to statehood. 
IV. Other possible criteria 
Recognition implies an undertaking by the recognising state 
that it will treat the entity in question as a state.10This essay 
will now move beyond the criteria of statehood articulated in 
the Convention to examine what motivates a state to 
recognise another entity and in the process of which, 
demonstrate that there are indeed both legal and factual 
criteria for recognition. The criteria to be analysed are i) 
illegality; ii) absence of competing claims; iii) self-
determination; and iv) economic and democratic credentials. 
A. Illegality 
There are situations where entities seek to achieve statehood 
by means of an illegal act –a process that is deemed to be in 
contravention of international law. The criterion of illegality 
is a barrier to recognition as shown by the international 
community‟s ethical unanimous rejection of Turkish 
Northern Cyprus‟claim to statehood. This example shows 
that only law, and not fact, creates a state. However, it is 
argued that facts and law can be both relevant in illegality. In 
this regard, there is the sterling example of the North Atlantic 
                                                                
10 Crawford (n 7) 144. 
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Treaty Organisation‟s (NATO) bombing of Yugoslavia, 
which was done despite the absence of atrocities and 
massacres at the point of bombing. Despite having the 
genesis of a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
Kosovo is not stumbled from doing what she seeks to achieve 
today – statehood. It is political and historical facts like these 
that allow Kosovo to emerge as a separate entity from 
Yugoslavia and begin to court recognition as a state, a legal 
process. 
B. Absence of competing claims 
According to the Restatement (Third), an entity must claim 
to be a state for it to be a state.11 According to state practice in 
secession, the legal status of this particular entity will remain 
ambiguous until the competing claims are relinquished. 12 
This is clearly a fusion of both factual developments and legal 
regimes working together to cement sovereignty of an entity. 
Geopolitical facts can be the decisive factor for recognition. 
Unlike Taiwan, Bosnia received recognition readily, which 
was ensured by the removal of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY)‟s claim to territorial integrity13  while 
East Timor was created with Indonesia‟s consent. 14  The 
geopolitical realties facing Taiwan are radically different from 
Bosnia and East Timor. Despite meeting the criteria in 
Article 1, 15  the translation for the Economic Cooperative 
Framework Agreement inked between China and Taiwan in 
2010 ( 两 岸 经 济 协 议 , 16 which translates to Economic 
                                                                
11 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third): the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, 201. 
12 Jure Vidmar, „Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition‟ 61 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361. 
13 Jure Vidmar, „The Importance of Legal Criteria For Statehood – A 
Rejoinder to DapoAkande‟ (EJIL: Talk!, 9 August 2013) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-importance-of-legal-criteria-for-statehood-a-
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14 Jure Vidmar, „Territorial Integrity and the Law of Statehood‟(2013) 44 
George Washington International Law Review135. 
15 Additional criteria are democracy and economic value to other states. 
16 Liǎng'ànJīngjìXiéyì. 
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Agreement Between Two Shores)17 illustrates how competing 
claims remains an impediment to Taiwan‟s international 
recognition despite compliance with the Convention. The 
removal of this impediment is necessary for a legal process of 
recognition to be forthcoming. 
C. Self-determination 
Claims to self-determination centre upon the hopes of 
peoples within a particular entity for independence, which is 
usually fuelled by nationalist fervour. State practice has 
shown that recognition has been given on such ground and 
was recently held not to be in contravention to international 
law. 18  Indeed, some scholars claim that denial of self-
determination is contrary to juscogens.However, self-
determination‟s usefulness as a legal regime during the 
decolonisation era, where colonies could rely on it in order 
to pursue statehood, is unquestionable. Today, where the 
geopolitics have changed, self-determination has, to a large 
extent, lost its raisond‟être. Hence this is a legal regime that 
will not enable a state to unequivocally rely on in order to 
pursue statehood. 
The claim to self-determination has been relied upon by 
East Timor successfully,19 and it was invoked by Kosovo a 
few years ago.In the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice, the question to be considered was whether 
the declaration of independence was in accordance with 
international law. In order to answer this question, the court 
began by examining the relatively recent history of Kosovo,20 
to eventually conclude that the act did not contravene 
                                                                
17 Choice of “two shores” rather than states or names of the states reveal 
no recognition is given. 
18 Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010: 
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of 
independence in respect of Kosovo. 
19 Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, East Timor (Portugal v Australia) 
ICJRep 1995, 90. 
20 Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of 
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international law. A reason why the declaration of 
independence did not contravene international law was 
because Kosovo had self-governing elements in place which 
were enabled by the UNMIK regulation2001/9 of 15 May 
2001 on a Constitutional Framework for ProvisionalSelf-
Government. It is notable that self-determination did not 
make practical headway in Kosovo‟s case, which is for Serbia 
to relinquish her claim on Kosovo. However the main 
takeaway is that the declaration of independence is only 
necessary to the extent required to formalise statehood. For 
this reason, a legal regime alone will not be sufficient for a 
state to achieve recognition and additional factual credentials 
serving as incentives will be necessary for recognition. 
D. Economic and democratic credentials 
For an argument that formation of a state is largely factual, 
effectivité is deemed to be the dominant principle in gaining 
recognition. 21  Enhancing economic and democratic 
credentials are good strategies that states can adopt towards 
winning recognition thus bettering a state‟s external 
effectivité. 22  A reason why an entity has not received 
recognition could be that an impetus has not become 
apparent to the recognising state. This reason could come in 
the form of economic incentive. This is especially so if the 
two states have nothing in common –(e.g., cultural, 
geographical proximity or historical background). States that 
recognise the sovereignty of Taiwan are Pacific island-states 
and Caribbean island-states that have no immediate impetus 
to establish diplomatic links but have done so after fiscal 
negotiations and developmental training poured in. At the 
moment, the number of states recognising Taiwan is 
inversely proportionate to the economic and political clout of 
China and this is expected to widen. This reveals how 
                                                                
21 James Crawford, „The Criteria for Statehood in International 
Law‟(1976) 48(1)British Yearbook of International Law 93, 95. 
22 Professor d‟Aspremont mentioned this when musing on how Kosovo 
could better its external effectivité: d‟Aspremont and Liefländer (n 15) 18. 
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sensitively states can respond to incentives. Unsurprisingly, 
Kosovo has followed suit.23 With practical benefits, states can 
readily find a reason to extend recognition. Hence an entity 
that has met the Convention‟s criteria might have to rely on 
additional criteria to factually achieve what the Convention 
can legally affirm. 
Grant noted the accretion of state practice indicating the 
criterion of democracy as a pre-requisite to statehood. 24 
Crawford noted that states hesitated to recognise Guinea-
Bissau after its unilateral declaration of independence from 
Portugal, which was, in part, motivated by concerns over the 
undemocratic character of the new regime. Following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, democracy is unquestionably 
attached with greater importance. To recognise secessionist 
republics, the EU and the US required that the aspirants to 
statehood undertake democratic reform. Hence, it is 
generally the case that a government that is deemed 
democratic by the international community will enjoy greater 
international effectivité. Likewise, a democratically elected 
government typically enjoys stronger internal effectivité. 25 
However this will probably only hold true at the point or 
period when entities are seeking recognition as it is 
observable that illiberal democracies exist. Hence, a state 
need not be a true democracy in the ideal sense after it 
receives recognition, and it is also unlikely that its recognition 
as a state will be diminished. 
A quid pro quo thus exists at state level on the 
international plane. Even if it is not a quid pro quo, there has 
                                                                
23 Foreign Affairs Minister Hoxaj visited Singapore in January 2013 to 
make a request for recognition. He met the Minister for Law and Foreign 
Affairs, and discussed possible future collaborations on “diplomacy, 
education and urbanization”Ministry of Foreign Affairs, „Minister Hoxhaj 
in Singapore, seeks recognition of Kosovo‟ (29 January 
2013)<http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,1573> accessed 1 November 
2013. 
24 Thomas Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate 
and Evolution (Praeger 2007)94. 
25 Jean d'Aspremont, “Post-Conflict Administrations as Democracy-
Building Instruments”, (2008) Vol 9 Chicago Journal of International Law", 
15. 
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to at least be an impetus or qualifying reason (democracy) for 
a state to recognise a particular entity. From the point of 
seeking recognition to the result of attaining recognition, it is 
actually a process that begins politically and progresses to a 
legal act, ending as a legal fact. Hence constitutive and 
declaratory theories must be accepted as representative of 
state practice. 
V. Concluding remarks 
Recognition is motivated by facts that provide incentives or 
an impetus. In the same vein, historical and political facts 
could be stumbling blocks for recognition. In this vein, the 
law is but a means to cement the sovereignty of a state. While 
non-recognition and the absence or lack of recognition may 
be motivated by a refusal to accept the legality of another 
entity, it may also be a result of inaction due to the absence 
of an impetus that may come in the form of incentives; 
consequently, this speaks of the inconclusive nature of the 
legal regimes that purport to qualify statehood. If political 
facts render recognition to be necessary, convenient or 
purposeful, then there is no need for legal regimes. However 
the analysis does not stop here. Even if recognition begins as 
a factual process, what follows to cement recognition are legal 
acts that become legal facts. Hence the process of recognition 
is a progressive one that begins usually with facts favouring 
recognition, which then usher in the law that cements 
recognition. State practice also revealed that recognition is a 
highly discretionary act: therecognising state will decide 
whether to and when to recognise an entity as a state, 
therefore underscoring how crucial the facts that provide 
incentives or an impetus to bequeath recognition are. 
Whether there should be less discretion or flexibility is a 
non-issue because if states are sovereign, there should not be 
a curb on their discretion although this can worryingly mean 
ignoring (or approving) illegality. International law will always 
have a political element to it and the legal regimes of 
statehood will not be averse to it as well. What makes an 
entity a state will vary according to the era, geography, 
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history, and mutual benefits that the recognising state and the 
entity have between them, factors that all tie in with political 
facts. As a result, recognition, which is constitutive in nature, 
is also declaratory in nature. 
  




English courts are often required to grapple with the dilemma 
of medical decision-making on behalf of a young child in the 
situation where conflict arises between parental opinions and 
between the opinions of parents and healthcare professionals. 
The approach to these decisions focuses on the immediate 
best interests of the child as medical priorities. This essay 
seeks to argue that this approach is short sighted and narrow 
in the context of parental religious objections to treatment. 
The current approach can have wider long-term effects on 
families, and case studies of Re A (Conjoined Twins) and 
parental refusals from Jehovah‟s Witnesses will be used to 
illustrate this. In light of religious objections to treatment 
seemingly being dismissed by judges all too easily, this essay 
argues that a wider view of best interests must be embraced. 
I. Introduction 
This essay will demonstrate how the approach to medical 
decision-making on behalf of young children in England and 
Wales focuses on the immediate best interests of an 
individual.1 It is argued that this approach is short sighted and 
narrow, particularly when parental religious views come into 
conflict with the child‟s best interests. Theapplication of the 
best interests test, notwithstanding religious objections from 
parents, will therefore be the focus of this essay. Case studies 
of Re A (Conjoined Twins) 2  and parental refusals from 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses will be used as illustrations. It is 
submitted that the long-term wider effects on families as a 
whole should be awarded greater consideration. In order for 
the law to achieve this, it requires recognition that the best 
                                                                
1 Due to the parameters of this essay, competent children, or those of 
sixteen and seventeen years of ages, will not be discussed. 
2 [2001] Fam 147. 
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interests of a child are more than just medical interests. A 
wider view of best interests must be embraced in the context 
of religion, as it appears that some judges too easily dismiss 
objections stemming from this context. 
II. Best Interests as Medical Priorities 
In the overwhelming majority of situations, parents have a 
decisive role in medical decision-making on behalf of their 
children who are unable to express any views of their own. 
However, this is not always the case. The courts are 
sometimes required to grapple with the dilemma of medical 
decision-making when conflict arises between the parents 
themselves and the views of parental and healthcare 
professionals. It is evident from the existing case law that in 
these types of cases treatment decisions turn on an 
assessment of the child‟s immediate best interests. The 
immediate best interests appear to constitute what is best in 
terms of the child‟s medical condition. 
The benchmark of determining best interests was first 
considered in Re B. 3 This case concerned the court 
overriding parental refusal to consent to an operation that 
would remove an intestinal blockage from their child who 
suffered from Down‟s syndrome. The court ultimately 
rejected the argument that the views of responsible and 
caring parents must be respected. The decision to operate 
was made in the child‟s best interests, contrary to the parental 
views. Approvals may be sought from the Family Division of 
the High Court if parents refuse to provide consent.4 The 
best interests approach was confirmed in Re J (A Minor)5 
where it was stated by Lord Donaldson that “there is a 
balancing exercise to be performed in assessing the course to 
be adopted in the best interests of the child”.6 
                                                                
3 [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
4 Children Act 1989, s8. 
5 [1990] 3 All ER 930. 
6 ibid 938. 
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This approach continues to be adopted, as is evident from 
recent case law. 7It is clear, therefore, that there has been 
broad judicial endorsement of the best interests approach. 
This suggests that it is held as an appropriate standard andit 
still applies notwithstanding religious objections from a 
child‟s parents.8 However, whether this should be the case is 
questionable. 
The characteristics of the case law demonstrate, through 
the current approach to the test, that the child‟s immediate 
health is prioritised. It can be inferred that a best interests 
approach is the law‟s attempt to protect vulnerable 
individuals – namely, young children who lack the ability to 
make decisions for themselves. By focusing on immediate 
best interests, the child‟s medical condition is put at the 
forefront of the decision. Healthcare professional opinions 
are usually adhered to, and as Kearney notes, “[m]any 
doctors tend only to be guided by medical priorities.”9 
This approach can be viewed as consistent with 
professional guidelines and statutory authority: the GMC‟s 
requirement that the “primary duty is to the child”,10 and the 
Children Act which states that “the child‟s welfare shall be 
the court‟s paramount consideration”.11 When examining the 
courts‟ judgements, the outcomes have been achieving these 
aims. For example, in the above stated cases the medical 
condition of the child has always been prioritised. However, 
arguments that this approach is an appropriate standard are 
not always convincing and there are some inconsistencies. 
III. Inconsistency in the Law 
There is inconsistency in the law and the way in which the 
best interests test is applied which may suggest that some 
                                                                
7 An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842 (Fam). 
8 Re R [1993] 2 FLR 757. 
9 PJ Kearney, „Leukaemia in Children of Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Issues 
and Priorities in a Conflict of Care‟(1978) 4(1) Journal of Medical Ethics 
34. 
10 GMC, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice 
in Decision Making (2010) [90]. 
11 Children Act 1989, s1(1). 
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judges are more wary of religious than other objections. An 
illustration of this can be seen in Re T (A Minor),12 which 
concerned parental refusals to their child‟s life-saving liver 
transplant. They did not perceive the transplant as in their 
child‟s best interests. The parents, both healthcare 
professionals, fled the country in fear of intervention. The 
court ruled that the parental views should be accepted, 
despite these views conflicting with the medical priorities of 
the child.An explanation from the seemingly contrasting 
decisions concerning the endorsement of parental views was 
highlighted in the judgement of Waite LJ. He makes a clear 
distinction between cases where parental opposition is 
“prompted by scruple or dogma of a kind which is patently 
irreconcilable with principles of health and welfare widely 
accepted by the generality of mankind” and “highly 
problematic cases where there is a genuine scope for a 
difference of view”.13 
The inconsistency with this case and others is clear. Fox 
and McHale question this by asking, “…whether the…judges 
were right to be more receptive to the parents‟ objections in 
Re T”?14 Other possible explanations are that more weight 
was given to parental views since they were healthcare 
professionals. An additional explanation could be due to the 
complication of the parents having fled the country. 
Whatever the reasoning, the decision in this case is unusual. 
However, the case should not be dismissed as a one-off since 
it raises broader issues concerning the adequacy of our 
current framework. 15  Inconsistencies of this case in 
comparison to those that concern religious objections will be 
discussed below. The unusual outcome in this case, where 
parental views have been respected despite being contrary to 
medical interests, can be used to emphasise the narrowness 
of the way the best interests standard is applied. 
                                                                
12 [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
13ibid 254. 
14 Marie Fox and Jean McHale, „In Whose Best Interests?‟(1997) 60(2) 
Modern Law Review 703. 
15 ibid 709. 
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It has been shown that the policy underlying the law in its 
current guise, decision-making on the basis of immediate best 
interests, aims to protect the vulnerable. However, it will now 
be established that, as the law strives to meet this aim, the 
best interests approach can be perceived as short sighted and 
narrow, particularly when faced with religious objections 
from parents. 
It is suggested that the law should protect the vulnerable 
by looking further into the family unit. Case studies of Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) and the objections to blood transfusions 
from Jehovah‟s Witnesses will be used to illustrate that 
dismissing religious objections from parents, on the basis of a 
child‟s best interests, can have wider long-term effects on 
families as a whole. 16  It is argued not that religious views 
should always be imposed upon the child, but that a broader 
approach to medical decision-making should be adopted. 
IV. Re A (Conjoined Twins)17 
The case of Re A concerned a set of conjoined twins whose 
parents were devout Roman Catholics. Death was inevitable 
for the twins if they were not separated by surgery. Separation 
would give the stronger twin a very good chance of survival 
but would result in the death of the weaker twin. It would 
have been against the parent‟s religion to consent to this 
surgery. Despite parental refusal, the separation was 
permitted after balancing the interests of the twins and a 
defence under the doctrine of necessity was utilised. 
The best interests approach appears to be under pressure 
here. Freeman states how “[t]he Court of Appeal…concluded 
that the operation could not be justified as in the best 
                                                                
16 Due to the parameters of this essay only these two case studies will be 
analysed. However, there are other aspects of religious objections from 
parents that could have equally been examined. For example, refusals to 
the removal of ventilation (Re C [1998]1 FLR 384) or disputes about 
religious circumcision (Re J [2000] 1 FCR 307) could also have been used 
to illustrate the narrowness of the best interests approach. 
17 Re A (Conjoined Twins) (n 2). 
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interests of…the weaker twin. Since it was not in her best 
interests to die”.18 
It is obvious that the best interests of each twin were 
diametrically opposite. Hence, this suggests that taking this 
approach may have been inappropriate. It is narrow since the 
best medical interests of the stronger twin were prioritised. 
Wider issues should have been taken into consideration. For 
example, the emotional distress on the parents could have 
been awarded more respect by addressing values they 
regarded as highly important. As Hewson states, the court 
“…implicitly downgraded the doctrine of the sanctity of 
life.”19 
Re A emphasises that the court‟s view of decisions made 
on the basis of religious conviction is narrow, since the strong 
parental views were dismissed. Freeman asks the question, 
“did too much hinge upon the religion and culture of the 
parents?”20Gillion convincingly argues that in this case the 
court “should have allowed the parents to refuse medical 
intervention”,since the parents‟ moral reasoning was “not 
eccentric or merely religious, but widely acceptable”.21 This is 
convincing because if both reasoning for and against the 
separation was morally adequate, why should the court‟s view 
have been for one to prevail? Parental views should have 
been accorded more respect. 
Re A is difficult to reconcile with the case of Re T, which 
wasdiscussed above. Fox and McHale observe “Re T 
focussed on broader circumstances.”22 Possible reasons for 
the disparity between this case and others have already been 
considered. Re T is surprisingly inconsistent with religious 
refusal cases because wider long-term effects were taken into 
consideration despite “no potential rejection of the child 
                                                                
18 Michael Freeman, „Whose Life is it Anyway?‟(2001) 9(3) Medical Law 
Review 276. 
19 Barbara Hewson, „Killing off Mary: Was the Court of Appeal 
Right?‟(2001)9(3) Medical Law Review298. 
20 Freeman (n18) 275. 
21 RaananGillon,„Imposed Separation of Conjoined Twins – Moral 
Hubris by the English Courts?‟(2001) 27(1) Journal of Medical Ethics4. 
22 Fox and McHale (n14) 703. 
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prompted by religious doctrine.”23 What is important to draw 
from Re T is that it demonstrates that the best interests 
approach can be applied in a broader manner than what is 
best in terms of the child‟s medical health. If a broader 
approach were to be adopted, the inconsistencies that can 
undermine the law‟s coherency would appear less dramatic 
and more justified. 
Michalowski‟s argument substantiates the 
recommendation that a broader approach should be 
embraced. She emphasises how the twins‟ medical condition 
was prioritised:24 
“Re A demonstrates that the courts‟ approach to 
substitute their own decision for that of the 
parents combined with the tendency to give 
precedence to medical evidence leads to a shift 
from parental powers to a more and more 
influential role for the medical 
profession…physicians cannot be the best judges 
of their child patients‟ best interests.” 
It is suggested that more weight should have been 
awarded to parental views in this case. Furthermore, 
physicians may not be the best judges of best interests since 
parents are the ones who are responsible for their children 
after treatment, know them best and care the most. This can 
similarly be argued in relation to parental refusals from 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses. However, the reasoning for refusals in 
these cases is much more controversial. 
V. Parental Refusals From Jehovah‟s Witnesses 
The case study of parental refusals from Jehovah‟s Witnesses 
to consent to treatment involving the use of blood products 
on their children provides an additional illustration of how 
                                                                
23 Caroline Bridge, „Religion, Culture and Conviction – The Medical 
Treatment of Young Children‟(1999) 11(1)Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 10. 
24 Sabine Michalowski, „Reversal of Fortune – Re A (Conjoined Twins) 
and Beyond: Who Should Make Treatment Decisions on Behalf of 
Young Children?‟[2001] Health Law Journal 168. 
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the best interests test can be recognised as short sighted and 
narrow. The reasons for such refusals are very controversial. 
Based on biblical texts, 25  the perceived consequences for 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses receiving blood products are 
catastrophic. It is not suggested that these controversial 
religious beliefs should always be imposed upon the child, 
but that decisions should be made having examined 
potential, wider long-term effects. 
There is a line of case law that demonstrates that the 
courts will override parental rejections of life saving blood 
products on the basis of a child‟s best interests. For example, 
in Re R, 26 Booth J stated how the court was “bound to 
override the parents‟ wishes.”27This was similarly done in Re 
S. 28  In Re S parental religious views were awarded some 
recognition since there was a delay in administering 
treatment. However, as Bridge insightfully points out, 
“[w]hy…wait so long when they knew…the parents would 
never agree?”29 This is not an effective method of recognition 
as the child stands only to suffer and the approach is still 
narrow. 
It is argued that the best interests approach is narrow 
because decisions are only based on immediate medical 
interests, without sufficient recognition being awarded to 
religious beliefs. McHale and Fox question “whether the 
down playing of such beliefs is legitimate.”30The discretion 
that parents possess, or at least ought to possess, in how to 
bring up their child also appears to be ignored. Bridge states 
that it is a natural instinct of parents to impose “their own set 
                                                                
25 Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 17:10 and Acts 15:29. 
26 Re R (Minor)(Blood Transfusion)[1993] 2 FLR 757. 
27 ibid. 
28 [1993] 1 FLR 376 Explanatory Notes: S, aged four and a half, suffered 
from T-cell leukaemia. There was strong medical opinion that in order to 
maximise the prospect of successful treatment and saving the life of S, the 
transfusion of blood products was essential. S‟s parents objected to this 
treatment due to religious belief and concerns over the safety of the of 
blood products. Thorpe J overruled the parental objections on the basis of 
promoting the child‟s welfare.  
29 Bridge (n23) 7. 
30 Fox and McHale (n14) 703. 
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of values in relation to upbringing. It is arguably their right to 
do so.”31 Families could present this reasoning to argue that 
their Convention Rights demand a wider outlook on best 
interests.32 
A wider outlook requires long-term effects to be 
considered in addition to immediate medical interests. 
Kearney states how “decisions have to be considered both in 
the short and the long term.” 33 He continues to argue 
that“[d]ecisions are too often based on short-term medical 
contingencies. This may be counter-productive if the short-
term gains are less important than the long-term problems.”34 
Kearney is convincing in his argument since he suggests 
that the medical condition of the child remains vitally 
important, but more consideration should be awarded to 
long-term effects such as the disruption of the family unit. 
Since “destruction of these relationships…often has a 
detrimental effect on the patient”35 a wider outlook than on 
immediate best interests is required. It has been reported that 
a Jehovah‟s Witness man, from Ghana, disowned his five-
year-old son as a result of him having received a life-saving 
blood transfusion.36 Although this is an extreme example, it 
provides an illustration of possible wider long-term effects on 
families– something that the law in its current guise fails to 
accommodate. 
Wider long-term effects on families appear to fall outside 
the ambit of immediate best interests. This is likely to have 
detrimental effects on patients. As Gilbar argues, “[t]he close 
link between family support and involvement in decision-
                                                                
31 Bridge (n23) 3. 
32 Article 8 and 9, European Convention on Human Rights. 
33 Kearney (n9) 32. 
34 ibid 34. 
35 ibid 32. 
36 „Jehovah Witness couple disown five-year-old son for receiving blood‟ 
(Ghana Web) 
<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?I
D=181322>accessed on 1 April 2013. 
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making indicates that family support is one of the main 
considerations”.37 
Although he is not writing in the same context as is being 
discussed here, his reasoning, that the support of the family is 
crucial, can be imposed in the situation of parental religious 
refusals. Adding weight to this argument is Kearney‟s 
statement that “[t]he parents‟ fundamental beliefs should not 
be easily dismissed. A strong family unit is almost essential in 
the management of children with cancer.”38 
It can be inferred that whilst a child is being treated for a 
serious illness a strong family unit is highly desired. In the 
context of parental religious refusals, there is a high risk of 
disruption of the family unit because the perceived 
consequences of treatment can be grave. Hence, this is an 
area where greater weight should be awarded to parental 
views. 
The best interests approach has shown to be narrow and 
short sighted in relation to religious objections from parents, 
as the approach appears to have a sole focus on medical 
priorities. It is stated by Bridge that “[a] case can persuasively 
be made out for upholding the parental religious interests 
for, on balance, the child‟s welfare in the context of his 
culture, religion and family is enhanced”.39 
Therefore, although a child‟s medical welfare will be 
central, other interests, such as the impact on family 
relations, should be taken into consideration. This is 
important because wider long-term effects can sometimes be 
more detrimental than not acting in, what the law may 
currently perceive to be, the immediate best interests. 
VI Conclusion 
It is evident from the existing case law that the approach 
taken in medical decision-making on behalf of young 
                                                                
37 Roy Gilbar, „Family Involvement, Independence and Patient 
Autonomy in Practice‟(2011) 19(2) Medical Law Review 19(2) 225. 
38 Kearney (n9) 34. 
39 Bridge (n23) 5. 
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children in England and Wales focuses on the immediate 
best interests of the child. The purpose of this is to protect 
the vulnerable. When decisions are made in the best 
interests of a child, which conflict with strong religious views 
held by the parents, this approach has proven to be short 
sighted and narrow. The adoption of an approach that 
encapsulates and recognises more than just medical interests 
is recommended. This is more appropriate as greater 
consideration would be awarded to the wider long-term 
effects of families who have religious objections. A wider view 
of best interests must be embraced. 
 Different categories of employment status: an 
opportunity for employers to cut costs or 
another hurdle to overcome? 
Sophie Cooke 
Abstract 
There are different categories of employment status found in 
the workplace: employees, workers and independent 
contractors. The employment status of an individual 
determines which employment rights they will benefit from, 
and in turn, which obligations their employer will be subject 
to. The availability of these different categories allows 
employers financial flexibility and can be used to their 
advantage to cut costs. This article examines how the 
intervention of the courts in determining employment status 
has made it more difficult for employers to make commercial 
choices when employing individuals in order to keep costs 
down. 
The tests used to determine employment status are 
examined, highlighting the characteristics typically found in 
each category. I then discuss the obligations that each category 
imposes on employers and how this might affect their costs. 
Through an examination of the courts‟ intervention in 
determining employment status, particularly in relation to 
vulnerable workers, it will be argued that they have made this 
area of law too uncertain, and how, as a result, any potential 
savings that employers could derive from these categories is 
sacrificed. 
I. Introduction 
Traditionally two categories of employment status have been 
recognised: employees and independent contractors. While 
judges have struggled for years to classify labour relations, this 
so-called binary divide is a development of the 20th century.1 
An employee is “an individual who has entered into or works 
under a contract of employment” 2 whilst an independent 
                                                                
1 Simon Deakin, „Does the “Personal Employment Contract” provide a 
basis for the reunification of employment law?‟ (2007)36(1) Industrial Law 
Journal 68. 
2 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 230(1). 
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contractor is self-employed, working under a contract for 
services. 
Evidently these definitions are not particularly 
prescriptive. As a result, the courts have developed various 
tests to determine employment status by examining aspects of 
the relationship. Where the employer controls, or has the 
right to control, how the work is done, it is likely that he is 
dealing with an employee.3 The greater the degree of control, 
the more likely the court is to find a contract of service.4By 
the organisational test, an employee is well-integrated and 
considered “part and parcel of the organisation”.5 Mutuality 
of obligations is considered an essential pre-requisite for an 
employee. This is satisfied where there is an obligation on 
the employer to provide work and on the individual to accept 
it. 6  Alternatively, if the economic reality of the situation 
suggests that individuals are in business on their own account, 
bearing the financial risk and enjoying the profits, then this 
usually makes them an independent contractor.7 
In light of the wide range of factors that should be taken 
into consideration when determining employment status, the 
courts have more recently developed a multi-factorial 
approach, whereby a variety of factors are considered 
together. At a minimum, control and mutuality of obligations 
must be present for an individual to be classed as an 
employee.8 
Since 1997 an intermediate category has been recognised: 
the „worker‟. This is:9 
                                                                
3 Yewen v Noakes[1880] 6 QBD 530; Walker v Crystal Palace Football 
Club[1910] 1 KB 87. 
4 Whittaker v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance[1967] 1 QB 
156. 
5 Bank voor Handel enScheepvaart NV v Slatford[1953] 1 QB 248, 
295. 
6 Montgomery v Johnson Underwood[2001] EWCA 318 (Civ). 
7 Market Investigations Ltd v Minister for Social Security[1969] 2 QB 
173. 
8 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) v Minister for Pensions and 
National Insurance[1968] 2 QB 197. 
9 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 230(3). 
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“An individual who has entered into or works 
under a contract of employment, or any other 
contract…whereby the individual undertakes to 
do or personally perform any work or services 
for another party to the contract whose status is 
not by virtue of the contract that of a client or 
customer of any profession or business 
undertaking carried on by the individual.” 
By this definition, all employees are workers. However, 
worker is a wider concept; the category was introduced to 
extend protection to people who are excluded from the 
narrow definition of an employee, but are not in business on 
their own account and therefore require protection due to 
their economic dependency on their employer.10 Again the 
courts have identified a number of key factors within this 
definition. The individual must contract to perform the work 
personally, there must be mutuality of obligations and the 
individual must not be in business on their own account.11 
This additional third category catches individuals who do not 
satisfy the definition of an employee, but as they are not in 
business on their own account, are not truly independent 
contractors. A further distinction will also be made between 
typical and atypical workers. The label refers to their mode 
of work and whether the working arrangement is considered 
„typical‟. It is important to note that both typical and atypical 
workers can still fall within any of the three categories of 
employment status. 
The law distinguishes between these different categories 
within the workplace in order to regulate the application of 
protective legislation, common law rights and for tax and 
National Insurance purposes. This is important for 
employers because it is the different rights and 
responsibilities that accrue to each group that affects their 
business costs. 
                                                                
10 Guy Davidov, 'Who is a worker?' (2005)Industrial Law Journal 57, 57. 
11 Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd v Baird and Others[2002] ICR 667. 
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II. How different categories of employment status 
provides employers with opportunities to reduce costs 
A. Variations in statutory obligations 
Statute provides for a number of rights to protect individuals 
in the workplace and compliance with these rights can be 
expensive for employers. These rights do not apply equally 
across the different categories, as the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal explains:12 
“The reason why employees are thought to need 
such protection is that they are in a subordinate 
and dependent position vis-à-vis their employers: 
the purpose of the Regulations is to extend 
protection to workers who are, substantively and 
economically, in the same position. Thus the 
essence of the intended distinction must be 
between, on the one hand, workers whose 
degree of dependence is essentially the same as 
that of employees and, on the other, contractors 
who have a sufficiently arm's-length and 
independent position to be treated as being able 
to look after themselves in the relevant respects.” 
All three categories are protected under equality 
legislation.13 This is the only statutory protection accorded to 
independent contractors, however it should not be 
overlooked as failure to properly comply can result in costly 
litigation; a successful claim for equal pay can require an 
employer to retrospectively equalise the pay for up to 6 
years. 14  Workers benefit from some limited additional 
protection, which includes entitlement to the National 
Minimum Wage, 15  protection under the Working Time 
Regulations 16  and entitlement to Trade Union 
                                                                
12 Byrne Bros (n 11) 677. 
13 Equality Act 2010. 
14 ibid s 132. 
15 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, s 1. 
16 Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833, reg 2. 
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membership.17Employees benefit from all the rights provided 
for by statute, including family and unfair dismissal rights that 
the other categories do not enjoy.18 
Employers inevitably incur costs in complying with these 
rights. Trade Unions “often secure better terms and 
conditions of employment” 19  through collective bargaining, 
such as improved social rights and higher pay.20 They can 
also organise industrial action 21  which is disruptive for an 
employer who will see a decline in productivity if a large 
portion of his staff are on strike. Minimum wage increases 
annually, 22  irrespective of the economic conditions that 
employers may be facing. Although the increase is often only 
a matter of pence, across a whole business this can be costly 
for employers. Furthermore, while employers can claim back 
at least 92% of maternity pay, which may rise to 100% 
depending on National Insurance contributions,23 there is no 
automatic entitlement relating to sick pay where employers 
are left out of pocket.24 They may also face additional costs in 
hiring and training a temporary replacement. 
Indeed an argument often cited by those against 
regulation is that the cost of compliance is high. Employers 
have stated that “employment law does have a negative effect 
on business growth, and the concern… is about cost, 
complexity and the … cost of „getting it wrong‟”.25 For this 
                                                                
17 Trade Union and Labour Regulations (Consolidation) Act 1992, ss 1, 
295 and 296. 
18 Employment Rights Act 1996, ss 71 and 94 for maternity leave and 
unfair dismissal respectively; Social Security Contributions and Benefits 
Act 1992, s 151 for statutory sick pay. 
19 Hugh Collins, KD Ewing and Aileen McColgan, Labour Law: Text 
and Materials (2ndedn, Hart Publishing 2005) 723. 
20 Collins (n 19) 647. 
21 Trade Union and Labour Regulations (Consolidation) Act 1992, pt V. 
22 Government Digital Service, „National Minimum Wage rates‟ 
(GOV.UK) <https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates> accessed 
16November 2013. 
23 HMRC, „Employer Helpbook for Statutory Maternity Pay‟ (2013) E15, 
30. 
24 HMRC, „Employer Helpbook for Statutory Sick Pay‟ (2013) E14, 31. 
25 The Better Regulation Executive, „Lightening the Load: The 
Regulatory Impact on UK‟s Smallest Businesses‟ (November 2010)  
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reason, it is beneficial that an employer can, where 
appropriate for the role, hire workers or independent 
contractors rather than employees, circumventing increased 
costs that may have arisen from compliance with statutory 
obligations or collective bargaining. 
B. Costs relating to implied duties 
In addition to statutory protection, employees benefit from a 
number of implied duties to which the employer is subject. 
These duties do not apply to workers or independent 
contractors. Employees may enforce these even where 
employers do not intentionally contract to them. The implied 
duty of good faith 26 prohibits conduct likely to produce 
destructive or damaging consequences.27 A range of conduct 
can result in breach of this duty, such as use of foul 
language 28  or failure to provide a grievance procedure, 29 
making the employer liable to pay damages.This additional 
financial burden in respect of employees strengthens the case 
for using workers and independent contractors as attractive 
cost-saving alternatives. 
C. Costs arising from vicarious liability 
Another crucial distinction affecting employers‟ costs is 
found in the doctrine of vicarious liability, by which an 
employer is liable for the torts of his employee:30 
“Every act done by a servant in the course of his 
duty is regarded as done by his master‟s orders 
and consequently is the same as if it were the 
master‟s own act.” 
                                                                                                                      
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/31614/10-1251-lightening-the-load-regulatory-impact-smallest-
businesses.pdf> accessed 16 November 2013. 
26 Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd[1991] 1 
WLR 589. 
27 University of Nottingham v Eyett and Another[1999] ICR 721. 
28 OgilvievNeyrfor-Weir Ltd(EAT, 15 May 2003). 
29 WA Goold (Pearmak) Ltd v McConnell[1995] IRLR 516. 
30 Bartonshill Coal Co v McGuire[1858] 3 Macq 300. 
2014] CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS 61 
The court has given the determinative concept of „course 
of employment‟ a broad interpretation to cover acts closely 
connected to the employee‟s work. 31  Consequently 
employers can be liable for actions that they have no control 
over and which often occur outside working hours and the 
workplace.32 This includes situations where the act has been 
expressly forbidden, 33  was an intentional tort 34  or even 
criminal activity.35 
Recent case law has given rise to a new precedent, which 
suggests that workers may also benefit from the doctrine of 
vicarious liability. Traditionally the employer would have to 
exercise sufficient control over the individual in order for 
their relationship to give rise to vicarious liability.36 This has 
recently been expanded to include relationships that are 
“akin to that of employer and employee”.37 As the tests for a 
worker replicate some of the tests for an employee, it is 
possible that the court could find the employer–worker 
relationship sufficiently analogous to give rise to vicarious 
liability. By comparison, concerning independent 
contractors, employers are only liable where they are subject 
to a non-delegable duty of care,38 arising where the activity 
involved is particularly hazardous39 or where the employer 
has assumed responsibility. 40  Where vicarious liability 
applies, the employer will have to pay damages to the victim. 
Indeed, a regularly cited justification for this imposition of 
strict liability is that the employer has deeper pockets and can 
better afford the compensation.41 However, this can amount 
to substantial sums of money and in order to avoid these 
                                                                
31 Poland v John Parr & Son[1927] 1 KB 236. 
32 ibid. 
33 Plumb v Cobden Flour Mills[1914] AC 62. 
34 Poland (n 31). 
35 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd[2001] UKHL 22. 
36 Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros Ltd[1934] 1 KB 191. 
37 Various Claimaints v Catholic Child Welfare Society[2012] UKSC 56. 
38 Cassidy v Minister of Health[1951] 2 KB 343. 
39 Black v Christchurch Finance Company Ltd[1894] AC 48. 
40 John Murphy, Street on Torts (12thedn, OUP 2007) 600. 
41 Murphy (n 40). 
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costs an employer may instead choose to hire an 
independent contractor, ensuring they will only be liable in 
limited circumstances.From the above it can be seen that the 
various employment classifications have vastly different rights 
and responsibilities with the ability to significantly reduce an 
employer‟s costs if utilised correctly. 
III. Employers, Beware 
The prudent employer will use the employment classification 
most suited to the role to avoid contracting for additional 
rights beyond what is needed for the work to be completed. 
Often employers will expressly define their relationship in a 
way that will not give rise to excessive costs. However, 
problems arise when the employment status is disputed. 
A. Tests lack clarity / coherence 
As previously noted, vague statutory definitions have led to 
the adoption of multiple tests, which may be used 
individually or combined together in the multifactorial 
approach.42 However, no guidance has been given on how 
much weight should be accorded to each factor. As a result, 
different tests may produce different results on the same set 
of facts. For example, in Durcan,43 the claimant was a self-
employed dentist, but also worked rota at a local hospital. 
When his status regarding the hospital work was in dispute, 
the court found that he was an employee. Factors supporting 
this included his use of hospital premises and equipment, 
lack of choice over who to treat and that his remuneration 
was not dependent on the number of patients treated. 
However, several other factors pointed towards an 
independent contractor status. The dentist paid his own tax 
and National Insurance contributions, had a limited ability to 
replace himself, and the hospital lacked control over how his 
work was performed. Had the court followed any one of 
these tests on its own, it is likely that it would have also found 
                                                                
42 See n8 and accompanying text. 
43 City and East London FHS Authority v Durcan[1996] EAT/721/96. 
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him to be an independent contractor. This illustrates the 
ambiguity surrounding employment status. 
Substitution clauses were previously treated as conclusive 
of a contract for services;44 where the individual has the right 
to substitute themselves, there is no personal service and 
therefore no mutuality of obligations. However this created 
problems of „sham contracts‟,45 where the substitution clause 
would be very limited and in practice the individual would 
have no such ability. These are used against vulnerable 
individuals with no real bargaining power in order to 
circumvent their employment rights.46 As a result the court 
has held that limited substitution clauses do not negate a 
contract of employment.47 
To avoid this uncertainty, employers will write 
comprehensive contracts that clearly indicate employment 
status, but over time may cease to reflect the reality of their 
situations and as a result may be struck down by the court. 
While beneficial to individuals being exploited by their 
employer, it is problematic for employers who are often not 
actively seeking to exploit their staff, but simply trying to stay 
afloat during difficult economic times. They may believe they 
are dealing with an independent contractor because that is 
what they contracted to, only to later find out that they are 
not, and have become subject to all the responsibilities 
normally associated with an employee, thereby incurring 
greater costs. 
B. Difficulties with atypical workers 
Employment status becomes still more confusing in relation 
to atypical workers. These individuals may not receive 
regular permanent work, do not work on premises or have 
                                                                
44 Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton[1999] ICR 693. 
45 For more on sham contracts, see Sam Middlemiss, „The legal impact 
on employers where there is a sham element in contracts with their 
workers‟ (2012) 54(3)International Journal of Law and Management 209. 
46 Alan Bogg, „Sham self-employment in the Supreme Court‟ [2012] 
41(3)Industrial Law Journal 328. 
47 Byrne Bros (n 11). 
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no single employer. The label „atypical worker‟ is misleading 
as often the individuals lack certain attributes of a worker 
leaving their status uncertain. In particular, mutuality of 
obligations is necessary for worker status yet this is often 
absent for casual workers. Arguably the traditional 
conception of a nine-to-fiveworker is no longer typical48 and 
in recent years employers have relied more heavily on 
atypical workers to save costs throughout the recession, with 
the use of zero-hour contracts increasing by 174% between 
2007 and 2012. 49  These allow employers to respond to 
fluctuations in demand; they have staff available when 
needed but who are not guaranteed work, nor paid 
permanent salaries. 50  Practitioners claim that employers in 
other struggling economies envy this flexibility.51 However an 
alternative view of this practice is that shifting “the risks of 
business fluctuations from the employer on to the worker”52is 
exploitative, as the lack of guaranteed work creates financial 
instability for these workers. To prevent this, the court will at 
times take a protective stance. Even where the contract 
expressly states the employment status, the court will 
disregard it if it does not believe that it reflects the reality of 
the situation “…the true agreement will often have to be 
gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the 
written agreement is only a part”.53 
                                                                
48 Ian Smith and Aaron Baker, Smith & Wood‟s: Employment Law 
(10th edn, OUP 2010) 56. 
49 IDS Thomson Reuters, „Zero hours, but not necessarily zero 
responsibility‟ (16 April 2013) 
<https://ids.thomsonreuters.com/employment-law/features-analysis/zero-
hours-not-necessarily-zero-responsibility> accessed 20 November 2013. 
50 ibid. 
51 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23573442> accessed 
20November 2013. 
52 Sandra Fredman, „Labour Law in Flux: The Changing Composition of 
the Workforce‟ (1997) 26(4) Industrial Law Journal 337, 337. This article 
examines the perspective of employers, but for more on the effect on 
individuals see BBC News, „Q&A: What are zero-hour contracts?‟ (5 
August 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23573442> accessed 
20 November 2013. 
53 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and others [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] ICR 
1157, 1168. 
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A contract may preclude mutuality of obligations, 
however it has been found to exist in practice where, over a 
long period of time, a casual worker actually worked on a 
regular basis.54 Where a group of staff on zero hour contracts 
provided critical around-the-clock care for a severely disabled 
patient, they were employees because the work was so 
challenging and personalised that a series of ad hoc contracts 
with independent contractors would have been 
inappropriate. 55  The decision of the court to ignore a 
contract, freely entered into, is somewhat paternalistic. The 
individual in question may have chosen that arrangement to 
suit their own lifestyle, and therefore benefit from it as much 
as their employer does, until something goes wrong. Ignoring 
contractual stipulations, particularly in zero hour contracts, is 
just another way of preventing employers from cutting their 
costs in a difficult economy. 
C. Potential expansions of implied duties to workers 
Brodie argues that the courts may further extend protection 
to workers using implied duties. The emphasis on personal 
service with regards to workers makes them more similar to 
employees than to independent contractors. On that basis, 
the courts may well decide to extend the implied duties of 
employers to include workers, particularly the duty of mutual 
trust and confidence, which is only appropriate where a 
contract is personal in nature.56 This would impose a greater 
burden on employers and could be seen as a step too far on 
the part of the courts. If parliament had intended that 
workers should be treated as employees, they would have 
simply legislated to expand the definition of an employee. 
                                                                
54 Cornwall County Council v Prater[2006] EWCA Civ 102. 
55 Pulse Healthcare Ltd v Carewatch Care Services Ltd & Others(EAT, 6 
August 2012). 
56 Douglas Brodie, „Employees, workers and the self-employed‟ (2005) 
34(3)Industrial Law Journal 253. For more on the extension of the worker 
category see Davidov (n 10). 
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IV. Conclusion 
Employees, workers and independent contractors are subject 
to different rights and responsibilities regarding their 
employment relationship, which can directly affect the cost to 
employers. Knowledge of these rights can enable the 
employer to make the most efficient use of his workforce, 
such as reducing his wage bill through zero hour contracts, or 
removing liability through the use of independent 
contractors. However, the unclear and ambiguous tests for 
establishing employee status make it practically impossible to 
accurately categorise these individuals and blur the 
distinction between each group. As a result, employers are 
unable to know with any certainty which rights and liabilities 
they are exposed to and the associated costs they must factor 
in. This is exacerbated by the increasingly protectionist stance 
of the courts; whilst protecting individuals from exploitation 
is a valid concern, employers are being prevented from using 
these statuses to cut their costs in difficult economic times. 
Indeed, there is little benefit in the availability of these 
different categories if the courts are too ready to blur the 
distinctions between them. Therefore, while these different 
statuses appear to be a useful economic tool, they can equally 
impose greater hurdles to overcome, resulting in increased 
costs to the employer. As mentioned above, the cost of 
getting it wrong is high; the courts need to provide some 
clarity on the position on employment status to the benefit of 
both parties. 
 The CESL proposal: Progress or misstep? 
Sam Wardleworth 
Abstract 
The state of European consumer protection is incoherent and 
inconsistent across member states. The Commission believe 
that this has a detrimental effect on cross border trading and 
costs the EU €26 billion a year in dissuaded trade. In 
response it proposes a Common European Sales Law, the 
aim of which is to inspire confidence in the European market, 
increase competition and ultimately improve the consumer 
market for all European consumers. However as it stands the 
CESL is problematic and falls short of this ambition. This 
essay considers some of its faults from the point of view of 
B2C transactions, focusing on the scope, features and cost of 
the CESL. Ultimately, while the CESL has its benefits, it is 
too inconsistent to have a positive effect on the Consumer 
Contract acquis, and the threat to existing harmonisation is 
simply too great to justify the few advantages it offers in its 
current form. 
I. Introduction 
As it stands the Consumer Contract acquis is a rather 
confusing picture and can “hardly be said to be coherent”.1 
In the Commission‟s view, this confusion has a substantial 
negative effect on cross border trading.2In fact, they believe 
that acquiring information on and adapting to the contract 
laws of other member states are two of the most significant 
hurdles that traders face when attempting to trade within the 
European Union. Clearly businesses would undoubtedly 
                                                                
1 NobertReich, 'Harmonisation of European contract law: with special 
emphasis on consumer law' (2011) 1 China-EU Law Journal55, 70-76. 
2 European Commission, „European Contract Law in Consumer 
Transactions: Analytical Report‟ (2011) Flash Eurobarometer 321 – The 
Gallop Organization< 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_321_en.pdf> accessed 4 April 
2013. 
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prefer a “legal environment with less complexity”.3 As a result 
of this impetus, in October 2011 the Commission released a 
long awaited proposal for a “pan-European”4 contract law, 
known as the Common European Sales Law (CESL). The 
CESL establishes a uniform set of contract rules that purport 
to offer a high level of consumer protection indiscriminately. 
The Commission believes that it will “stimulate the 
commerce between Member States”5  and combat the €26 
billion lost each year to dissuaded trade.6This will improve 
competition and therefore potentially lead to a greater choice 
and lower prices for over 500 million European consumers. 
This essay focuses on Business-to-Consumer (B2C) 
transactions and as such we must consider the real nature of 
a consumer.Critically, consumer confidence is aesthetic; a 
consumer will have more confidence if the market becomes 
strengthened, through experience and word of mouth.7 It is 
an exceptional consumer who surveys the contractual 
relationship when making purchases.8 That is not to say that 
the consumer does not stand to benefit from the CESL. If 
the CESL makes cross-border trading more attractive, then it 
could have a positive effect on consumers by increasing 
                                                                
3 Nicole Kornet, „The Common European Sales Law and the CISG: 
Complicating or Simplifying the Legal Environment?‟ (2012) 19Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 164. 
4 Pinsent Masons, 'MPs back Government over Common European 
Sales Law stance and question legal basis for proposed regime' (2013) 
<www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/january/mps-back-government-over-
common-european-sales-law-stance-and-question-legal-basis-for-proposed-
regime> accessed 4 April 2013. 
5  Directorate-General For Internal Policies, 'Consumer Protection 
under the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law' (2012) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/462507/I
POL-JURI_NT(2012)462507_EN.pdf> accessed 4 April 2013. 
6 European Commission, 'Common European Sales Law to boost trade 
and expand consumer choice' (Press Release 11 October 2011) 
IP/11/1175.  
7 See Thomas Wilhelmsson, „The Abuse of the „Confident Consumer‟ 
as a Justification for EC Consumer Law‟ (2004) 27(3) Journal of Consumer 
Policy 317. 
8 For a consideration of what influences consumers, see 
RossellaIncardona and Cristina Poncibò, 'The average consumer, the 
unfair commercial practices directive, and the cognitive revolution' (2007) 
30(1) Journal of Consumer Policy 21, 21-38. 
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competition and choice. But at least in the immediacy, 
consumer confidence will be slow to react. It is only through 
positive experiences over time that consumers will come to 
know of the true benefits of the CESL. 
Accordingly, this essay will assess three contestations 
against the CESL. Part one considers the aim in the context 
of problems facing Union trade generally. Part two then 
considers the optional nature of the CESL addressing the 
mechanical problems with its implementation. Finally, part 
three will look at the cost. Each section will be considered in 
terms of the potential effect on cross border sales and 
consumer confidence. Ultimately this essay will propose that 
while the CESL is a step in the right direction, it falls short of 
what is necessary to create a coherent Consumer Contract 
acquis, and to achieve a high standard of consumer 
protection across Europe. 
II. A Misguided Venture 
The Commission drafted the CESL in response to what they 
perceived to be some existing problems with the state of the 
Union‟s market principles. As it stands, only “1 in 10 Union 
traders export within the Union” 9  and the Commission 
makes it clear that, in its opinion, contractual differences are 
the major obstacle facing traders contemplating cross border 
transactions. It claims the CESL would “improve the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market by 
facilitating the expansion of cross border trade”. 10  This 
approach over simplifies the problems that exist within the 
Contract law acquis and it becomes quickly apparent from 
simple reflection on the Commission‟s own referenced 
findings that diversity of contract law is one of a multiplicity 
of problems with regard to B2C transactions. 
                                                                
9 European Commission, „Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law‟ 
COM(2011) 635 final. 
10 ibid. 
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The Commission has underestimated the scale of the 
obstacles consumers face and overreacted to their 
assumptions. They have underestimated in the sense that 
their focus on Contract law is misplaced. In practice it seems 
that consumers are more concerned with other issues, for 
example: fraud, delivery, language and the right to redress.11 
They have over reacted to their own claims that 44 per cent 
of Europeans will not buy abroad because they are 
“uncertain about their rights in cross border situations”. 12 
They have jumped to the conclusion that “rights” are 
synonymous with contractual rights, but in reality this kind of 
aggregating “assumption leads the analysis astray”. 13 
Consumers have a high level of variance, and without a 
deeper understanding of what “rights” the average consumer 
is referring to, solutions will remain elusive. 14  In fact, the 
Commission‟s own example15 demonstrates that the level of 
harmonisation that already exists16 is adequate to address the 
                                                                
11 Which, „Consultation Response: Response to the Green Paper from 
the Commission on policy options for progress towards a European 
Contract Law for consumers and business‟ (2011) 
<http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/policy-options-for-progress-
towards-a-european-contract-law-for-consumers-and-business-which-
response-243720.pdf> accessed 4 April 2013. 
12 European Commission Memo, „Attitudes towards cross-border trade 
and consumer protection – Analytical Report‟(2011) Flash Eurobarometer 
299 – The Gallop Organisation < 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_299_en.pdf> accessed 4 April 
2013. 
13 Richard Epstein, 'Harmonization, heterogeneity and regulation: CESL, 
the lost opportunity for constructive harmonization' (2013) 50 Common 
Market Law Review 207. 
14 Richard Epstein, „Inside the Coasean Firm: Why Variations in 
Competence and Taste Matters‟ (2012) 54(4)Journal of Law and 
Economics S41. 
15 The example included a Finnish woman who did not know her legal 
guarantee rights when shopping in France, see the Feasibility Study 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/news/20111011_en.htm> accessed 
10 April 2013. 
16 As a result of CouncilDirective 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L171/12. 
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majority of Consumer issues. 17  The real barrier for 
consumers is not a lack of rights in the EU market, but a 
severe lack of understanding and education as to what those 
rights are and how they apply.18Therefore, if the CESL was to 
have the desired effect it would have to be accompanied by a 
high scale initiative to educate European consumers, 
otherwise the CESL may end up being overlooked and 
unforgivably outside the scope of consumer knowledge. The 
situation is thus unlikely to improve. 
However, the Commission does concede that there are a 
multitude of problems.19 In comparison to some of these, 
Contract law is a “clearly identifiable obstacle to the 
European single market” 20  and can be acted on. Some 
obstacles, such as linguistic diversity and cultural differences 
are practically insurmountable. Thus, it is important not to 
pigeon hole the CESL as useless, improving the consistency 
of contract law is a good first step towards combatting many 
of the other issues. 21  Seen as a first step towards further 
Union development, the CESL could lead to improvements 
in consumer confidence and cross border transactions 
through the union of contract law; however in its current state 
it is likely to be limited in its scope and any benefits to 
consumers may be compromised by the requirement that 
both parties must choose to opt into the agreement. 
III.The danger of Optionality to the success of the 
CESL 
Article 3 of the proposed regulation highlights the optional 
nature of the CESL. The contract mechanism will be 
available for parties to opt into, but only if they agree to do 
                                                                
17 Ursula Pachl, „The Common European Sales Law – Have the right 
choices been made? A Consumer Policy Perspective‟ [2012] Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 180. 
18 European Commission, „Consumers' awareness and skills worryingly 
low, survey finds‟ (Press Release 11 April 2011) IP/11/455. 
19 Directorate-General For Internal Policies (n 5). 
20 ibid. 
21 For example, confidence in foreign markets and the problems of 
enforcement. 
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so. Thus, the CESL operates as an alternative to the contract 
laws of domestic states of the parties or the transaction.22 The 
Commission reasoned that delivering the CESL as an 
optional mechanism would be the “most proportionate 
action”. 23  It was the belief of the Commission that, being 
optional, the CESL would reduce the cost to traders since it 
would mean that those who are content trading domestically 
and those who wished to trade in the EU very rarely, would 
not face substantial legal costs in adapting their contract law 
processes to the new system. Upon deeper analysis,I will 
explain why the Commission was short sighted and the 
proposed „optional‟ nature of the CESL threatens the 
document‟s integrity as a useful contracting alternative. In 
turn this threatens, in particular, the advantages that the 
CESL will offer to the consumers through its availability and 
may even have a negative impact on consumers in some 
Member States. 
The primary problem with the optional status of the 
CESL is that in many situations it creates a “contract of 
adhesion”.24 That is to say, there is such a strong imbalance 
in contracting power between the two parties that there is an 
implication there has been no real bargaining over the 
contractual terms. This is clearly true in the case of B2C 
transactions, and may also be the case in Business-to-
Business (B2B)transactions where there is a disproportionate 
difference in size between the traders. In almost all consumer 
transactions there is generally no opportunity for the 
consumer to negotiate the terms of the contract. Be it a high 
street or an online purchase, traders tend to offer consumers 
an ultimatum; either comply with their terms or take their 
business elsewhere. This has some incidental effects on the 
consumer‟s relationship with the CESL and is the primary 
                                                                
22 GieselaRűhl, „Consumer Protection in Choice of Law‟ (2011) 44 
Cornell International Law Journal 569. 
23 European Commission (n 9). 
24 Pachl (n 17) 186-192. 
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cause of dissatisfaction against the proposal.25 The proposal 
itself attempts to mitigate this issue to some degree, namely 
through the requirements of Article 8, which requires that the 
consumer must make an “explicit statement” agreeing to use 
the CESL.26 This offers very little practical value,however it 
may ensure the consumer is aware the CESL applies. 
Nonetheless, their only two options remain to trade on these 
terms or to abandon the transaction. As Epstein points out, 
this relationship means “the likelihood of businesses offering 
contracts under the CESL depends on the standard of 
protection provided by the instrument”.27 This will have a 
detrimental effect for consumers and may in turn decrease 
their confidence in the Union market if consumers fear the 
terms of the CESL shall be drawn against them in cross-
border transactions. 
In fact, in the establishment of an optional CESL lies a 
pertinent “conceptual dilemma”. 28  Since we have already 
acknowledged that the decision lies in the hands of the 
business and outside of the consumer‟s control, the CESL 
will become either redundant or a weapon against 
consumers. If the optional instrument were to be established 
on a relatively high level of consumer protection in 
comparison with the national laws of the member states, it 
would be considered undesirable by businesses and they 
would not use it. But if the CESL were to be based on a level 
of protection considered average among the member‟s states, 
it would be inevitably weaker than some of the domestic laws 
within the Union. This would lead to “a race to the 
bottom”.29  That is to say businesses could manipulate the 
CESL as a tool to reduce consumer rights in countries where 
the national law offers a higher level of protection. This 
would have a detrimental effect on consumer law within the 
                                                                
25 Susan Chae and Paul Heidhues, „Buyers‟ Alliances for Bargaining 
Power‟ (2004) 13(4) Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 731. 
26 European Commission (n 9). 
27 Epstein, „Harmonization, heterogeneity and regulation‟ (n 13). 
28 Pachl (n 17) 186-192. 
29 ibid. 
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Member State. Such an effect may make businesses more 
willing to trade across borders, because they would be able to 
rely on the fact that the CESL would be the upper limit of 
consumer protection and this may improve their confidence 
when dealing with consumers abroad. However such a 
propensity is likely to be short lived, since this effect would 
almost certainly decrease consumer confidence in the Union 
market, especially in the Member States where they see their 
rights decreased by the advent of the CESL. Furthermore, 
the market becomes much less attractive if the consumer 
feels like the EU‟s regulation works in favour of the already 
grossly overpowered businesses. 
Problematically, the optional nature of the CESL puts the 
mechanism out of reach of those it was designed to assist the 
most. It has the potential to weaken the position of 
consumers even further and make them reluctant to trade on 
the terms of the CESL. However, it may have some indirect 
positive effects for consumers, by empowering traders in 
foreign jurisdictions to undertake more cross border 
transactions and accordingly create a more competitive 
market and in theory reducing prices and increasing 
consumer choice. This effect would be somewhat mitigated 
should the cost of implementing the CESL be passed on to 
the consumers. 
IV. The Cost of Implementation 
In creating the CESL the Commission‟s intentions are 
“economic, rather than social or political”.30 They claim that 
cross border transactions are costly in legal discovery fees 
and adaptation,31 priced roughly at EUR €15,000 for entering 
each new jurisdiction.32 These fees are highly dissuasive for 
                                                                
30 Simon Whittaker, 'Identifying the Legal Costs of Operation of the 
Common European Sales Law' (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 
85. 
31 European Commission (n 9). 
32 Directorate General For Internal Policies, „Common European Sales 
Law: A Practical View' (2012) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/462474/I
POL-JURI_NT(2012)462474_EN.pdf> accessed 4 April 2013. 
2014] THE CESL PROPOSAL 75 
small traders considering entering new markets and in turn, 
this has a negative effect on the choice and competition 
available to European consumers. The CESL purports to 
eliminate this matter. However it seems that this issue is 
exaggerated and in fact to the contrary of the Commissions 
claims, 82 per cent of traders said that the transaction costs 
had no great impact upon their decision to trade across 
borders.33 Thus, even if we accept the premise, it is certainly 
not axiomatic that the CESL will increase cross border 
transactions in 82 per cent of the cases. 
Problematically, there should be concern that the CESL 
will in fact increase costs for the Union traders. The 
Commission mistakenly sees the CESL as the alternative 
regime, but realistically it is the “28th regime”.34 It does not 
replace the contractual laws of Member States but is an 
optional alternative. Thus, traders have to be “well advised” 
on another alternative contract law system.35 This could cause 
particular problems where relationships already exist between 
traders. Each party will have to make an initial investment in 
legal discovery costs and in the event that one party discovers 
they are likely to benefit from the scheme they will push its 
application on the trading relationship. 36  This process of 
negotiation will be costly for both sides even if enquiries have 
no fruition and it may be potentially destructive where there 
is disagreement. 
Despite this, it is arguable that an enquiry into the CESL 
is an investment, since traders will be able to use the 
knowledge they gain through their one time educational 
enquiries to “serve a bigger market on the basis of the CESL” 
                                                                
33 European Commission (n 2) p20. 
34 Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, 'Project Europe 
2030: Challenges and Opportunities' (2010) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3210
249ENC.pdf> accessed 4 April 2013. 
35 Kornet (n 3) 10. 
36 Eric Posner, „The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales 
Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition‟ 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 261. 
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rather than studying other national laws.37 But such uniform 
confidence will take time to develop, since in the beginning it 
will be “shrouded in uncertainty until significant 
jurisprudence has sprouted”.38 
Paradoxically, there is a conflict between the level of 
consumer confidence and protection the CESL offers, and its 
goal to increase cross border transactions. 39  The extent to 
which the proposed regulation protects consumers is broad40 
and this may have two devastating effects on the utilisation of 
the CESL. Firstly, maintaining a high standard of protection 
will discourage parties from deploying the CESL where it 
imposes on them higher requirements than the national laws 
do. Secondly, there is a danger that the CESL will decrease 
consumer confidence and dissuade cross border transactions 
simultaneously. The high standard of protection will mean 
that if a trader does choose to operate in a jurisdiction under 
the CESL, then they have to offer higher protection to 
consumers and “consumer protection comes at a price”. 41 
This cost will then be transferred onto the consumer in the 
form of higher sales prices.42 Primarily this acts like a forced 
warranty,43 but it also means that cross border products are 
likely to be more expensive than those traded under 
domestic law. In this respect, the CESL may make cross 
border transactions less attractive to traders since it puts them 
at a competitive disadvantage. Similarly the consumer may 
                                                                
37 Chantal Mak, 'Unweaving the CESL: Legal-economic reason and 
institutional imagination in European contract law' (2013) 50 Common 
Market Law Review277, 283-5. 
38 Posner (n 36). 
39 ibid. 
40 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, „Regulatory Techniques in 
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract 
Law‟(2013) 50Common Market Law Review 109. 
41 ibid. 
42 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard 
University Press 2004). 
43 Additional cost for higher protection is akin to an optional warranty; 
consumers usually prefer the cheaper option when all other things are 
similar, and that cheaper option is likely to come with an „optional 
warranty‟ that will strengthen their consumer protection. 
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feel that the CESL legally forces upon them a warranty they 
would not have otherwise elected for. 
V. Conclusions 
Consumer confidence and cross border trade will increase if 
the consumer has stronger rights, and is aware of that fact. 
The CESL is a step in the right direction, but where the 
rights it grants are effective, the optional nature of the 
instrument puts it out of reach of the consumers. Perhaps 
more problematically, even if the CESL was available to a 
consumer, we know from past experience that they are 
unlikely to be aware of their rights. The CESL is likely to 
become the next generation of EU legislation unknown to 
consumers. 
Of more concern, the CESL is of particular worth to 
traders where it decreases the level of consumer protection, 
potentially increasing trade but at a cost to the consumer. 
Yet, there may still be hope as the CESL offers a legitimate 
advantage for some businesses. It is an “indication to 
consumers that they are willing to grant a very high standard 
of protection”.44 This is an attribute particularly appealing to 
traders who offer high end, less frequented and more 
expensive products. If the CESL were to be accompanied by 
a symbol, it would be a visual incentive to consumers, 
associated with an “excellent level of consumer protection”.45 
Through this mechanism the CESL may influence cross 
border trade, and in time, increase consumer confidence as 
domestic markets become accustomed to its presence. 
Unfortunately, the CESL in its current form has too many 
inconsistencies and loopholes to have a positive effect on the 
Consumer Contract Acquis. The advantages it offers are 
undercut by other issues at the heart of cross-border trading 
and are overshadowed by its conceivable exploitation. The 
harmonisation of consumer law has been one of the EU‟s 
                                                                
44 Directorate-General For Internal Policies (n 5) 9-10. 
45 ibid. 
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greatest successes,46 and it would be a shame to threaten this 
with an experimental new tool that poses significant risk and 
little potential advantage to consumers and traders alike. 
                                                                
46 ibid. 
 
 Incoherence and policy in the law of causation: 
a cause for concern? 
Alex Sprake 
Abstract 
This article reconsiders the law of causation in the context of 
criminal law. In so doing, it will explore some of the 
inconsistencies that can be found in the law atpresent, and 
seeks to propose an explanation as to why such 
inconsistencies exist. It will be seen that the apparent 
incoherence in the law may be explained by reference to 
divergent public policy influences. The approach to causation 
in criminal law allows judges the flexibility to decide cases on 
the basis of prevailing public policy; any apparent 
incoherence is simply the corollary of the courts‟ ability to 
decide cases on this flexible basis. Such flexibility may be 
seen as desirable, although it may ultimately result in legal 
uncertainty. 
I. Introduction 
In English criminal law, for an individual to be charged with a 
criminal offence both factual and legal causation are 
required: did the defendant cause the injury and are they 
legally the cause of that injury? Complexities arise when 
seeking to establish whether an individual is legally culpable 
for „causing‟the incident;the 
conceptoflegalcausationhasironically„caused‟difficulty for 
thecourts andacademics alike. This paper will examine those 
difficulties, as well as the extent to which they render the 
current law of causation incoherent and uncertain. 
II. What is legal causation? 




                                                                
1 Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd v National Rivers Authority[1999] 2 
AC 22 Lord Hoffmann [2]. 
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“withoutknowingthepurposeandscope ofthe rule”. 2  Ineffect, 
LordHoffmannwas highlightingthedifficulties 
ofassessingacausalinfluencewhenthere is nosettledand 
consistentdoctrineofcausation.LordHoffmanninthis 
caseindicatedthattherecouldbeliabilityregardlessofanovusactus
interveniens(an intervening act); this effectively 
subvertedthegeneralunderstandingofthelaw 
priortotheEmpressCarcase. Subsequently,LordBingham 
















ranoffence for whichtheyarenotmorallytoblame. Accordingly, 
asLordBinghamstates, “common sense answers to questions 
of causation will differ according to the purpose for which the 
question is 




                                                                
2 Empress Car Co (n 1) Lord Hoffmann [2]. 
3 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 [15]. 
4 ibid. 









uldnormally take place”. 6 Hartand Honoré 
addthatwhenthisoccurstheresponsibilityforany 
interferenceshallbelegallyattributed,owingtosufficientproximit







s Norriepointsout, itishard to classify 
whatexactlyis“normal”andwhatexactlyis“abnormal”. 10 Hart 








                                                                
5 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd edn, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd 1983) 381. 
6 HLA Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford 1959) 26. 
7 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) 195. 
8 Hart and Honoré (n 6) 31. 
9 Hart and Honoré (n 6) 79-80. 
10 Alan Norrie „Critique of Criminal Causation‟ (1991) Modern Law 
Review 690. 
11 HLA Hart and T Honoré (n 6) 37. 
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might explain its incoherence. Norrie highlightsthisissue: 
“informal „conditions‟aresubjectto… changeaccordingto 
theircontext. 
Itisaweak,potentiallyunstablefoundationforlegalandmoral 




wever,as Norrie points 
out,ifthereisuncertaintyastowhatwillconstitutean 
„abnormality‟,this is perhaps not a stable basis upon which to 








. 14  Fromthis 
wecaninferthatNorrieagreesthatindividualfaultisbasedonmoral
ity,thoughhis ideasarelocatedinthecontextofthe socio-
politicalimplicationsofanindividual‟s actions. As 
such,NorrieiscriticalofHart and Honoré‟s 
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asounddecision ornotisupfordebate.For example, if 
thedecisionin Blaue is scrutinised inthecontextofHartand 
Honoré‟s theory,itcouldbearguedthattheattackin 
                                                                
15 R v Williams & Davis [1992] Crim LR 198. 
16 R v Roberts[1971] EWCA Crim 4. 
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19 This example is extreme. Nonetheless, Norrie illustrates a similar 
argument in relation to members of Religious Sects: seeNorrie (n 10) 696. 
Some religious sects are viewed with hostility in society. Would this societal 
reaction result in the courts adopting a different approach to that adopted 
in Blaue? 
































inconsistentareaoflaw.InRvJordan 20 “palpably 
wrong”medicaltreatmentwasheldtobreakthechainofcausation,
butinRvSmith 21 ,thejudgessomewhat 
                                                                
20 R v Jordan[1956] 40 CR App Rep 152. 
21 R v Smith[1959] 2 QB 35. 
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“evaded” 22 theinterveningactdoctrineandpreferredinsteadtoad
optan„operating andsubstantial‟test for 
causation.Norriealsodrawsattentiontothefactthatthedecisionin



























                                                                
22 Norrie (n 10) 697. 
23 N Padfield, „Clean Water and Muddy Causation: is causation a 
question of law or fact, or just a way of allocating blame?‟ (1995)Criminal 
Law Review 683. 
24 In Kennedy (n 3) it was held that the defendant was not the 
blameworthy cause, and as such had not infringed upon the victim‟s 
autonomy. 
















inR vBlaue,findingthedefendantguilty despitethe 
victimrefusingtreatmentupheldtheintegrityofthevictim‟sreligio
usbeliefs. It is arguable that deciding the case in this way was 
simply a reflection of prevailing public policy. 
V. Conclusion 
Ithasbeenshownthatitisnottheoutcomeofcriminalcausationcas




Policy considerations play an important part in determining 
causation; this allows judges an inherent flexibility. Such an 
approach is desirable, although it does mean that the current 
law of causation necessarily contains an element of 
uncertainty. 
 Gender, Crime and Criminology 
Chris Clarke1 
Abstract 
Crime is a multi-faceted problem that is driven by a wide 
range of means, motives and opportunities. People of all ages, 
education, employment, race and gender partake in criminal 
activities for one reason or another but no one characteristic 
is as prevalent in the participation of crime as that of being 
male. Males commit the vast majority of nearly all crimes and 
have, unsurprisingly, been the focus of most academic work 
but, in spite of this incontrovertible assertion, the reasons for 
this fact have been largely ignored and the study of gender 
and crime has been nothing more than incidental to 
criminological study. The purpose of this article is to examine 
the extent of the gender gap, the inability of pre-existing 
sociological theories to explain it and the new developments 
that may help us understand it. Thanks to insight from 
feminist criminologists and the response of masculinities, 
criminology should finally be able to break free from the dark 
ages of gender ignored deviance and incorporate it into the 
heart of criminological theory. 
I. Introduction 
The proposition that men commit more crimes than women 
is one of the few undisputed “facts” of criminology,2  with 
men “always and everywhere more likely than women to 
commit criminal acts”.3 Statistically, men accounted for 76% 
of criminal sentences in the United Kingdom in 20114 and 
remain a key focus of criminological debate. Unsurprisingly, 
the predominance of male criminality meant that most 
                                                                
1 Thanks go to Professor David Gadd, Hannah Wishart, Max Melsa 
and Joseph Tomlinson for helpful comments on various drafts. 
2 Janet Lauritsen, Karen Heimer and James Lynch, 'Trends in the 
Gender Gap in Violent Offending: New Evidence from the National 
Crime Victimisation Survey' [2009] 47 Criminology 361, 362. 
3 M Gottfredson and T Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Stanford 
University Press 1990) 145. 
4 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Women and the Criminal Justice 
System 2011; A Ministry of Justice Publication under S95 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 (Ministry of Justice 2012). 
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studies prior to 1980 focused on men‟s crime and 
delinquency, 5  but the rise of feminism has encouraged 
criminologists to diverge from the ethnocentricity in 
mainstream criminology in order to formulate theories which 
attempt to explain why this gender gap exists. 
Gender is an important consideration in the study of 
crime because offending is a gendered concept. Gender 
shapes and dictates an individual‟s actions by “guiding 
expectations and appraisals of others and the self with regard 
to risk-taking and criminal behaviour”. 6  A fundamental 
problem with the previously predominant theories of 
criminology was that their reliance on sex failed to consider 
the influence of gender on criminality. Therefore, in order to 
create a truly gendered understanding of crime, theory needs 
to illuminate how gender norms, tendencies, and differences 
affect individual motivations and opportunities to commit 
crime. 
Before exploring the importance of gender and crime, it 
is first necessary to decouple sex from gender. Whereas the 
former is usually a fixed, physical characteristic,7 the latter is a 
collection of individualistic traits that dictate if an individual is 
masculine or feminine. 8  Typically, sex and gender 
correspond, but they can differ. It is therefore important to 
recognise gender as a diverse range of forces, which can allow 
women to perform masculine-related tasks and men to 
perform feminine-related tasks, if we are to avoid confusing 
sex with gender. Criminologists must consequently 
                                                                
5 E Leonard, Women, Crime and Society: A Critique of Criminology 
Theory (Longham, 1982). 
6 Darrel Steffensmeier, Jennifer Schawrtz and Michael Roche, „Gender 
and Twenty-first-Century Corporate Crime‟ [2013] XX(X) American 
Sociological Review 1, 5. 
7 Although sex is usually a biological certainty, it is not always fixed 
because „one in one hundred babies are born with ambiguous genitalia‟ 
and adults can undergo sex change therapy or surgery in later life: Dana 
Britton, The Gender of Crime (Rowman& Littlefield Publishers 2011). 
8 Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna, Gender: an 
Ethnomethodological Approach (University of Chicago Press 1978). 
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differentiate between the two if they are to avoid creating “an 
empty tautology [whereby] gender collapses into sex”.9 
II. The Gender Gap 
Criminal acts are overwhelmingly carried out by men. In the 
UK, 90% of Class A drug offences, 88% of cases of ABH and 
74% of shoplifting incidents in 2011 were committed by 
males.10 In general, women desist from crime more readily,11 
their criminal careers are shorter,12 and they rarely participate 
in the highly lucrative world of organised crime. 13  The 
criminal deeds perpetrated by women are less readily reliant 
on violence, require a higher level of provocation, and tend 
not to be repeated. 14  Traditionally, this distinction was 
attributed to masculine physicality as “physical prowes and 
muscles are useful for committing crimes”. 15  In contrast, 
criminologists evaluated woman‟s crimes as crimes of the 
weak and powerless.16 
Nonetheless, despite their differences, there are 
similarities in both gender‟s patterns of offending. Most 
criminals, male and female, tend to be of low socioeconomic 
status, poorly educated, under- or unemployed, and 
                                                                
9 John Hood-Williams, „Gender, Masculinities and Crime: From 
Structures to Psyches‟ [2001] 5 Theoretical Criminology37, 45. 
10 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Women and the Criminal Justice 
System 2011; A Ministry of Justice Publication under S95 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 (Ministry of Justice 2012). 
11 Neil Weiner, Violent Crime, Violent Criminals (Sage Publications 
1989)108. 
12 Britta Kyvsgaard, The Criminal Career (Cambridge University Press 
2003)135. 
13 Commonwealth of Pennsylvannia, Organised Crime in Pennsylvania: 
The 1990 (Pennslyvannia Crime Commission 1991). 
14 Weiner N, Violent Crime, Violent Criminals (Sage Publications 1989) 
35. 
15 Marisa Silvestri and Chris Crowther-Dowey, Gender & Crime (Sage 
Publications 2008) 52. 
16 See Darrell Steffensmeier ,The Fence in the Shadow of Two Worlds 
(Rowman and Littlefield 1986) and Anne Worral, Offending Women: 
Female Lawbreakers and the Criminal Justice System (Routledge 1990). 
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disproportionately from minority groups.17 Additionally, both 
males and females tend to commit crime at a comparable 
rate after their first offence 18  and tend to react equally to 
social pressures and legal forces.19  While these similarities 
are important to recognise, they cannot compensate for the 
aforementioned differences, which show that gender is a 
crucial aspect of understanding criminal behaviour. 
The gender gap is a universal characteristic of criminal 
statistics, persisting around the world regardless of how social 
and economic conditions differ,20 and it is therefore essential 
that criminologists “recognise gender as a social construct 
and not simply as a statistical variable”.21 
However, these statistics must be treated with caution as 
the world reacts differently to each gender‟s offending, taking 
into account the characteristics of both crime and 
punishment. For example, women shoplifters are sent “back 
into the private sphere of the home, while more professional 
male thieves [are turned] into the hands of the public police 
and courts”22 and because of this chivalrous bias, women are 
systemically under-accounted for in crime statistics. Instead, 
they are left to the informal control of the family whilst men 
feel the full force of the law. 
                                                                
17 Darrell Steffensmeier and Emilie Allan, „Gender and Crime: Toward a 
Gendered Theory of Female Offending‟ [1996] 22 Annual Review of 
Sociology 459, 465. 
18 Deborah Denno, „Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses‟ 
[1994] 85 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 80, 94. 
19 H Boritch and J Hagan, 'A century of crime in Toronto: gender, class 
and patterns of social control 1859–1955' [1990] 28 Criminology 567, 601. 
20 Darrell Steffensmeier and Emilie Allan, „Gender and Crime: Toward a 
Gendered Theory of Female Offending‟ [1996] 22 Annual Review of 
Sociology 459, 465. 
21 Frances Heidensohn and Marisa Silvestri, „Gender and Crime‟ in 
Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 336, 338. 
22 Hagan J, Simpson J and Gillis A, „The Sexual Stratification of Social 
Control: A Gender-Based Perspective on Crime and Delinquency‟ 
[1979] 30 The British Journal of Sociology 25, 26. 
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III. Gender Blind Criminology 
Although criminologists have tried admirably to provide 
general explanations of crime and deviance, their theories 
were designed to explain male, rather than female, crime.23 
None of the most widely accepted criminological theories 
adequately account for the influence of gender, and in doing 
so have “resisted this obvious insight with energy comparable 
to that of medieval churchmen denying Galileo”.24 
Merton‟s theory of strain and anomie 25  suggests that 
unequal social structures and opportunities to attain success 
lead to crime. As such, the marginalisation and victimisation 
of the female population should make them more criminally 
active than their male counterparts when this is clearly not 
the case. Durkheim,26 along with Broidy&Agnew,27 explains 
this apparent discrepancy as a product of women‟s distinct 
emotional responses to pressure and strain, but this alteration 
to Merton‟s theory is unsatisfactorily ad-hoc and reactionary. 
Similarly, Hirschi‟s control theory28 suggests that inhibiting 
each individual‟s desire to deviate can reduce 
crime.However, by focusing upon male criminality, rather 
than female conformity, it fails to explain why females more 
readily follow expected patterns of attitude and behavior, 
ignoring the importance of gender expectations in criminal 
careers. 
                                                                
23 See Dana Britton, The Gender of Crime (Rowman& Littlefield 
Publishers, Plymouth 2011); E Leonard, Women, Crime and Society: A 
Critique of Criminology Theory (Longham, 1982); Frances Heidensohn, 
„The Deviance of Women: A Critique and an Enquiry‟ [1968] 19 British 
Journal of Sociology 160. 
24 Frances Heidensohn, Women and Crime (New York University Press 
1987) 22. 
25 Robert Merton, „Social structure and anomie‟ [1938] American 
Sociological Review 672. 
26 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Simon and Schuster 
1951). 
27 Lisa Broidy and Robert Agnew, „Gender and Crime: A General Strain 
Theory Perspective‟ [1997] Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 275. 
28 Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (University of California Press 
1969). 
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Additionally, labelling theory suggests that “social groups 
create deviance by making rules whose infraction creates 
deviance”29 but it is systemically incapable of explaining the 
gender gap. Generally, men find themselves in more 
powerful positions than women and as such, should be able 
to shape the social rules that define deviance. Therefore, 
women should be labelled more criminal than men because 
of their inability to influence and thereby abide by the 
rules.The fact that women are not more but less likely be 
labelled deviant than men illustrates the futility of the theory 
when it comes to explaining the gender gap. 
Finally, the gender equality hypothesis was formulated, 
which predicted that increased gender equality would lead to 
an increase in female crime.30 The emergence of the “mean 
girl”31 and “girl gang”32 was attributed to women‟s liberation 
and the consequences of being “freed from the constraints of 
their gender”.33 However, in the United States of America, 
between 1965 and 2004 the female share of arrests only rose 
from 11% to 23% in 2004,34 despite the fact “women have 
substantially gained on men throughout the wage distribution 
over the last four decades”.35Additionally, violent and serious 
property crime remained an overwhelming male activity and 
                                                                
29 Howard Becker Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (The 
Free Press 1963) 9. 
30 Freda Adler, Sisters in Crime (McGraw-Hill 1975); Rita Simon, 
Women and Crime (Lexington Books 1975). 
31 Freda Alder and Anne Worrall, Girl‟s Violence: Myths and Realities 
(SUNY Press 2004); Jessica Ringrose, „A new Universal Mean Girl: 
Examining the Discursive Construction and Social Regulation of a New 
Feminine Pathology‟ [2006] 16 Feminism and Psychology 405. 
32 Anne Campbell, The Girls in the Gang (2nd edn, Blackwell 1991). 
33 Meda Chesney-Lind, „Patriarchy, Crime, and Justice: Feminist 
Criminology in an Era of Backlash‟ [2006] Feminist Criminology 6, 11. 
34 Jennifer Schwartz and Darrell Steffensmeier, „The Nature of Female 
Offending: Patterns and Explanation‟ in Zaplin R, Female Offenders: 
Critical Perspective and Effective Interventions (Jones & Bartlett 2007) 43, 
48. 
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1963 and 2005- David Autor, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney, 
„Trends in US Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists‟ [2005] 90 The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 302. 
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increased equalitydecreased the number of women being 
pushed into offending by oppressive patriarchy.36 
Ultimately, although these socially grounded theories of 
crime represent an improvement on Lombroso‟s crude 
biologism, 37  they all represent an unnecessary detour that 
stalled efforts to develop a gendered theory of crime by 
focusing on macro issues that failed to detail micro matters at 
the heart of the debate. 
IV. Insights from Feminist Criminology 
In an attempt to combat the inability of traditional theories to 
explain the lack of female crime, feminists have argued 
against the theories of crime that attribute women‟s lower 
crime rates to “their domesticity, maternal instinct, and 
passivity” 38  or to their “sexual coldness, weakness, and 
undeveloped intelligence”. 39  By challenging biological and 
sociological stereotypes, feminists questioned the overly 
simplistic assumptions of primarily male-asserted theories in 
an attempt to cultivate a more gender aware approach to 
criminology that reflects the true influence of masculinity and 
feminity.40 
In general, society has different standards and 
expectations for girls and boys, men and women. Whereas 
boys are often seen as active and adventurous exhibitionists, 
girls are seen as mature and cunning bourgeois. Whereas the 
difference between what is boisterous and what is criminal is 
blurred, the difference between what is feminine and what is 
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criminal is clear. As a result, boys are policed more for 
legitimate criminal activities and girls are policed more for 
gender-inappropriate deviance- reflecting broad “social and 
political concerns to “police” girls in social life and to 
reinforce gender stereotypes”.41 
Rather than controlling their actions by criminalisation, 
society controls female actions through suppression, as an 
extension of male patriarchy and female subordination. 
Radical feminists see “patriarchy as [an] unremittingly 
oppressive tyranny driven by the „masculine traits‟ of 
aggression, intimidation and physical violence”,42 and believe 
men ultimately maintain their power through the fear of 
rape. 43  Nowadays, few hold such a radical view, but the 
feminist position still maintains that society ensures female 
subordination in more subtle ways.For example, as the moral 
panic of the female offender has emerged, female 
imprisonment has grown and the “courts are [now] imposing 
more severe sentences on women for less serious offences”.44 
Whereas traditional paternalist tendencies have 
perpetuated the myth that women are spared the cruelty of 
prison, statistics show that the “number of women sentenced 
to immediate imprisonment in England and Wales grew 
faster than comparable figures for males for much of the 
1990s and into the twenty first century”.45 However, whilst 
feminists have worked toward the elimination of gender 
inequality, they are yet to offer a comprehensive alternative 
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and have actually created a bifurcated criminology,46 whereby 
one side studied traditional lines of enquiry and the other 
side approached the field through a feminist lens- 
representing an another unfortunate discourse as opposing 
parties went about trying to replace one partisan view with 
another. 
V. A Response to Feminism through Masculinities 
As is now recognised universally, “nothing is as frequently 
associated with criminal behaviour as being a male”. 47 
Criminology‟s contemporary turn to masculinities is 
therefore a long overdue attempt to address the “apparently 
obvious, and yet seemingly so difficult to explain, maleness of 
crime”.48 Viewing masculinity as a socially shaped concept, 
Miedzian49 believes that the influence of the media and the 
military have led people to believe that violence is an 
acceptable form of masculine behaviour and that the link 
between masculinity and crime is now widely 
established. 50 Thelma and Louise, the patriarchal backlash 
blockbuster, is an unexpected yet educative example of a 
number of these concepts, illustrating: how girls can “do” 
masculinity; how informal social influences dictate acceptable 
forms of gender behaviour; and how the “miscellany of 
masculinity”51 structures gender relations. 
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West and Zimmerman52 describe gender as an everyday, 
routine accomplishment that can be achieved in both an 
orthodox and unorthodox fashion. Doing gender involves 
earning continuous societal recognition, and it is usually 
achieved through socially accepted accomplishments such as 
having a family, a job, and a car. However, males who are 
unable to express their masculinity legitimately are more 
likely to resort to violence or criminal activities.53 Therefore, 
these men of typically poor backgrounds resort to crime in 
order to assert their toughness through actions that are 
“traditionally symbolic of untrammelled masculinity”.54 
In order to rationalise the concept of masculinity, 
Connell 55  contextualised the concepts of patriarchy, 
domination, and exploitation through which men are 
deemed powerful. In doing so, he “drew together feminist 
perspectives on the social construction of gender”,56 whilst 
remaining “conversant with the range of troubling dilemmas 
and contradictions many men experience in their everyday 
attempts to negotiate interpersonal relationships”. 57  By 
adopting such an approach, Connell clarified the flexibility 
and plurality of masculinities and their hierarchical 
structures, laying the foundations for insight into crime and 
gender through hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. 
Messerschmidt 58  built on West & Zimmerman‟s and 
Connell‟s foundations by exploring how gender is 
accomplished in society and why criminal behaviour is a 
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resource for men to do masculinity when their economic and 
social resources are inadequate. Traditionally, men are 
expected to provide for their families but if they are unable to 
do this, they will seek out other “masculine validating 
resources”, 59  which, for a group of adolescent males, can 
mean having the “balls to go break into a house or steal a car 
[or] screwing the most girls..., holding the most beer, 
smoking the most weed”.60 In keeping with the desire of all 
humans to fill their socially mandated role, crime is a result 
of the male drive to ruthlessly accomplish masculinity by any 
means necessary, as a result of excessive individualistic 
gender tension.61 
Whereas traditional theories are unable to explain why 
“boys disproportionately participate in computer crime 
compared with girls”,62 the concept of masculinities is able to 
offer an explanation for the prevalence of male criminality in 
cybercrime.According to this theory, even in an anonymous 
and force-free environment of the cyber world, the gender 
gap remains because men are inherently more likely to 
offend in order to facilitate profit-making and assert their 
dominance over others. 
However, Jefferson63 saw this version of masculinities as 
over socialised, and, in contrast, attributed greater 
importance to how men interpret and react to their own 
psychic considerations and life history. Whereas 
Messerschmidt‟s theory only predicted which social groups, 
rather than which individuals, were likely to resort to crime, 
he thought a psychoanalytic analysis was more accurate 
because it can “encompass both the messy reality of actually 
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existing gender relations, the diversity of actual men and 
women‟s relationships to discourses of masculinity and 
femininity, and the underlying psychological processes”. 64 
Thus, by elevating the importance of psychoanalytic theory 
and incorporating it into masculinities, criminology has been 
able to better accommodate each individual‟s “unique 
(sexual) genesis”65 and understand the vulnerabilities felt by 
even the most vicious criminals. 
Nonetheless, critics still question how accurately gender 
can explain crime through masculinities given the following: 
the pervasiveness of male criminality suggests that masculinity 
is deeply distressed;66 the notion that crime is a masculine 
trait is a tautology; 67  and the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity is too broad of a sociological concept.68 Indeed, 
in practice, masculinity remains in its infancy and needs to be 
developed to encompass a more explicit reference to the 
psyche and clearer isolation of gender itself. However, in 
theory, it offers the most feasible route towards 
understanding the relationship between gender and crime. 
Traditionally, masculinity has been identified as a 
propensity to fight, be tough, and dominate,69 and invariably 
some men are always “reaffirming collective male violence, 
misogyny, and homophobia [and] are, in a sense, familiar 
folk devils”.70 In reality however, not all men are aggressive 
and the concept of masculinities now provides both macro 
and micro explanations as to what it is “not as working-class, 
not as migrants, not as underprivileged individuals, but as 
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men, that induces them to commit crime”.71 By exploring the 
sociological and psychoanalytical effects of gender, 
masculinity helps deepen our understanding of male 
behaviour and therefore crime. 
VI. Conclusion 
Although it is true that gender clearly helps explain crime, it 
is not the only socio-economic factorthat influences it. When 
a poorly educated, black teenage boy steals an expensive 
smartphone from a middle class, female University student, 
there is a lot more to consider than simply gender.However, 
considering the predominance of male crime, it is important 
not to under-estimate the influence of gender on 
criminological study. Regardless of historical tendencies to 
overlook its importance as a matter of social coincidence, 
and contemporary attempts to shoehorn it into pre-existing 
sociological theories, it is vital to treat gender as 
“fundamental, not incidental”72 to the study of crime. 
As such, developments in the study of masculinities have 
been a welcome addition, helping to remove the barriers 
created by gender specific theories and encouraging 
academics to ask why masculinity causes crime rather than 
why men commit crime. However, in order to further 
understand and explain how gender causes crime, it is 
important that criminologists adopt a more nuanced 
approach towards the concept of masculinity if they are to 
fully appreciate the gendered nature of deviance and allow 
criminology to finally face its own sex question. 
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 A Comparative Analysis of the RNR based Sex 
Offender Treatment Programmes 
JessicaCapello Mathews 
Abstract 
The effectiveness of sex offender treatment programs has 
provoked widespread debate among academics; whilst many 
praise their ability to reduce re-offending and promote 
desirable intrinsic outcomes, others condemn their alleged 
potential for indifferent or even negative results. This article 
seeks to determine whether current theories, namely the risk, 
need and responsivity (RNR) theory, can consistently provide 
positive results in comparison with cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT). The effectiveness of the theory of RNR in 
conjunction with alternative theories will be examined, before 
acknowledging the difficulties that may arise when attempting 
to conclusively assess this issue. After reviewing the evidence, 
it becomes apparent that RNR based CBT are the most 
effective treatments available, although one must acknowledge 
that this is currently the most widely used method and 
therefore there is significantly more data is available to 
compare. At present RNR based CBT can effectively reduce 
re-offending and enable intrinsic benefits for a variety of sex 
offenders. 
When examining the topic of sex offender treatment 
programs in general one must be aware that opinions, from 
the theory through to the effectiveness, lack a decided 
amount of consensus.1 However at present, the theory that is 
most effective in providing intrinsic benefits to sex offenders, 
whilst at the same time providing reduced rates of re-
offending, is conceptualised around the collective ideas of 
Andrews, Bonta and Hodge.2Their principles of risk, need 
and responsivity (RNR) encompass a number of strategies 
designed to target and correct individual traits of offenders, 
                                                                
1 Dennis Howitt, An Introduction to Forensic and Criminal Psychology 
(Harlow: Pearson 2011). 
2 (1990) cited in DA Andrews, James Bonta& J Stephen Wormith, The 
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which encourage that particular individual to offend. 3 
Reviewing the historical context, the first sex offender 
treatment programs were predominantly behavioural in their 
nature and founded on the theory of Pavlov‟s Classical 
Conditional Model, which used negative association in order 
to try and curb undesirable behaviours.4 By the late 1900s the 
focus had shifted to cognitive processes, which put greater 
emphasis on identifying and promoting change in the 
dysfunctional thought processes and emotions of offenders.5 
A combination of these two processes, named cognitive-
behavioural treatments (CBT), was formulated and 
interlinked with RNR principles to provide treatments that 
can be extremely effective in correcting both the undesired 
physical aspects of offenders, with treatments such as 
hormone control, and the psychological aspects such as 
difficulties with social skills. 6  Although other theoretical 
frameworks do exist, the most positive results have derived 
from a combination of RNR and CBT programs.7 It must be 
noted, that some academics have gone as far not only to 
question the effectiveness of these sex offender treatment 
programs, but to argue that among certain sectors of sex 
offenders, sex offender treatment programs can actually be 
detrimental and cause degeneration in behaviour.8 Though 
these claims are largely unfounded, to ensure maximum 
effectiveness care must be taken when implementing 
treatment programs. To yield the most beneficial and 
effective results, sex offender treatment programs must 
distinguish their treatments based on differing types of sex 
offenders, for example rapists and pedophiles are far less 
likely to prosper under generic rather than individually 
                                                                
3 Howitt (n 1). 
4 Aviva Moster, Dorota W Wnuk& Elizabeth L Jeglic, Cognitive 
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tailored treatment programs. 9  Finally, it is also worth 
questioning the definition of „effective‟when assessing the 
effectiveness of sex offender treatment programs. Should 
effectiveness be limited purely to whether or not any re-
offending occurs, or should other benefits of treatment, such 
as regain of self-worth or increased motivation to change in 
the individual,10 be reason enough for continuation of these 
treatments. 
Many strongly believe that the theory of RNR “should be 
primary consideration in the design and implementation of 
programs for sexual offenders”, 11  however other theories 
such as the Good Lives Model (GLM) have emerged offering 
alternative methods, goals and desired outcomes. Though 
influence may be drawn from these alternate treatments, 
RNR has been consistently shown to be the most effective 
theory basis.12 RNR is based on the theory that treatment 
should focus on first assessing offenders in terms of risk and 
decide how intensive treatment should be in relation to the 
level of risk.13 Static risk factors, such as previous criminal 
convictions, cannot be changed and are good indicators of 
long-term risks, dynamic stable risk factors are those which 
can be changed with correct treatment, such as deviant sexual 
interests, and dynamic acute risk factors are associated with 
offending in the short-term, such as substance abuse.14 The 
„need‟factor consists of then highlighting the problematic 
characteristics of the offender and categorising them into 
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„criminogenic‟and „non-criminogenic‟factors. Criminogenic 
factors are those that increase the likelihood of re-offending 
(such as impulsiveness), whereas non-criminogenic factors 
are those that do not necessarily affect offending, such as low 
self-esteem. 15  Identifying the need is fundamental to 
improving effectiveness of treatment programs, as it 
immediately tailors treatments to the offender‟s specific 
needs. Finally the „responsivity‟factor consists of calculating 
which methods of treatment are likely to be most effective for 
the individual offender. 16  Combining assessment of these 
factors can ensure that all aspects contributing to criminal 
behaviour are targeted, this can significantly aid creating 
effective sex offender treatment programs with the goal of 
reaching the primary, but not exclusive, goal of crime 
prevention and desistence from offending.17  
GLM focuses on a more positive rehabilitation model and 
suggests, that by improving self-worth and encouraging good 
relationships, sex offenders are less likely to re-offend.18 It is 
widely acknowledged that “GLM views RNR as incomplete 
with its eye fixated on the end point, the elimination of 
criminal behaviour”,19 rather than the personal fulfilment of 
offenders. Sex offenders respond more positively to 
treatment if they are treated firmly but with respect by their 
therapists,20 and this is a core value of GLM. Despite the 
claims that RNR does not include aspects such as 
“therapeutic alliance”, 21  the RNR model extensively 
encourages training of probation officers to build natural and 
positive relationships with the offenders in their care, 22  in 
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order to promote successful outcomes after treatment. This 
illustrates that misconceptions of RNR practices are largely 
incorrect and when considering theories most suited for 
application to sex offender treatment programs, the RNR 
model should be paramount. 
Critics of RNR would also argue that it dedicates little 
time and attention to clinical issues such as motivation of sex 
offenders. 23  The belief that RNR does not concentrate 
sufficiently on these issues, is something that is largely a 
consequence of agencies incorrectly applying RNR principles 
or not adequately incorporating clinical aspects, rather than 
the issues not being included. 24  Whilst GLM may offer 
assistance in terms of aiding in the treatment of motivational 
issues, there is a danger of focusing primarily on creating a 
fulfilling life, in that crime prevention becomes a secondary 
goal.25 The aim of treatments that follow the RNR principles 
is to combine protecting the community (by dedicating focus 
to criminogenic needs) and nurturing the needs of the 
offender.26 While RNR principles provide an active model 
for desistance of offending, and following these principles 
can result in strong positive crime prevention effects;27 the 
RNR theory also includes at the very least a basic 
understanding and incorporation of GLM principles on the 
majority of topics. Furthermore RNR‟s effectiveness is 
illustrated in practice; on the one hand RNR treatments lead 
to considerable reductions in re-offending whereas other 
methods, such as GLM „yield minimal results‟.28 The RNR 
model encourages not only support of the psychological and 
emotional needs of sex offenders, but also stresses the 
importance of crime prevention. By combining these factors 
RNR has yielded more positive results than any other 
                                                                
23 Andrews (n 2). 
24 Andrews (n 2). 
25 Andrews (n 2). 
26 Moster (n 9). 
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model29 demonstrating its superiority on providing effective 
sex offender treatment programs. 
In assessing the effectiveness of sex offender treatment 
programmes in general, the difficulties that arise in terms of 
the validity of results, must be considered. There is at least 
consensus among most that many past treatments have not 
been particularly successful in reducing re-offending, 30  the 
real debate is in reviewing more current programs. Despite 
positive results, poor strategies or bias in investigations can 
invalidate findings that at first appear to reduce re-offending 
significantly. There are many conflicting theories as to the 
success of sex offender treatment programs in practice, due 
to the fact that when evaluating successes or failures most 
academics have differing views of which studies are adequate 
or the „best‟to use.31Kenworthy et al32 included data collected 
from studies that used self-reports in terms of change in 
psychological characteristics, however Rice and Harris 
believed that their results were not valid. 33  It is 
understandable, though not necessarily correct, that Rice and 
Harris concluded that sex offender treatment programs show 
no overall treatment affect, because in their opinion, the 
studies were simply not to satisfactory standard.34 Although 
RNR treatment programmes do demonstrate positive results, 
one must at least be aware that difficulties with the validity of 
results do exist.   
Difficulty also arises when examining uncontrollable 
factors and the effects they may have, which is illustrated in 
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Schmucker and Lösel‟s results.35 When initially interpreting 
and evaluating the results of their study, both surgical and 
chemical castration appeared to yield the most significant 
decrease in re-offending for sex offenders in general. On 
further analysis of other potential influencing factors 
attributing to the positive results of surgical castration, it 
became evident that offender characteristics may have had a 
large affect. It is not unreasonable to assume that those 
willing to undertake intrusive, non-reversible surgery may be 
the most highly motivated to reform from the outset,36 and 
that this motivation at least partially contributed to the low re-
offending statistics. Similarly chemical castration, which is a 
reversible procedure, originally showed re-offending levels 
significantly diminish. However, after the discontinuation of 
treatment, hormone levels within the patient returned to 
normal and further studies have demonstrated that 
consequently re-offending also increases.37 It becomes clear 
that although sex offender treatment programmes can be 
shown to be effective, there are difficulties such as the 
influence of external factors, which cannot be ignored. 
This is not to say that sex offender treatment programs 
are entirely ineffective at decreasing the likelihood of re-
offending. On the contrary, in terms of significantly 
diminishing the level of re-offending, programs that follow 
CBT techniques have appeared consistently effective in the 
majority of studies.38 Results of RNR based CBT programs 
show re-offending rates after a 5-year follow up are between 
5-10% lower in treated sex offenders, than untreated sex 
offenders.39 These techniques are more effective in practice 
and “superior to purely behavioural treatments”,40 due to a 
number of reasons. They are typically highly structured and 
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intensive (sometimes involving in excess of 300 hours over 
28weeks),41 and include specific cognitive treatments such as 
anger control and interpersonal problem solving, which is 
known to aid positive outcomes.42 An example of a treatment 
program that incorporates CBT is the Sex Offender 
Treatment Program (SOTP), which was set up in 1991.43 It is 
divided into four main sections; core treatment, extended 
treatment, booster treatment and thinking skills. 44  While 
extended treatments focus more on the behavioural aspects 
of offending, the core treatments are the most extensive and 
focus around cognitive factors, for example making the 
offender aware of what dynamic factors such as mood can 
increase their level of risk on a day-to-day basis.45 This again 
relates back to RNR principles, illustrating the effectiveness 
of identifying and treating risk factors detrimental to positive 
results. 
In a study of SOTP, Beech et al found that after 
psychological testing nearly all the dynamic risk factors 
examined had improved, further demonstrating the 
effectiveness of CBT in practice.46 Additionally, SOTP and 
CBT promote techniques such as group therapy;47 in taking 
part offenders are exposed to less extreme distortions, which 
can directly reduce their own distortions. 48  It is at first 
difficult to assess if any treatments actually cause a significant 
decrease in re-offending among sex offenders, however 
programs that incorporate CBT that follow RNR principles 
                                                                
41 Polaschek et al, (2004) cited in Howitt (n 1). 
42 Mark W Lipsey, Nana A Landenberger& Sandra J Wilson, „Effects of 
Cognitive Behavioural Programs for Criminal Offenders‟ (2007) 6 
Campbell Systematic Reviews 1, 5. 
43 Howitt (n 1). 
44 Anthony Beech, Richard C Beckett & Dawn Fisher, 'Step 3: An 
evaluation of the Prison Sex Offender Treatment Programme (London: 
Stationary Office 1998). 
45 Beech (n 44). 
46 Beech (n 44). 
47 Howitt (n 1). 
48 Brian P Marx, Robert Miranda Jr & Lori A Meyerson, „Cognitive-
behavioural treatment for rapists: Can we do better?‟ (1999) 19 
ClinPsychol Rev 875. 
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often exhibit significantly reduced rates of re-offending. It 
must be acknowledged that the evidence supporting this may 
be due partially to the fact that there are more examples of 
CBT in action, 49  and with further experimentation or 
examining the validity of previous results, it may become 
apparent that other techniques are equally or even more 
effective. However, at present CBT interlinked with RNR are 
the most effective sex offender treatment programs in terms 
of reducing the re-offending of sex offenders in general. 
Although the evidence demonstrates RNR based CBT 
are the most effective treatments for sex offenders, when 
examining the subcategories of sex offenders it becomes 
apparent that different sex offenders require emphasis on 
different aspects of these programs. Measuring the 
effectiveness of sex offender treatment programs for different 
types of sexual offenders is not restricted to rates of re-
offending, 50  in fact, identifying differences in dynamic risk 
factors such as the levels of motivation of offenders‟before 
and after treatment, often gives more insight into where 
studies are effective and which aspects require development. 
By first identifying the risk factors, it is simpler to determine 
for each subcategory which areas require the most focus, in 
other words following the concept of the need principle. A 
study by Barrett et al assessed changes in motivation levels 
before and after treatment for child molesters, paedophilic 
child molesters and those who committed offences against 
adults, namely rapists.51 Non-Pedophiliac child molesters had 
consistently higher motivation levels following treatment 
compared to initial analysis, whereas paedophilic child 
molesters and rapists displayed more complex results. 
Following treatment, admission of guilt and acceptance of 
responsibility for both categories were substantially lower 
than expected. Before identifying possible ways to increase 
                                                                
49 Schmucker&Lösel (n 35). 
50 Kurt M Bumby, „Assessing the Cognitive Distortions of Child 
Molesters and Rapists: Development and Validation of the MOLEST and 
RAPE Scales‟ (1996) 8 Sex Abuse 37. 
51 Barrett (n 9) 279. 
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results in these areas the reasons for both categories‟results 
and the theories behind them should be investigated. 
Though both paedophilic child molesters and rapists are 
often diagnosed with sexual disorders, evidence has shown 
stronger sexual deviance among peadophilic child 
molesters.52 What can be extracted from this knowledge is 
that paedophilic child molesters are more likely to have 
cognitive distortions about sexual deviance, that is to say, 
have beliefs about sex that are not socially acceptable and can 
lead to criminal behaviour.53 CBT examples that focus on 
these aspects, such as The Kia Marama Sex Offender 
Treatment Program, place extra emphasis on tackling sexual 
deviance by not only cognitive restructuring but largely 
through introducing coping methods, which do not attempt 
to dispel distortions, but allow pedophilic child molesters to 
develops ways to resist deviance.54 Furthermore due to the 
evidence linking pedophilic child molesters with sexual 
disorders, it is perhaps wise to consider also increasing levels 
of behavioural treatments such as masturbatory 
reconditioning.55 These treatments illustrate the importance 
of identifying the need factor of the RNR theory within CBT, 
in an attempt to change the offender‟s perception of what is 
arousing from sexually deviant to more socially acceptable 
concepts, such consenting sex between adults.56 
While rapists are often viewed as having sexual 
disorders,57 studies have shown that they do not benefit solely 
from treatments aimed at sexually deviant behaviour and 
often do not exhibit particularly successful outcomes when 
                                                                
52 Donaldo Canales, Mark Olver& Stephen Wong, „Construct Validity of 
the Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offender Version for Measuring Sexual 
Deviance‟ (2009) 21 Sex Abuse 474. 
53 Bumby (n 50) 38. 
54 Stephen Hudson, David Wales, Leon Bakker & Tony Ward, 
„Dynamic Risk Factors: The Kia Marama Evaluation‟ (2002) 14 Sex Abuse 
103. 
55 Barrett (n 9) 281. 
56 Howitt (n 1). 
57 Barrett (n 9) 280. 
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treated alongside child molesters in the SOTP.5859  In fact, 
they are possibly the most complex and intriguing sector of 
sex offenders, in regards to sex offender treatment programs 
effectiveness. Eher et al noted after reviewing diagnoses of 
rapists, that 76% had personality disorders rather than sexual 
disorders, with particularly high rates in antisocial 
disorders. 60 Some academics are of the opinion that sex 
offender treatment programs among those with personality 
disorders are not only ineffective, but can actually have 
harmful effects. Jones, who describes these outcomes as 
iatrogenic, argues that sex offenders with personality 
disorders have a significantly high dropout rate (50%) and 
even when completed, sex offender treatment programs do 
not result in a significant reduction in re-offending rates.61 He 
continues to voice his concerns that if treatments are 
ineffective the first time they are experienced, cognitive 
distortions could be strengthened and a lack of belief in the 
ability to change could be instilled in the offender. Evidence 
to the contrary shows that there is statistical uncertainty and 
not enough evidence exists at present to support this theory.62 
 Regardless, when treating offenders with personality 
disorders (in this example rapists), different methods should 
be applied to increase effectiveness to its fullest potential. In 
response to antisocial disorders, methods should heavily rely 
on measures to decrease anti-social behaviour63 such as anger 
control and interpersonal problem solving. 64  There is also 
evidence illustrating that when treating rapists it is prudent to 
consider Lang‟s triple response theory, 65  this advises that 
                                                                
58 STEP Team,„The Therapeutic Impact of Sex Offender Treatment 
Programmes‟(1995) 42 Probat J 2. 
59 Sophie Davison &AleksandarJanca, „Personality Disorder and 
Criminal Behaviour. What Is the Nature of the Relationship?‟ (2012) 25 
CurrOpinPsychiatr 39, 41. 
60 Eher et al, (2010) cited in Davison &Janca (n 59). 
61 Jones (n 8) 72. 
62 D'Silva (n 27). 
63 Barrett (n 9) 280. 
64 Lipsey (n 42). 
65 (1968) cited in Marx (n 48) 882. 
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there are “three response channels (verbal, overt motor and 
physiologic)”66 and that these channels should be measured 
and evaluated in regards to what motives different rapists to 
offend. Applying his theory in practice is important when 
evaluating which motivation function is primary in different 
offenders. For example, an individual may find a victim in 
pain sexually arousing at all times but this arousal alone may 
not lead to offending. 67  However, combining this sexual 
deviance with certain conditions, such as high-tension levels, 
may lead to undesirable acts being carried out.68 This theory 
would imply that significant inclusion of techniques to 
encourage offenders to accept that, although they may have 
deviant thoughts, they can learn coping methods so as not to 
act on them, would perhaps prove more effective.69 
This is further illustrated in a study by Marshall and 
Barbaree in which the results from 60 rapists showed that 
30% were equally or more aroused by scenes of 
nonconsensual sex than consensual sex.70 When compared 
with 27% of non-offenders finding nonconsensual scenes 
equally or more arousing than consensual sex, the difference 
is insignificant. This further demonstrates that rapists are not 
necessarily more likely to have sexually deviant thoughts, and 
that sex offender treatment programs should also focus on 
other factors to increase effectiveness. Sexual deviance clearly 
does not play a primary role in motivation of rapists and 
therefore it would be less effective to rely purely on 
behavioural treatments. It is evident that despite CBT 
displaying significant reductions in rates of re-offending, the 
term and concepts of „cognitive-behavioural‟programs are not 
specific. This runs concurrently with the view that sex 
offenders do not commit offences for the same reasons and 
therefore treatments that are generalised are very unlikely to 
                                                                




70 William L Marshall & James McGuire, „Effect sizes in treatment of 
sexual offenders‟ (2003) 47Int J Offender Ther Comp Criminol 653. 
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be effective for all categories.71 When assessing sex offender 
treatment programs tailored to support different 
subcategories of sex offenders, it is important to understand 
theories of why different types of sex offenders, particularly 
rapists, offend and apply these to sex offender treatment 
programs in practice in order to induce maximum 
effectiveness. This again, illustrates the importance of 
identifying the need factor of individual offenders, as 
suggested in the RNR theory. 
In conclusion, the importance of identifying the factors of 
risk, need and responsivity is evident in selecting treatment 
programs that are most likely to be effective for sex offenders 
in general. The principles of the RNR theory allow for 
treatment programs that are specifically tailored to the 
diverse needs of individual sex offenders. These principles, 
when interlinked with a combination of both cognitive and 
behavioural treatments, are decidedly the most effective in 
practice and this is supported by numerous studies, which 
have concluded that RNR based CBT significantly reduces 
re-offending for sex offenders.72 When more closely assessing 
the effectiveness of sex offender treatment programs, it is also 
important to note that the reasons behind offending differ 
hugely and sex offenders cannot be effectively treated 
identically. Following the RNR model allows for specific 
treatment of subcategories that at first appear similar, but 
which require largely different methods of treatment to 
achieve positive results. When applying the RNR principles 
to CBT, hugely beneficial treatment of sex offenders can 
occur, these treatment programs can again provide specific 
treatments based on the most effective ways to correct 
specific motivations behind offending, either cognitive or 
behavioural.73 It is clear that extensive research into theories 
behind motivations and possible ways of reducing re-
offending rates, particularly among rapists, is needed, and 
                                                                
71 STEP Team (n 58). 
72 Howitt (n 1). 
73 STEP Team (n 58). 
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present evidence of success is by no means conclusive. 
However when correctly applying the RNR theory to CBT, 
sex offender treatment programs can not only provide hugely 
desirable intrinsic outcomes for offenders, but also 
significantly diminish the likelihood of re-offending in the 
community.74 
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 A Critique of Enlightened Shareholders Value: 
Revisiting the Shareholders‟ Primacy Theory 
Collins C. Ajibo* 
Abstract 
The statutory re-conceptualisation of the traditional common 
law shareholders primacy into „enlightened shareholders 
value‟ emblematic of section 172 of the UK Company Act 
2006 has generated a universe of views among scholars. 
While some scholars hypothesise that the enlightened 
shareholder value concept epitomised by section 172 is no 
more than a re-affirmation of the traditional common law 
shareholders‟ primacy under different guise, others theorise 
that it inches towards the „pluralist theory‟ of continental 
European tradition. Still further, others argue that the re-
conceptualisation is emblematic of the convergence of 
principles from both the traditional „primacy theory‟ and the 
„pluralist theory‟. While the preceding divergences on the 
contours of the substantive rules subsist, arguments and 
counter-arguments have similarly underpinned the potential 
fallout of the procedural framework for the enforcement of 
the sectionconsequent on procedural constraints. It is 
contended that despite the laudable statutory re-
conceptualisation, section 172 only added little improvement 
(if any) on the traditional common law shareholders‟ primacy; 
and its greatest shortcoming lies on the enforcement 
constraints.Nevertheless, the courts can still adopt a 
teleological interpretative approach to the construction of the 
section that plug the loophole in the stakeholders‟ protection. 
I. Introduction 
The graduation from the traditional common law 
shareholders‟ primacy to enlightened shareholders‟ principle 
now encapsulated in section 172 of the UK Company Act 
2006 has led to so many postulations as to the potential 
implication of the section. 1  The Company Law Review 
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Steering Group(CLRSG)2considered the pluralist approach 
characteristic of some continental European countries 3  but 
abandoned it in favour of enlightened shareholders 
approach. The directors are now constrained to have regard 
to stakeholders‟ interests as well as to observe the tenets of 
corporate social responsibilities while promoting the success 
of the company for the benefit of members as a whole. 
However, the preceding responsibilities have equally thrown 
up conceptual arguments of various strands. Thus, while 
some scholars postulate that the enlightened shareholder 
concept epitomised by section 172 is coterminous with 
traditional shareholders‟ „primacy theory‟ that underpinned 
the common law paradigm, 4  others hypothesise that it 
inclines towards „pluralist theory‟ characteristic of a significant 
number of continental European countries. 5  Still further, 
others argue that the re-conceptualisation is emblematic of a 
confluence of principles from both the traditional „primacy 
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that section 172 is a product of effort to codify the directors‟ duties in 
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codified.See The UK Government, „Explanatory Notes to Company Act 
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Success of the Company in S.172 (1) of UK Company Act 2006: Towards 
an „Enlightened Directors‟ Primacy?‟ (2008)Original Law Review 4, 37. 
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accessed: 25 November 2013. 
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theory‟ and „pluralist theory‟typical of continental Europe.6 
While the arguments on the contours of the substantive rules 
linger, others have gone further to express scepticism on the 
enforcement of shareholders‟ and/or stakeholders‟ 
rightsconsequent on procedural constraints. These 
divergences tend to challenge the philosophical premise 
behind the reformulation of the section; and may, as well, 
have far reaching implications on the practical fallout of its 
construction. A critique of the foregoing trajectories therefore 
forms the focus of this article. It will be argued that despite 
the laudable statutory re-conceptualisation, section 172 only 
added little improvement (if any) on the shareholder 
„primacy theory‟; and its greatest shortcoming lies on the 
procedural enforcement constraints. However, the courts can 
salvage the situation through teleological interpretation of the 
section. 
The article is divided into eight sections to underscore the 
significance of each of the concepts as well as to enhance 
better understanding by the readers. Section II examines the 
conceptual premise of shareholders versus stakeholders‟ 
debate. Section III lays out the constituents of section 172 for 
easy reference, then examines the background preceding the 
reform before analysing the contours of „promoting the 
success of the company‟ in relation to the common law 
position. Section IV dwells on the concept of good faith. 
Section V then examines the core concept of enlightened 
shareholders as it relates to the conjunctive terms of„have 
regard (amongst other things)to‟.Section VI explores whether 
the position of stakeholders particularly employees 
andcreditors‟ is better protected under the current 
framework compared to traditional common law position. 
Section VII then argues that the controversy characterising 
the section could be ameliorated if the courts could adopt a 
teleological interpretative paradigm. Section VIII concludes 
                                                                
6 Stephen Brammeret al, „Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Institutional Theory: New Perspectives on Private Governance‟ [2010] 
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that section 172 added little (if anything) to the traditional 
common law shareholder primacy theory, except if the courts 
could adopt a purposeful interpretative approach anchored 
on a teleological paradigm. 
II. Conceptual Framework of Shareholders versus 
Stakeholders Debate 
Before delving into the trajectories of section 172, it would be 
pertinent at the outset to examine in general the competing 
theories of corporation to underscore the normative 
foundation cum divergent postulations that underpin the 
shareholder versus stakeholder debate. The doctrinal 
conception of corporation in early years had been an artificial 
entity (a derivative of concession or grant theory of 
corporation)7which came into being by virtue of substantive 
laws of the state – demonstrated in chartered nature of 
corporation then.8 However, as the state continued to loosen 
legal strictures making it easier for the incorporation of 
companies, a new doctrinal conception emerged therefrom, 
in the form of natural entity theory. 9  In contrast to an 
artificial entity, natural entity theory postulates that a 
corporation is a natural creation consequent upon 
agglomeration of private initiatives of the individuals, and 
thus can only exercise such powers as are extended to it by 
the shareholders.The state should refrain from imposition of 
regulatory constraints as the corporation, governed by private 
law, exists to serve shareholders‟ interests as against 
stakeholders‟ interests.10 
                                                                
7 Morton J Horwitz, 'Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory' [1985-1986]West Virginia Law Review 88, 184. 
8 David Millon, 'Theories of Corporation' [1990] (2) Duke Law Journal, 
206;David Millon, 'New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, 
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law' [1993] 50Washington & 
Lee Law Review 1373. 
9 Millon, 'Theories of Corporation' [1990] Duke Law Journal 201. 
10 For a review of these theories see, David Millon, 'Theories of 
Corporation', 211-216.Note that aggregate theory of corporation provided 
the theoretical basis for natural entity theory but was unsustainable due to 
the separation of ownership from management as well as the crystallisation  
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This doctrinal premise provided the theoretical 
framework for the shareholder versus stakeholder debate 
between Berle 11  and Dodd 12  in the early 1930s that 
significantly shaped subsequent legal discourse on the scope 
of directors‟ duties. Neo-classical proponents of Berle‟s 
positioncontend that shareholder value maximisation 
constitutes the only theory of corporation consistent with free 
market economy.13 In their provocative article, The End of 
History for Corporate Law,14Hansmann and Kraakman, in 
supporting the shareholders‟primacy theory, posit that other 
stakeholders such as creditors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, environments, among others, can only be part of 
the corporate governance equation if they are party to the 
express and unambiguous contract with the corporation. 
Failing that, they can only lay claim to protections of other 
bodies of law, otherwise their interests are not to be the 
concern of corporate management. Specifically, corporate 
accountability of directors is owed to shareholders only who 
invested their money in the corporation and not otherwise. 
Thus, members of society affected by corporate activities 
may avail themselves of the protection of, for example, 
environmental law or the law of tort, butthey are not to 
expect corporate management to have them in 
contemplation during the operation of the company.15 
In contrast to the above, progressive writers, particularly 
Cynthia William, argue that in the context of increasing 
globalisation, the argument that corporation exists purely to 
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[1932]45(8) Harvard Law Review 1365. 
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[1932] 45(7) Harvard Law Review 1145. 
13 Stephen Bainbridge, 'In Defence of Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm' [1993] 50 Washington & Lee Law Review 1423; Milton Friedman, 
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maximise the shareholders‟ wealth is illusory. 16  In other 
words, the so-called regulatory rules and explicit contract to 
regulate company relationship with stakeholders are 
inadequate. Equally, Margaret Blair and Leon Stout question 
the validity of shareholder primacy theory.17 Blair and Stout 
argue that the existence of corporation is a by-product of 
team production involving the input ofvarious interests not 
limited to shareholders per se.18 In fact, the team production 
theory rejects shareholder primacy theory. 
Shareholder versus stakeholder debates can further be 
analysed from the standpoint of thecontractarianism versus 
communitarianism debate; 19 the predominant versus the 
progressive position;20 the monism versus pluralism debate, 
among others, reflecting the diversity of perspectives.21Thus, 
these conceptual frameworks shaped the evolution and 
continue to shape the growth of corporate law and by 
implication the directors‟ duties which are the touchstone of 
corporate governance. It can be argued therefore that the 
statutory re-conceptualisation of section 172 Company Act 
2006 might have been influenced in part, at least 
conceptually, by the preceding. Analysis of the core 
substantive import of the section forms the focus of the 
following parts punctuated, first and foremost, by laying out 
the constituents of the section for easy reference. 
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III. Section 172 
Section 172 provides: 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way 
he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard (amongst other matters) to – 
a) the likely consequences of any decision 
in the long term, 
b) the interests of the company's 
employees, 
c) the need to foster the company's 
business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
d) the impact of the company's operations 
on the community and the 
environment, 
e) the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct, and 
f) the need to act fairly as between 
members of the company. 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of 
the company consist of or include purposes 
other than the benefit of its members, subsection 
(1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its 
members were to achieving those purposes. 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect 
subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or 
act in the interests of creditors of the company. 
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IV. Background to the Company Law Reform of 2006 
The company law reform of 2006 was an agglomeration of 
the efforts to reform the UK corporate governance model, 
inspired collectively by the Cadbury Committee Reports of 
1992; the Greenbury Committee Report of 1996; and the 
Hampel Committee Report of 1998, which consolidated the 
preceding into a Combined Code.22 Following the preceding 
Reports,23  the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 24 
commissioned Company Law Review Committee charged 
with modernising the UK company law to make it “simple, 
efficient and cost effective framework for British business in 
the twenty-first century”.25 The Committee submitted its Final 
Report involving the recommendation options to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on 26 July 2001. 
After series of further consultations, the government finally 
issued the White Papers “Modernising Company Law” (July 
2002) and“Company Law Reform” (March 2005). 26 
Following further public comments on the Government 
intention as embodied in the White Paper of 2005, the 
Government finally introduced the Company Law Reform 
Bill to the House of Lords on 4 November 2005, setting the 
stage for the reform that included section 172 which 
constitutes the focal point of this article. The analysis of the 
substantive parts of the section forms the focus of next 
discussion hereunder. 
                                                                
22 Note also that other Reports such as those emanating from the 
Turnbull Committee, and the Higgs Review, amongst others, added to the 
build up to the Company law reform agendas. These Reports in one way 
or the other tended to offer recommendations to improve the UK 
corporate governance model including the workings of the board of 
directors and disclosure of directors‟ remunerations. Note equally that the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance has been replaced by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code of June 2010. See Derek French et 
al,Company Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012-2013), 429-430 
23 Note that these Reports were not limited to the reform of section 172 
inter se, but straddle the principles of corporate governance in its entirety. 
24 Note that the DTI has now been replaced by the Department of 
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V. Promoting the Success of the Company 
Traditionally, directors under common law owe the fiduciary 
duty to act bona fide for the interest of the company.27 This, 
by and large, translates into balancing the short term interests 
of present members with the long term interests of future 
members 28  with shareholders‟ interest construed from the 
prism of advancing shareholders‟ value. 29 The statutory 
reformulation substituted „interest of the company‟ with 
„promoting the success of the company‟. However the Act 
offers no definition of what constitutes promoting the success 
of the company for the benefit of members as a whole. This 
is likely to create a significant problem for the court in 
construing it.30 
Section 170(4) provides that the general duties shall be 
interpreted and applied in the same manner as common law 
rules and equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the 
corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in 
interpreting and applying the general duties. 31  This could 
mean that the meaning ascribed to „interest of the company‟ 
under the common law namely –the benefit for the present 
and future shareholders 32  may be relevant in interpreting 
„promoting success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole‟, embedded in section 172. 
Although parliamentary debate33 described success as long 
term increase in shareholders‟ value evidencing economic 
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success of the company, 34  that by no means constitutes a 
clear-cut parameter of measurement. It has been posited 
thatpromoting the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members equates to observance by the directors of the 
objectives of the company set out in its constitution.35 
However, wherea company is a charity and/or community 
interest-based, 36  or incorporated for a specific object, 
determining the success of the company may be difficult. 
Although it has been suggested that the measurement of 
success of the company in such circumstances couldbe 
determined based on achieving the intended object,37 that by 
no means settles the issue, particularly where the „intended 
object‟does not significantly incorporate external 
constituencies. Indeed, such non-commercial or charitable 
companies might, perhaps, be required to promote the 
success of the companies to achieve the charitable objects 
having regard to stakeholders‟ interest. Nonetheless, success 
would still be difficult to calibrate where companies exist for 
interest other than that of its members. 38  As 
noted,39subsection 2 is intended to preserve non-commercial 
objectives of companies as illustrated by Horsley v Weight.40 
It remains to be seen how courts will construe this subsection 
given “different hierarchy of priorities” 41  that have to be 
weighed in determining the success of the company. 
One potential guide to determining the success of the 
company might be that directors‟ actions must not ipso facto 
                                                                
34 See HL Deb. Vol 678 GC 255-8(6 Feb 2006). 
35 See Hannigan,Company Lawat 209. 
36 See DTI, Companies Act 2006: Duties of Directors: Ministerial 
Statement (DTI, London, June 2007) 7, statement of Lord Goldsmith, 
Lords Grand Committee, 6 Feb Column 255. See also, s172(2)) UK 
Company Act 2006 (hereinafter referred to as CA 2006). 
37 Hannigan, Company Law at 209. 
38 Hannigan,Company Law at 209. 
39 A Alcock, „Accidental Change to Directors‟ Duties?‟ [2009] 30(12) 
Company Lawyer, 7. 
40 Horsley v Weight [1984] 3 All ER 1045. 
41 Paul Omar, „In the Wake of Company Act 2006: An Assessment of 
Potential Impact of Reforms to Company Law‟ [2009] 20(2) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review, 44. 
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promote the success of the company in objective terms as 
long as they acted in good faith believing their action to be 
likely to promote the success of the company. 42  This 
argument is, perhaps, reinforced by the Guidance on Key 
Clauses in Company Law Reform Bill which states that “[t]he 
decision as to what will promote success and what constitutes 
such, is one for the directors‟ good faith judgment...”.43 The 
foregoing no less encapsulates wide discretionary powers of 
the directors in the exercise of the management judgment. 
Nonetheless, where directors‟ action is devoid of 
consideration of company‟s interest and there is no ground 
on which he or she could reasonably arrive at such a 
conclusion that it was done for company‟s interest, he or she 
would be in breach of duty.44Furthermore, directors‟ action 
would not be justified where, irrespective of the fact that the 
boards would have arrived at the same decision as the 
directors, their action, considered in totality, could not be 
said to be in the interest of the company.45 This however 
does not detract from the wide discretion of directors 
embedded in section 172(1) which must be exercised in good 
faith. 
It is settled that embedded in section 172(1) is a subjective 
element46 in promoting the success of the company for the 
benefit of the whole members in contrast to thecommon law 
duty that directors “act in good faith for the benefit of the 
company which has element of objectivity”.47A subjective test 
may prove cumbersome for the court to construe. 
Consequently, it has been postulated that just like under 
                                                                
42 Andrew Keay, „S.172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation 
and Assessment‟ [2007] 28(4) Company Lawyer, 5. 
43 See DTI, Guidance on Key Clauses to the Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the framework (DTI, London 2000) 
para 63. 
44 See Item Software UK Ltd vFassihi[2005] 2 BCLC 91. 
45 W & W Roith Ltd Re [1967] 1 WLR 432. 
46 Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law at 
510. 
47 Ji L Yap, „Considering the Enlightened Shareholders Value Principle‟ 
[2010] 31(2) Company Lawyer, 3. 
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common law, courts will ultimately introduce an objective 
element in construing acting in „good faith‟ to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of the members as a 
whole. 48  Thus, illustrative of this position was the case of 
Chatterbridge Corp. Ltd. V Lloyd Bank Ltd.,49 where it was 
held, inter alia, that the duty to act in good faith for the 
company‟s interest could be faulted where the actions of the 
directors could not be reasonably considered to be in the 
interest of the company by any reasonable and intelligent 
person. 
Apart from the stakeholders‟ interest enumerated in 
subsection 1 to section 172, directors should, in promoting 
the success of the company, have regard to the need to act 
fairly between members of the company.50Subsection 1(f) in 
effect probably entails that directors have to take into 
consideration the effect of their proposal on different classes 
of shareholders,51 and act fairly among all in a manner absent 
protecting sectional interest.52 Failure of the directors in this 
regard may trigger minority action under unfair prejudice 
provision. However, it would appear that directors could be 
justified under section 172(1) to defend any decision to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of the 
whole members even if it favours employees‟ interest over 
short term profit.53 
Similarly, where directors‟ actions will ultimately promote 
the success of the company but, invariably, affect certain 
shareholders, their action could still be upheld 
notwithstanding. Thus, in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New 
                                                                
48 Keay, „S.172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and 
Assessment‟, 5. 
49 Chatterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyd Bank Ltd[1970] Ch 62. 
50 See subsection 1(f). See also R. (on the application of People & Planet) 
v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin). 
51 See Re BSB Holding Ltd. No2 [1996] 1 BCLC 155. 
52 See Mills v Mills [1930] 60 CLR 150. 
53 John Lowry, „The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the 
Accountability Gap through Efficient Disclosure‟ [2009] 68(3) Cambridge 
Law Journal, 607; see also Re Welfab Engineers Ltd [1990] BCLC 833 
per Hoffmann J. 
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York v Rank Organisation Ltd.,54 despite discrimination in 
issue of shares to hedge cost of regulatory compliance by the 
company, it was held, inter alia, that directors honestly 
believed that raising capital as such would benefit the 
company with consequential benefit to all the shareholders. 
It should be noted that the duty to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of the members as a whole is 
subject to subsection 3; and as argued, some otheroverriding 
legislations particularly employment, consumer, safety and 
discrimination legislations, even if non-compliance with the 
above legislations will promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of members as whole.55 
VI. Good Faith 
Good faith is not defined by the Act. Thus, since regard must 
be had to common law rules and equitable principles in 
construing the section56 it would appear that the directors‟ 
discretion embodied in the section, in similar fashion as 
under common law, is uninhibited. As illustrated by Lord 
Greene MR in Smith & Fawcett Ltd,57 directors are bound to 
exercise their powers “bona fide in what they consider, not 
what a court may consider, is in the interest of the company”. 
Although the preceding ruling might be informed by the fact 
that directors are better positioned to make value judgments 
on what course the company might take, such an unfettered 
discretion mightequally lead to potential abuse of powers by 
the directors.58 
                                                                
54 Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v Rank Organisation 
Ltd[1985] BCLC 11. 
55 Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law at 
510; see also, s.172 (3) CA 2006. 
56 See s.170 (4) CA 2006. 
57 [1942] Ch 304, at 306 (CA). 
58 See Wrexham Associated Football Club Ltd (In Administration) v 
Crucialmove Ltd[2008] 1 B.C.L.C. 508, where the director, in exercise of 
discretion, was involved in a breach of fiduciary duty as well as conflict of 
interest as result of personal gain. 
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Guidance on Key Clauses in Company Law Reform Bill59 
stipulates that good faith should be exercised in a manner 
characteristic of a reasonable man of skill, care and diligence. 
Nonetheless, it has been postulated that directors ought not 
to be liable in breach of their fiduciary duties where their 
actions are unreasonable but he or she honestly believes it is 
done in good faith for the interest of the company.60 This is 
because good faith is, inter alia, anchored on honesty and 
loyalty, not necessarily competence. 61  However,courts may 
invalidate directors‟ actions done for collateral 
purpose,62irrespective of the powers of the boards to ratify 
subsequently. 
Moreover, as argued, where a director fails to exercise 
power in good faith to promote the success of the company, 
their action may be open to review; and if loss resulted to the 
company, he or she will be liable to make good the loss.63In 
this regard, non-executive directors have been advised not to 
allow themselves to be dominated by directors lest they 
would not be able to convince the court that they acted in 
good faith.64It can be argued, on the contrary, that where bad 
faith characterises action of the directors, it ought to ground 
liability. 
VII. Enlightened Shareholder Principle 
The common law position was based on primacy of 
shareholders value 65 – what can be termed the „primacy 
theory‟. It is arguable whether section 172 (1) encapsulated as 
                                                                
59 See DTI,Guidance on Key Clauses to the Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the Frameworkat 63. 
60 DKC Wu, „Managerial Behaviour, Company Law and the Problem of 
Enlightened Shareholders Value‟ [2010] Company Lawyer, 2. 
61 ibid 2. 
62 See Ultraframe (UK) v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 Ch. 
63 John Birds et al, Company Law (7thedn Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 
2009) 597. 
64 Ji L Yap, „Hear no Evil, See no Evil, Speak no evil: the Total Inactivity 
of Non-Executive Directors‟ [2009] 20(11) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, 412. 
65 Greenhalgh v Aderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch286; see also Hutton v 
West Cork Rly Co [1883] 23 ChD 654. 
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„enlightened shareholders value‟ significantly differed from 
the existing legal position. According to Davies,66section 172 
is an improvement on common law but only a modest one. 
However, it has been held that the section did “little more 
than set out the pre-existing law”.67Although this decision has 
been challenged as not reflecting the correct legal position,68it 
does indicate the divergence that underpins this sphere. 
Nonetheless, it has been contended that section 172(1) is in 
accord with OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 
which emphasises, among other things, cooperation between 
the corporation and stakeholders in creating wealth, and that 
the full import of such accord will come into effect upon 
directors‟ internalisation of the section.69 
It is considered that section 172 (1) represents a 
significant improvement, since amongst other things, the 
interest of a wider scope of stakeholders will now be 
considered by directors than hitherto the case. However, it 
would be hard to claim that the section replicates the „dual 
consideration theory‟ in its entirety characteristic of 
significant number of continental European countries, 
particularly the German co-determination model that accords 
dual consideration to both shareholders and stakeholders in 
management decisions. 
Undoubtedly, the directors in promoting the success of 
the company for the benefit of the members as a whole 
should have regard to, the likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term;70interest of the employees;71interest 
                                                                
66 SeeDavies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Lawat 
509. 
67 See Re West Coast Capital Ltd [2008] CSOH 72 per Lord Glennie; 
he reasoned that sections 171 – 172 did little more than set out the pre-
existing legal position. 
68 Robert Goddard, „Directors Duties‟ [2008] 12Edinburgh Law Review, 
468; Lowry, „The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the 
Accountability Gap through Efficient Disclosure‟ [2009] 68(3) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 607, 614 (arguing that s172 is a step further than 
pre-existing law). 
69 Cerioni, „The Success of the Company in S.172 (1) of UK Company 
Act 2006: Towards an „Enlightened Directors‟ Primacy?‟ [2008] OLR 4(1) 
70 Companies Act 2006, s 172(1)(a). 
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of suppliers, customers and others; 72  impact of their 
operation on the environment; the need for high standards of 
conduct;73 and the need to act fairly between members of the 
company. 74  It is settled that the stakeholders‟ interest 
encapsulated in the above subsection by no means equates to 
shareholders‟ interest.75 Rather, directors are called upon to 
take into account stakeholders‟ interests so long as such 
action will promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of members as a whole. 
Under common law, it was possible for directors to take 
into account stakeholders‟ interests so long as it promoted 
the interest of the company for the benefit of shareholders as 
a whole.76 This was illustrated by the case of Hutton v West 
Cork Rly,77where it was held that, “the law does not say that 
there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes 
and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the 
company”. 
The stakeholders‟ interest may appear, prima facie, to be 
better protected under section 172 than hitherto the case. 
However, the shortcoming of section 172 (1) becomes more 
apparent when one inquires as to whether stakeholders can 
directly enforce the observance of their interest. 
Consequently, it has been postulated that except 
shareholders, or where a stakeholder doubles as a 
shareholder, other stakeholders lack the capacity to enforce 
the observance of their interests embodied in the 
                                                                                                                      
71 Companies Act 2006, sub-s 172(1)(b). 
72 Companies Act 2006, sub-s 172(1)(c). 
73 Companies Act 2006, sub-ss 172(1)(d – e). 
74 Companies Act 2006, sub-s 172(1)(f). 
75 See Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Lawat 
510. 
76 See the case of Evans v Brunner, Mond and Company, Limited [1921] 
1 Ch 359, where the company expenditure for scientific research incidental 
to its main object of chemical manufacturing was held to be within the 
object of the company and therefore not ultra vires. 
77 Hutton v West Cork Rly[1883] 23 Ch D 673, per Bowen LJ. 
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section.78Similarly, shareholders bringing derivative action on 
company‟s behalf must obtain court‟s approval,79 as well as 
encounter other (almost insurmountable) hurdles. 80  The 
above shortcomings have led to questions as to whether the 
lots of shareholder and stakeholders are better protected 
under section 172 than hitherto the case. It has been argued 
that the inability of the stakeholders to enforce the 
observance of the section 172 (1) directly may entail that the 
section will hardly be litigated. 81  It could be argued that, 
perhaps, empowering direct stakeholders‟ enforcement could 
lead to vexatious actions against directors. Nonetheless, a 
duty is only useful in law if it is enforceable.82 
The encapsulation of what is generally known as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in section 172 (1) (d – 
e) is a giant stride in law making. However, as noted, 
corporate governance that is shareholder-centric as is the case 
with section 172 (1) may not adequately cater to 
CSR.83Nonetheless, it has been argued that shareholders are 
deemed“to be enlightened and to want to take into account 
issues of[CSR]”.84 
                                                                
78 Companies Act 2006, s 261; Parker Hood, „Directors Duties under the 
Companies Act 2006: Clarity or Confusion?‟ [2013] 13 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, 47. 
79 Companies Act 2006, ss 261-262. 
80 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, „Derivative Proceedings in a Brave 
New World for Company Management and Shareholders‟ [2010] 2 
Journal of Business Law 152 – 161, where they discussed potential hurdles 
a shareholder may face in bringing derivative action such as, establishing 
prima facie case; implication of company filing response and effect of s263; 
and possibility of applicability of equitable doctrine of clean hands. See 
also Wishart [2009] CSIH 65; Franbar Holdings Ltd. v Patel [2008] 
EWHC 1534 Ch, on what appears to be conflicting threshold set by the 
court.  
81 L Linklater, „Promoting Success: the Company Act 2006‟ [2007] 28(5) 
Company Lawyer, 129; See also Yap, „Considering the Enlightened 
Shareholders Value Principle‟, 3 (arguing that the inability of stakeholders 
to enforce directly makes s.172 toothless against directors). 
82 Peter Loose et al,The Company Director: Powers, Duties and 
Liabilities(10thedn Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 2008) 285. 
83 AdefolakeAdeyeye, „The Limitations of Corporate Governance in 
CSR Agenda‟ [2010] 31(4) Company Lawyer, 4-5. 
84 Bill Perry and Lynne Gregory, „The European Panorama: Directors‟ 
Economic and Social Responsibilities‟ [2009] 20(2) International Company  
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Perhaps, as submitted, members will only bring action 
where directors fail to act in good faith to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of members as a 
whole, and, where they fail to act fairly between members,85 
rather than bringing action for the protection of stakeholders‟ 
interestsstrictosensu.If theforegoing becomes the eventuality, 
then it means that “parliament has created a right without a 
remedy which the law abhors”.86 As noted by a commentator, 
it appears law makers have “mistakenly encapsulated 
shareholders‟ principle into the objective of the companies” 
in section 172 (1). 87  This conclusion, it is submitted, is 
inevitable since stakeholders‟ interests remain subordinate to 
shareholders‟ interests. 
Members of the company will be able to assess directors‟ 
compliance with the provision of section 172 (1) when 
business review is tendered.88Although business review has 
now become a part of financial reporting, the contours of 
what constitutes an ideal business review remain blurred, and 
could be amenable to manipulation by the directors. 89 
Indeed, it has been hypothesised that directors may adopt a 
cynical approach to stakeholders‟ interests by adopting 
mechanical compliance with business review regime. 90One 
                                                                                                                      
and Commercial Law Review, 25. By contrast, shareholders might as well 
act in „unenlightened manner‟ thereby detracting from the substance of the 
CSR paradigm. See Carrie Bradshaw, „The Environmental Business Case 
and Unenlightened Shareholder Value‟ [2013] 33Legal Studies, 141. 
85 S.172(1)(f). 
86 Deryn Fisher, „The Enlightened Shareholders - Leaving Stakeholders 
in the Dark: Will S.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 make Directors 
Consider the Impact of their Decision on the Third Parties‟ [2009] 20(1) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, 10. 
87 Daniel Attenborough, „How Directors Should Act when Owing Duties 
to Companies‟ Shareholders: Why we Need to Stop Applying Greenhalgh‟ 
[2009] 20(10)International Company and Commercial Law Review, 339 
88 See s.417(2) CA 2006. 
89 Michael Page, „Business Models as a Basis for Regulation of Financial 
Reporting‟ (2012). <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10997-012-
9239-0> accessed: 25 November 2013. 
90 Charles Wynn-Evans, „The Companies Act 2006 and the Interest of 
Employees‟ [2007] 36(2)Industrial Law Journal, 192. 
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just hopes that the preceding eventuality does not become a 
reality. 
VIII. Have Regard (amongst other matters) to 
The Act provides no definition of „have regard to‟. It has, 
however, been suggested91that directors should „have regard 
to‟ array of other codified duties such as company‟s 
constitution;92creditors‟ interest;93exercise of reasonable care, 
skill and diligence; 94 avoidance of conflict of interest; 95 not 
accept benefit from third parties;96and disclosure of interest 
in any transaction.97 
Keay,98on the other hand, submitted that „have regard to‟ 
entails having regard to the interest of constituencies other 
than those referred to in section 172(1) so far as this 
promotes benefits to members. Keay‟s position has been 
echoed as being sensible.99 
The inclusion of „among other matters‟ means that the 
catalogues of matters directors should take account of in 
promoting the success of the company for the benefit of the 
members as a whole are not exhaustive. This was buttressed 
by government statements emanating from Lord Goldsmith: 
“we have included the words, „among other things‟. We want 
to be clear that the list of factors [for a director to have regard 
to] is not exhaustive”.100Such ministerial statement, no doubt, 
                                                                
91 JP Sykes, „The Continuing Paradox: a Critique of Minority 
Shareholders and Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006‟ 
[2010] 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly, 5. 
92 S.171 CA 2006. 
93 S.172(3) CA 2006. 
94 S.174 CA 2006. 
95 S.175 CA 2006. 
96 S.176 CA 2006. 
97 S.177 CA 2006. 
98 See Keay, „S.172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and 
Assessment‟, 8. 
99 Sophia Wesley-Key, „Companies Act 2006: Are Cracks Showing in the 
Glass Ceiling‟ [2007] 18(12) International Company and Commercial Law 
Review, 428. 
100 DTI, Companies Act 2006: Duties of Directors: Ministerial 
Statement (DTI, London, June 2007) 8 at column 846, quoting statement 
of Lord Goldsmith at Lords Grand Committee, May 9, 2006. 
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helps in understanding the section, but as noted, it is doubtful 
if such ministerial clarification will douse the anxiety of 
directors seeking to avoid falling foul of section 172.101 
IX. Employees 
Section 172(1) (b) provides for the protection of the interest 
of the employees as part of stakeholders. There was a similar 
provision under the Company Act 1980 and Company 
Act1985.102 However, the difficulty of demonstrating breach, 
and the inability of the employees to directly enforce the right 
since only the company could bring action rendered the 
section almost useless. 
Similarly, under section 172 (1) the interest of employees 
is clearly subordinate to the promotion of the success of the 
company for the benefit of the members as whole. Equally, 
employees do not have direct enforcement powers except 
where they double as shareholders. And even then they must 
seek court approval which stands the danger of being 
refused. On account of the above shortcomings, it has been 
argued that section 172 “will not necessarily improve 
directors‟ substantive engagement with employees‟ 
interests”. 103 In other words, employees‟ position is even 
worse off now than hitherto the case since their interest 
would have to compete in the same pedestal with other 
stakeholders‟ interests. However, it has been argued that 
other myriad employees‟ statutes can offer protection to 
employees.104It is submitted that the protection afforded to 
employees by section 172 (1) is inadequate even though they 
might be protected elsewhere by other legislations. One just 
expects that the section would not turn out to be nothing but 
                                                                
101 Chizu Nakajima, „Whither „„Enlightened Shareholder Value‟?‟‟ 
[2007] 28(12) Company Lawyer, 354. 
102 See s.309 Company Act 1985. 
103 Wynn-Evans, „The Companies Act 2006 and the Interest of 
Employees‟, 192. 
104 See Kiarie, „At Crossroads‟, [2006] in Fisher, „The Enlightened 
Shareholders - Leaving Stakeholders in the Dark: Will S.172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006 make Directors Consider the Impact of their 
Decision on the Third Parties‟, 11-12. 
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a mere legislative piece of decoration, with little or no 
enforcement value, in the same manner as the corresponding 
section 309 of 1985 Company Act. 
X. Creditors 
There is a remarkable absence of creditors in section 172(1) 
(a-f). It can be argued that „others‟ mentioned in subsection 
(1) (c) in company of suppliers and customers incorporate 
creditors, based on ejusdem generis canon of interpretation, 
since they belong to the same genus. 
However, a better argument is that creditors were 
tactically omitted in subsection (1)(a-f) because their interest 
is already protected by subsection 3;which states that section 
172 is subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the 
interest of creditors of the company. Thus, the circumstances 
in which directors are supposed to consider the interest of 
creditors vis a vis shareholders remain uncertain under the 
Act. Apparently, the efficacy of subsection 3 comes into 
operation during insolvency or threatened insolvency when 
directors must cease trading lest they be guilty of wrongful 
trading 105 and/or misfeasance. 106 Thus, section 172 (1) is 
subject to Insolvency Act of 1986. In other words, during 
threatened insolvency directors must consider creditors‟ 
interest which takes priority 107 . Indeed, it has been 
suggested108 that section 172(3) seems to have preserved such 
cases109that require directors to consider creditors‟ interest on 
imminent insolvency, though owing no such duty to 
                                                                
105 See s.214 Insolvency Act 1986. 
106 See s.212 Insolvency Act 1986. 
107 Derek French et al, Company Law (26thedn Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009-2010) 485. 
108 Andrew Hicks and SH Goo, Cases and Materials on Company 
Law (6thedn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 385. 
109 See Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] 
BCLC 250. 
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creditors. 110  It is doubtful whether section 172 added 
anything new in the interest of creditors. 
XI. Teleological Construction of Section 172 
Although significant scepticisms underscore the potential of 
section 172 to cater to stakeholders‟ interests, nevertheless, 
there could still be ways of ameliorating the situation. Two 
options readily come into perspective. Firstly, should 
lawmakers embark on another legislative reform? Secondly, 
should reliance be placed on the courts to adopt a pragmatic 
and purposeful interpretation of section 172 known as 
teleological construction? 
Although initiating another legislative option that would 
significantly take into account the stakeholders‟ interests 
might be a useful policy option, such a wholesome enterprise 
might not the optimal option under the current circumstance. 
First and foremost, it would be unwise to embark on another 
holistic legislative exercise simply to rectify a perceived 
anomaly (or misalignment) inherent in one section, which 
has not even become a subject of substantial judicial 
interpretation. Secondly, it appears that the lawmakers while 
craving for greater appreciation of the stakeholders‟ interests 
by the directors were reluctant to state so categorically. 
In other words, it appears the legislative philosophy 
behind the enlightened shareholders value might have been 
to situate the UK corporate governance model somewhere 
between the traditional common law shareholders‟ primacy 
theory and dual consideration theory of some continental 
European countries; even though some scholars seemingly 
think otherwise. Thus, the Commission on the Public Policy 
and British Business suggested that the CLRSG adopts a 
pluralist approach to corporate governance.111 However, this 
was rejected by the CLRSG on the ground that it might result 
                                                                
110 See Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investment Corporation 
(No2) [1998] 1 WLR 294. 
111 See The Commission on the Public Policy and British Business, 
Promoting Prosperity: a Business Agenda for Britain (Vintage, London, 
1997) 107. 
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in directors not being“effectively accountable to anyone since 
there would be no clear yardstick for judging their 
performance”.112 
Nevertheless, the CLRSG did not set out simply to codify 
the traditional shareholders‟ primacy theory characteristic of 
the common law paradigm. Indeed, it was thought that the 
shareholders‟ primacy model should be modernised to 
incorporate stakeholders‟ interests in line with contemporary 
practice. 113  However, the end result of this preceding 
legislative effort appears to have been blurred, and even 
obfuscated by the divergences characterising its 
understanding. However, these divergences can be settled by 
the courts through the adoption of a teleological approach to 
construction of the section. 
Teleological construction in this vein entails that the 
courts construe the section pragmatically to integrate fully the 
stakeholders‟ interest in similar vein as that of the 
shareholders. One useful means of achieving such a result is 
for the courts to adopt the approach that actions of the 
directors that are inimical to the interest of the stakeholders 
do not promote the interest of the shareholders. The 
implication is that the directors acting in good faith“to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole”114 must take into account the interests 
of the stakeholders otherwise the resultant actions do not “to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole”. 115  Arguably, this approach could 
provide the required interpretative elixir that would lessen 
the controversy characterising the section. Similarly, it would 
directly coalesce stakeholders‟ interests with that of 
                                                                
112 See Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report 
(London: Gee, 1998) para. 1.17, 12 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf> accessed: 11 February 
2014. 
113 See Stephen Girvinet al, Charlesworth‟s Company Law 
(18thedn, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2010) 331; OECD, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, Paris, 2011) 17-26. 
114 Section 172 (1) CA 2006. 
115 Section 172. 
138 REVIEW OF LAW, CRIME AND ETHICS [Vol 3:115 
shareholders. Apart from the fact that the preceding 
teleological interpretative approach obviates the necessity of 
further legislative reform; such an approach would further 
align the UK corporate governance model with that of the 
significant number of the continental European countries, in 
line with contemporary practice. Indeed, the divergences that 
underpin this sphere of corporate governance would 
continue to hold sway for a while attenuated only by judicial 
pronouncement and clarification on the real purport of the 
section. 
XII. Conclusion 
The enlightened shareholders approach marks a watershed 
in the protection of stakeholders‟ interests. Similarly, the 
scope of constituencies of stakeholders‟ the directors must 
have regard to has laudably been widened. Nonetheless, 
section 172 still suffers from the inability of the stakeholders 
and even shareholders to directly enforce it, raising doubts as 
to the potential usefulness of the reform. A stakeholder that 
doubles as a shareholder and/or shareholder(s) per se having 
the interest of stakeholders at heart might, however, enforce 
the section which may constitute ameliorating factor to the 
above shortcomings, subject of course to vagaries of court 
approval. Indeed, the debate on whether the primacy theory 
or pluralist theory or even the amalgam of the crystallised 
theories of both holds sway would, no doubt, continue to 
dominate the mind of commentators for the foreseeable 
future. However, courts could lessen the foregoing 
divergences by adopting a teleological interpretative paradigm 
that adequately caters for the stakeholders‟ interests. This 
preceding could be achieved by a judicial approach premised 
on the fact that the directors‟ actions that are inimical to the 
stakeholders‟interests do not„promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole‟. Apart 
from the fact that the foregoing approach would streamline 
the expectations of the stakeholders,such a position would 
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equally align the UK corporate governance model with the 
contemporary practice.116 
                                                                
116 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises at 17-
26. 

 Case comments 

 
Football must play by the same rules as 
everyone else – A Comment on Berg v 
Blackburn Rovers Football Club & Athletic Plc 
Philip Ebsworth 
Background 
The case between Blackburn Rovers FC and their former 
manager, Henning Berg, raised the question of whether the 
Managing Director of a football club has the authority to 
enter into negotiations and, subsequently, a contract of 
employment with a manager on behalf of the football club. 
Berg was employed as the manger of Blackburn Rovers 
FC following the dismissal of Steve Kean in November 2012. 
The negotiations prior to Berg‟s appointment were with 
Derek Shaw, the club‟s Managing Director, with the owners 
of the club having no direct involvement. Berg signed a 
service agreement on 16th November 2012, which Shaw 
signed on behalf of the club, which would continue until 30th 
June 2015 and contained a clause which stated that, 
“In the event that the Club shall at any time wish 
to terminate this Agreement with immediate 
effect it shall be entitled to do so upon written 
notice to the Manager and provided that it shall 
pay to the Manager a compensation payment by 
way of liquidated damages in a sum equal to the 
Manager's gross basic salary for the unexpired 
balance of the Fixed Period assuming an annual 
salary of £900,000.”1 
Blackburn Rovers FC terminated the service agreement 
with Berg on 27th December 2012 which entitled Berg to the 
remainder of his salary under the aforementioned clause. 
However, the club declined to pay the £2.25 million due so 
                                                                
1 Berg v Blackburn Rovers Football Club & Athletic Plc [2013] EWHC 
1070 (Ch), 16. 
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Berg issued proceedings in February 2013 for breach of 
contract. 
Following the filing of proceedings, Blackburn Rovers 
filed a formal admission in which they admitted liability to 
the claim but due to financial difficulties were only able to 
offer to pay in monthly instalments over a period of four 
months. However, at the first hearing on 16th April 2013 the 
club applied to withdraw their admission of liability and 
instead attempt to defend the claim of breach of contract. 
Therefore, in the hearing on 26th April 2013, His Honour 
Judge Pelling QC was required to consider whether 
Blackburn Rovers had a “realistically arguable defence” in 
order to allow the withdrawal of their admission. 
Proceedings 
The first defence Blackburn Rovers raised was that the 
payment due to Berg amounted to a penalty for breach of 
contract and is consequently unenforceable under English 
law. HHJ Pelling did not accept this argument and followed 
the decisions in Campbell Discount Company Ltd v Bridge2 
and Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil 
Products Company 3  which held that payments which are 
triggered due to a particular event rather than a breach of 
contract are not to be read as penalty clauses. HHJ Pelling 
went on to state that once it is established that a party is 
entitled to terminate the agreement before its expiry, as was 
the case in this instance, the law relating to penalty clauses is 
immaterial.4 
Blackburn Rovers‟ main defence rested on the argument 
that Shaw did not have sufficient authority to bind the club to 
the service agreement. However, it was very clear from the 
evidence presented that Shaw did have authority to negotiate 
and conclude an employment contract with Berg. In his 
                                                                
2 Campbell Discount Company Ltd v Bridge [1961] 1 QB 445 
3 Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products 
Company [1983] 1 WLR 391. 
4 Berg [n1], 34. 
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witness statement, Shaw stated that the owners had requested 
him to negotiate a contract with Berg5 and that he was the 
usual signatory on behalf of the club for similar matters.6 
Blackburn Rovers provided no evidence which suggested 
that Shaw did not have sufficient authority nor that Berg or 
his representatives were aware that Shaw‟s authority was 
restricted. They attempted to argue that Berg should have 
been aware that the agreement would have to be authorised 
by the owners of the club. However, evidence from Olaf 
Dixon, the Deputy Chief Executive of the League Managers 
Association, stating that it was normal for a manager to accept 
that a managing director has the authority to offer the terms 
they are offering on behalf of the club, strongly suggested 
otherwise. 7  Consequently, it appeared that Shaw was not 
operating outside of the control of the owners but acting 
within the usual boundaries of normal practice within the 
football industry. 
HHJ Pelling found that Shaw, as Managing Director, had 
usual authority to make decisions on behalf of the club in the 
ordinary course of its business as established in Hely-
Hutchinson v Brayhead. 8  Therefore it was held that the 
service agreement was binding on the club and Blackburn 
Rovers‟ application to withdraw their admission was 
dismissed and they were ordered to pay the outstanding sum 
owed to Berg. 
Comment 
Following the judgement, the League Managers Association 
issued a statement stating that: 
“It is unacceptable for a Football League club to 
allow the state of affairs to arise whereby its own 
case before the High Court is that its Managing 
                                                                
5 Berg [n1], 36. 
6 Berg [n1], 40. 
7 Berg [n1], 42. 
8 Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead[1968] 1 QB 549. 
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Director is out of control and operating outside 
the authority of the Club‟s owners.”9 
The strongly worded statement is not unreasonable 
considering that Blackburn Rovers never really got a legal 
argument together to support their position. Although it may 
seem obvious to apply well-established principles of contract 
and agency law to the case it is an important decision as it 
further demonstrates that the exceptionally big business of 
football does not have any exceptions in the law. 
The decision in Berg has since been followed inLNOC 
Ltd v Watford Football Club 10 where it was held that a 
Managing Director has implied authority to do all things 
which would normally fall within the remit of that office. It 
further held that there is no need for a formal appointment 
to the role as long as the board permits or authorises 
someone to act as Managing Director. This decision gives 
further weight to the precedent set inHely-Hutchinson 
regarding actual and implied authority to be equally 
applicable in the football industry. 
It appears sensible to apply agency law principles which 
have stood for fifty years to the football industry. As football 
has become a bigger business it has attempted to push the 
boundaries of „everyday‟ legal concepts in order to carve itself 
out its own law and set of precedents. However the „everyday‟ 
law is the law because it is deemed to be the position and 
principles that deliver justice to parties involved in a dispute. 
There is no reason why justice should be administered 
differently in a footballing context and this decision supports 
the principle that there is no such thing as sports law, just law 
applied in a sporting context. 
Author‟s Note: Although the initial reaction is to feel bad 
for Blackburn Rovers‟ barrister who was instructed to defend 
                                                                
9 League Managers Association, „Henning Berg Succeeds in High Court 
Claim Against Blackburn Rovers‟ 29th April 2013. Available at 
<www.leaguemanagers.com/news/news-7195.html> accessed June 2014. 
10 LNOC LTD v Watford Association Football Club Ltd [2013] EWHC 
3615 (Comm). 
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what looked like, and was, an unwinnable argument, spare a 
thought for Derek Shaw who, having instructed his lawyers to 
admit liability, then had to make a witness statement stating 
he was a rogue director acting outside his powers whilst at the 
same time being threatened with disciplinary proceedings for 
having done so. 
 
Power v Greater Manchester Police Authority1 
Amin Al-Astewani 
Background 
This case is now part of a number of religious discrimination 
cases in the last decade which mark the ever-increasing 
importance of religion and law as a new niche area in the 
legal arena, particularly in the context of employment. This 
series of cases can be stretched back to the landmark 
Begum 2 case in 2006, which then gave way to Ladele 3 , 
Chondol 4 and Mcfarlane 5 respectively. The most recent 
addition in this series was Eweida and others6, which was 
taken all the way to Strasbourg by the claimants after their 
claims were dismissed by the UK courts. Since these cases 
were amongst the first to seriously test the application of 
newly introduced anti-discrimination and equality legislation, 
English judges were faced with the difficult task of 
establishing a precedent for future judges in how such 
legislation is best interpreted and approached. Religious 
discrimination cases are often contentious in their very 
nature, but have also attracted attention because they play 
into larger debates about the place of religion in the secular 
courts and the secular public sphere. 
The Facts 
This case was heard at first instance in the Manchester 
Employment Tribunal with both the Claimant and 
Respondent both based in Manchester. Mr Alan Power, an 
employee of the Greater Manchester Police Authority, 
brought a claim of unlawful direct discrimination against his 
                                                                
1 [2010] UKEAT/0087/10/JOJ. 
2 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
3 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357. 
4 Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT 0298/08/JOJ. 
5 McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2009] UKEAT 0106_09_3011. 
6 Eweida and others v UK [2013] ECHR 37. 
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employer contrary to the provisions of the Equality (Religion 
or Belief) Regulations 2003. These regulations, now 
incorporated into section 19 of the Equality Act 2010, state 
that direct discrimination is established on the grounds of the 
religion or belief of an individual if “A treats B less 
favourably than he treats or would treat other persons”. 
Mr Power was a committed member of the Spiritualist 
Church and a keen believer in spiritualism, life after death 
and the use of mediums and psychics to contact the dead. He 
successfully applied for the post of a Special Constabulary 
Trainer in August 2008. Shortly after, his employer received 
statements from two police officers regarding his 
inappropriate conduct as a volunteer in neighbouring police 
forces. An investigation was consequently mounted, which 
found that Mr Power had also been providing other police 
officers with a CD-ROMs and posters related to his personal 
beliefs. As a result Mr Power was dismissed after only three 
weeks in his employment. A crucial part of the dismissal 
statement referred to his “work in the psychic field” as one of 
the major reasons for his dismissal, which is particularly what 
prompted Mr Power to complain of discrimination on 
grounds of his religion or belief. 
The decision 
The tribunal at first instance noted that the Spiritualist 
Church, of which Mr Power was a member, was established 
in 1853 and that spiritualism was listed as the eighth largest 
faith group in Britain with 32,404 adherents in the 2001 
census. It considered that this fulfilled the test for a religious 
or philosophical belief capable of being protected under the 
2003 regulations, as set out in Mcklintock7:it had sufficient 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, and was 
worthy of respect in a democratic society. However the 
tribunal decided that Mr Power had not been discriminated 
against on the grounds of those protected beliefs, but found 
he had been dismissed for two separate reasons. The first 
                                                                
7 McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29. 
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was his inappropriate conduct as a volunteer which 
highlighted he was not a suitable candidate to train young 
police officers. The second was his distribution of posters 
and CD-ROMs around the police station advertising his 
personal beliefs about spiritualism which did not meet the 
standard of professionalism required in the work place. Mr 
Power appealed the decision. 
The EAT headed by Judge Peter Clark affirmed the 
Tribunal‟s use of the classic Igen8 approach where a reverse 
burden of proof is imposed. In Igen the Court of Appeal 
applied a two-stage approach, in which the claimant first has 
to establish that there has been unlawful discrimination. The 
burden of proof then shifts to the employer to prove 
otherwise; if their explanation is not adequate, the tribunal 
has to find the discrimination proven. The EAT endorsed 
the Tribunal‟s decision that Mr Power did validly raise a 
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. It accepted 
however that the explanation given by the Respondent was 
also valid. Direct discrimination can of course not be justified 
unlike indirect indiscrimination, thus the only reason the 
respondent‟s explanation was valid was because they proved 
that the reasons for dismissal were not related to the beliefs 
of Mr Power. This was arrived at using the “reason why” 
question postulated by Lord Nichols in Shamoon 9  and 
adopted by Elias P in Ladele. It was also used in Chondol 
and Mcfarlane. This question focuses on the reason for a 
dismissal and enables a tribunal to make a distinction 
between treatment complained of on the ground of the 
Claimant‟s religion (unlawful) and on the ground that the 
Claimant was improperly foisting it on service users (lawful). 
Thus the EAT concluded that “the reason for the 
Respondent's dismissal of the Claimant was, in part, the 
manifestation of his spiritualist beliefs in the material which 
he had earlier distributed, not the fact of his beliefs. 
                                                                
8 Igen v Wong [2005] ICL 931. 
9 Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] 
ICL 337, 341-2. 
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Accordingly, there is no error of law disclosed in this appeal 
and it must be dismissed”. 
Comment 
It is welcoming to have a Manchester case which sets two 
significant precedents in this area of the law. The first 
precedent is in the definition of „Religion or Belief‟. This 
case has further confirmed the wide scope of the definition 
by holding that a belief in spiritualism and the philosophical 
belief in life after death and psychic powers falls within the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. 
The EAT in Grainger 10  had previously concluded that an 
asserted belief in man-made climate change, together with the 
alleged resulting moral imperatives arising from it, was also 
capable of constituting a „philosophical belief‟ for the 
purpose of the 2003 Regulations because it met the criteria 
laid out by the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which was directly 
relevant. This is welcoming news for employees who may 
face discrimination because of certain beliefs they hold, 
whether religious or philosophical. The second significant 
precedent is that this case affirmed the distinction that judges 
will draw between treatment on the grounds of a person‟s 
belief and on the grounds of the manifestation of those 
beliefs. This will be a welcoming development for employers 
as it sets quite a large hurdle for claimants to pass. Although I 
believe the decision was correct in this case because of the 
clear reason of misconduct by the claimant, I am 
uncomfortable with this second precedent in the way it sets 
such a large hurdle for employees. The distinction is not very 
easy to draw, and it is questionable whether discriminating on 
grounds of religion require you to be specifically motivated 
by that person‟s religion. This is indeed why most direct 
discrimination claims have thus far been unsuccessful, failing 
because the actions of the defendant are found not to be on 
the grounds of religion. 
                                                                
10 Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT. 
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The Queen and the 
Constitution (and Me) 
Rodney Brazier 
Harry Street was on the committee that appointed me here 
in 1968.When it was his turn to interrogate the 21 year-old, 
third-year, undergraduate, it was suggested that he ask me 
about my constitutional law dissertation.Harry simply replied 
“I don‟t know anything about that.I‟ll ask questions on 
administrative law.”And they were tough.But I bluffed my 
way through somehow.Harry was to give an enormous early 
boost to my career.We co-edited the late Stanley de Smith‟s 
classic work, Constitutional and Administrative Law.Ever 
keen to enhance his salary, I can still see Harry‟s beaming 
face as he told me that, in its first year, and throughout the 
world, it had sold a staggering 10,000 copies. 
Harry was the leading public lawyer of his generation.In 
every way it was a privilege to have known him.That view is 
shared by thousands of his students and his colleagues.You 
will understand, therefore, how moving it is for me to give 
this lecture in his memory. 
*** 
One February morning in 1952, a 5-year-old boy was 
daydreaming in his state primary class.Suddenly, the head 
teacher came in.He said that the King, George VI, had died, 
aged only 56.Princess Elizabeth was our new Queen.She was 
only 25.I was that little boy.To me, this news was of no 
interest at all.I couldn‟t wait for break-time, so that we could 
resume our snowball fights.That working-class scallywag was 
to become a frequent visitor to Buckingham Palace, 
discussing constitutional matters.More of all that later.(In 
case I forget to say, though, my first-ever visit there was at age 
8.My parents had taken me up to London to see the 
sights.Having watched the changing of the guard at the 
Palace, I desperately needed to do what little boys often 
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desperately need to do.My Mum whizzed me around the 
corner to Constitution Hill, where I did the necessary 
discreetly by the wall.59 years later, I publicly apologise.I 
know that the Queen would understand.) 
But I digress.Like many of her predecessors, the Queen 
handwrites a daily diary.What an incomparable mine of 
information that must be!But, following precedent, none of it 
will be published until after her death.Even so, enough is 
known after 61 years to assess the effect of the Queen on the 
British constitution, and vice versa.My analysis today will 
have to be very selective.The full story merits a new book.It 
will be interesting – I hope! – to see exactly what has 
happened since 1952, why it has occurred, and whether it 
was planned. 
Monarchy is a unique part of a constitution.Unlike all the 
other parts it consists of one person.So it‟s impossible to 
think about the monarchy without picturing the Queen.She 
fulfils her duties in much the same way as she always 
has.Even republicans acknowledge that, if there must be a 
monarchy – which they reject – the Queen has performed 
well.We also picture the next King – the Prince of Wales – 
and the King after him – the Duke of Cambridge.(Perhaps 
we can leave Prince George out of all this for now, gurgling 
happily away.) 
What did the Sovereign‟s constitutional powers look like 
on the death ofGeorge VI,on 6 February 1952?Queen 
Victoria (who reigned from 1837 to 1901) had used her 
constitutional powers fully towards her Prime Ministers.She 
helped her favourites.She obstructed Ministers for whom she 
did not care, or of whose policies she did not approve.But 
even Victoria had to accept, by the latter part of her reign, 
that the monarchy had changed.By that time, the 
Government represented the wishes of the (albeit small) 
electorate.The vote had been given to more and more 
categories of men.That (albeit limited) democratic legitimacy, 
possessed by the Government of the day, allowed two 
constitutional conventions to develop.One is what I call for 
shortness “the cardinal convention”.It prescribes that royal 
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action will normally only take place on ministerial advice, 
even if a Sovereign personally dislikes that advice.That 
convention is counterbalanced by what I dub “the tripartite 
convention”.It was identified by Walter Bagehot as the 
constitutional right of the Sovereign to be consulted, to 
advise, and to warn Ministers.(Those labels of mine were 
used in the continuing case of Evans v. Information 
Commissioner.)Thus even Victoria came to accept that she 
must normally act as elected Ministers advised her, even if it 
was uncongenial to do so.In return she could offer views – 
often trenchantly – in private to those Ministers, 
confidentially trying to steer, perhaps to help, Governments 
of any political party.That position was solidified by her 
successors, Edward VII, George V, and George VI.(We can 
ignore the 11-month reign in 1936 of Edward VIII.He is 
remembered today only for his Abdication.How lucky 
Britain was to be shot of both him and Mrs Simpson.) 
All a Sovereign‟s public speeches (except for the 
Christmas Day broadcast) are approved in advance by 
Ministers.Apart from those speeches, the Queen has been 
notable for her public silence, just as she had been as 
Princess Elizabeth.She has never given an interview, or 
published anything.We have no idea what the 
Queenpersonally thinksabout public issues, politics, the 
political parties, or indeed very much else.(That has not 
prevented self-styled “royal experts” popping up on TV, with 
monotonous regularity, talking with confident authority about 
things of which they canknow nothing.)The Queen has 
maintained that self-denying ordinance since 1952.(By 
contrast, much has been heard from the Prince of 
Wales.That raises intriguing constitutional questions, and 
there might be difficulties ahead for him.But time prevents 
me from addressing them here.)Perhaps the Queen‟s silence 
resulted both from her youth in 1952, and the reticence of 
the times.In those days it just wasn‟t done for members of the 
royal family to inflict their opinions on the public.Every 
attempt by the media to persuade the Queen to depart from 
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her public silence has failed.But so what?Why have I gone 
off on this apparent tangent? 
This royal silence has underpinned both the cardinal 
convention, and the tripartite convention.TheQueen has 
adhered scrupulously to both.Her inscrutability has 
enhanced them.A Sovereign must be apolitical, and be seen 
to be apolitical.To have no publicly-known views about any 
significant matter enhances the perception that she is above 
and beyond party politics.It is not known how she might vote 
– if she had a vote.Obviously, the Queen must have her own, 
personal, viewsabout current affairs and public policy.How 
could she not?All her Prime Ministers have attested to the 
value which they have obtained from her views, expressed in 
complete confidence at their weekly meetings 
(“audiences”).They take place between the Sovereign and the 
Prime Minister alone.No minutes are taken.That enables 
complete frankness on each side.All her Prime Ministers 
have acknowledged the Queen‟s great knowledge of public 
affairs, of policy details, of other heads of state and 
government, and not least of the Commonwealth.It is at 
these audiences that the tripartite convention mainly 
operates.The Queen‟s public silence has vastly strengthened 
it. 
By 1952, and despite the cardinal convention, real royal 
power remained.Thus it was still for the Sovereign personally 
to choose a Prime Minister, except, of course, after General 
Elections where one party emerged triumphant.Moreover, it 
was for the Sovereign to decide whether to grant a dissolution 
of Parliament.Such decisions could be difficult in certain 
political circumstances.And the royal prerogative itself – that 
vast collection of common-law powers – remained largely in 
place, ill-defined, never having been officially 
catalogued.Thus at her Accession in 1952 the Queen 
inherited a monarchy with real constitutional powers.And 
please don‟t assume that these were unused, or unimportant, 
powers.Her granddad, George V, had had to choose the 
Prime Minister in 1923, 1924, and 1929.And he had taken a 
major role in 1931 in the formation of the coalition, so-called 
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National, Government.The Queen‟s dad, as late as 1951, was 
vexed by the prerogative of dissolution.The 1945 Labour 
Government had squeaked back to office at the February 
1950 Election, with a tiny majority.There was much 
publicdebate about whether the Prime Minister, Clement 
Attlee, would be entitled to a further dissolution whenever he 
asked for it.(In fact, he obtained an Election in 
October1951.Labour lost to the Conservative Party under 
Winston Churchill.)And just three years into her reign, the 
Queen had personally to choose a new Prime Minister.As it 
turned out, she had to choose the two after him as well.All 
three happened to be Conservatives.I should like to look 
briefly at those choices. 
Unlike the other political parties, the Conservatives had 
no formal leadership election system until 1965.(I‟ll say more 
on that later).The choice of a successor to the great Churchill 
was easy.He retired, aged a mere 80, from his peacetime 
premiership, 1951 to 1955.Sir Anthony Eden had long been 
his unrivalled heir apparent.In less than two years, however, 
Eden had to resign through illness in the wake of the Suez 
fiasco.The succession in 1957 lay between two Cabinet 
Ministers, Harold Macmillan, and R A Butler.Very limited 
consultations, conducted by the Queen‟s Private Secretary, 
resulted in the Queen summoning Macmillan to the 
helm.There were rumblings from the losing side.(By the way, 
I once saw Macmillan, from the public gallery, in action at 
Prime Minister‟s Questions in the House of Commons.He 
was a class act.) 
Six years later, in October 1963, Macmillan was struck by 
what he later called “the stroke of fate”.He (wrongly) thought 
that he had prostate cancer, and decided to resign.This time 
there were several rival successors.The scene was set for what 
some commentators have described as the Queen‟s worst 
constitutional mistake.Briefly, this is what happened.From 
his hospital bed Macmillan initiated what he was pleased to 
callthe “customary processes of consultation” throughout the 
Conservative Party.(In truth, there were no such “customary 
processes”.)There was, however, an unprecedentedly-wide 
154 REVIEW OF LAW, CRIME AND ETHICS [Vol 3:149 
canvass of Conservative opinion.The Cabinet, junior 
Ministers, Conservative MPs, peers, and others, were asked 
their views, by various specified individuals.Macmillan 
collated the results into a memorandum, which he read to 
the Queen when she visited him in hospital.The 
recommendation was that the Foreign Secretary, the 14th Earl 
of Home, should become Prime Minister, which he did.(I 
heard the news at school.)This was very surprising – and 
highly controversial. The “customary processes” were 
damned by some for containing leading questions, designed 
to do-down a leading candidate, R A Butler.(Poor old Butler 
again, losing for a second time.He never was PM.)The 
Conservatives – not surprisingly – decided that such an 
exercise must never be repeated.And so in 1965 they fell into 
line with the other parties by adopting a clearly-
democratic,secret, balloting system for their leader.(By the 
by, I saw Home as Prime Minister during the 1964 General 
Election.He was addressing an open-air crowd, in a public 
car park, open to all.Simpler, safer days!In the same 
campaign, I listened to the young Labour leader, Harold 
Wilson, making a public speech, in our small public hall in 
Loughton, in Essex.(No “Towie” jokes, please.)He was 
accompanied by an elderly, and silent, Clement Attlee.) 
The criticism of the Queen is that she was constitutionally 
wrong to rely so heavily on Macmillan in 1963, and that she 
should have consulted more widely.On one point, all are 
agreed.The advice that Macmillan gave wasn‟t ministerial 
advice.His written resignation had been delivered to the 
Queen earlier that day (by his Principal Secretary – he didn‟t 
rely on Royal Mail).So whatever he said to the Queen could 
not amount to ministerial advice.Apart from that, though, I 
think that the criticism of the Queen is misplaced.Was the 
Queen really expected to set aside a long document, 
apparently based on rigorous, widespread consultation within 
the governing party?How could her Private Secretary 
possibly have rivalled the Conservative Party‟s 
consultations?I can‟t see how the Queen could have acted 
differently, without being seen to meddle in a political party‟s 
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internal affairs.In any case, after 1965 similar circumstances 
could not recur. 
Happily for democracy, a new convention about prime 
ministerial succession emerged afterwards.It governs the 
Macmillan-type situation.The convention is that, in such a 
case, the resigning Prime Minister is expected, if possible, to 
remain in office until the Government party has elected a 
successor.The winner will then be appointed formally by the 
Queen to office, following the resignation of the outgoing 
Prime Minister.That process was followed after Harold 
Wilson‟s surprise announcement in 1976 that he would 
resign after his party had elected a new leader.It was repeated 
in 1990 when Margaret Thatcher was ditched by her party, 
and again in 2007 when Tony Blair retired after 10 years as 
Prime Minister.That conventionmarks a significant reduction 
in royal responsibility, and in my opinion rightly so.The days 
of new Prime Ministers being personally chosen by the 
Sovereign (such as Eden, Macmillan, and Home) have ended 
in the Queen‟s reign. 
But wait a minute.What about the Queen‟s role when a 
hung Parliament is elected?After inconclusive elections in 
1923 and 1929, George V had to make real, personal, 
choices of Prime Minister.There was a hung Parliament in 
February 1974 – the first of the Queen‟s reign.In 1974, the 
politicians sorted out what should happen.The Queen 
remained constitutionally inactive.A minority Labour 
Government took office.By 1974 it had become accepted 
that such a highly-charged political decision should be made 
by politicians, not by the unelected head of state.(Please note, 
though, that the royal prerogative remains intact.Ifin such 
circumstances the politicians failed to sort it out, only the 
head of state could do so.Only the Sovereign has the legal 
power, under the royal prerogative, to appoint a Prime 
Minister.Perhaps, though, this will never have to happen.) 
We owe it to the constitutionally-ambitious Gordon 
Brown (Prime Minister 2007 to 2010) for the codification of 
that, and other, processes.He asked the then Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Gus O‟Donnell, to produce what was to be 
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published as the Cabinet Manualin 2011.(Incidentally, I have 
met Lord O‟Donnell, as he now is, on a number of 
occasions.(And incidentally, incidentally, have you noticed 
my First Law of Name-Dropping?If you‟re going to drop 
names into the conversation, make then good ones.I‟m still 
waiting for my chance to say to someone, boring away about 
this or that, “I do agree, and in fact said just that at dinner 
yesterday to the Queen”.I‟m digressing again!)Anyway, on my 
first visit to meet Gus O‟Donnell at the Cabinet Office, I was 
keen to visit its loo.I didn‟t need to use it, you understand.I 
just wanted to check a rumour.I had heard that each and 
every sheet of loo paper there bears the solemn declaration 
“Property of Her Majesty‟s Government”.What joy it would 
have been to use such paper if you happened to dislike Her 
Majesty‟s current Ministers!Alas, however, it‟s all an urban 
myth.)That document (the Cabinet Manual, not the loo 
paper) reduces existing non-legal rules and practices to 
writing.Chapter 2 explains how Governments come to office, 
including from a hung Parliament.That chapter was 
published, in draft, before the May 2010 General Election.(I 
had a part in drafting it.)Its procedures were – broadly – 
followed after Mr Brown lost that election.The present 
Coalition Government is the result.The Queen discreetly 
remained out of the way at Windsor throughout the 
Conservative – Lib Dem negotiations.Mr Brown actually 
resigned before those talks had finished.As a result, Mr 
Cameron had to tell the Queen at his first prime-ministerial 
audience that he didn‟t know whether there would be a 
Coalition, or a minority Conservative, Government.But what 
is critical is this.In May 2010 the political dance was 
performed to music scored in the then draft Cabinet 
Manual.The politicians resolved the electoral stalemate – and 
for the sake of democracy, quite right too.A Sovereign‟s role 
in government-formation has, therefore,shrunk vastly since 
1952. 
The monarchy has been changed by that Coalition 
Government.First, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 
provides that Parliament lasts for a fixed, five-year 
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period.Ever since a King first summoned the first-ever 
Parliament, the Sovereign has had theprerogative power to 
dissolve it at any time.That Act abolished it.We know that 
the next election will be on Thursday, 7thMay 2015.Put that 
date in your diaries.And then every five years after that.There 
could only be an “early” Election if MPs were to vote for it, 
according to rules in the Act.Before that statute, Prime 
Ministers asked for Elections when their party was doing well 
in the opinion polls – quelle surprise!They had an unfair 
advantage over the Opposition.Now, though, election dates 
are not a matter for the Prime Minister or any concern of the 
Sovereign.May we not assume that the Queen, on behalf of 
herself and her successors, might well have said privately, as 
someone did in Hamlet, “For this relief, much thanks”? 
Secondly, and as everyone knows, the rules about 
succession to the Throne are being changed.The Succession 
to the Crown Act 2013 will be brought into force when all the 
Commonwealth realms have approved its provisions.(They 
have already agreed the principles in that Act.)It does three 
things.First (and at long last) sex discrimination in the line of 
succession will be abolished.At present, males have 
preference over females.If the Duchess of Cambridge‟s baby 
had been a girl, then under the new Act any subsequent boy 
would not, as it were, shove his older sister aside and take her 
place in the line of succession.(But of course their first child 
was a boy.Prince George is next in line to the Throne after 
his dad.)Secondly, the rule which bars the Sovereign from 
marrying a Catholic, and which automatically removes from 
the succession anyone who marries a Catholic, will be 
repealed.The Sovereign, however, must still be a 
communicating Anglican.Finally, the idiotic Royal Marriages 
Act 1772 will be replaced.That Act requires anyone in the 
line of succession – however remotely – to obtain the 
Sovereign‟s consent to marry.Without it, any such marriage is 
void.Perhaps if you were to check, one of you might be (say) 
767th in that line.If you plan to marry before the 2013 Act 
comes into force, you must ask for a lovely document, signed 
by the Queen, to say that she consents.If you don‟t, your 
158 REVIEW OF LAW, CRIME AND ETHICS [Vol 3:149 
marriage would be void.Surprisingly (at least to me) 
Buckingham Palace has many such requests every year from 
careful people.The 2013 Act will require only the first six 
people in the line of succession to seek the Sovereign‟s 
consent.If any of them did not (which is unlikely) the 
subsequent marriage itself would be valid, but the miscreant 
could never become the Sovereign. 
The Queen‟s father would be astonished by the 
constitutional changes made to the monarchy over the past 
61 years. The Sovereign has become much more of a 
ceremonial and representative head of state.But the tripartite 
convention, for example, ensures the continuation of a real, 
though limited, constitutional contribution by the head of 
state. 
That review of more than 60 years raises at least two 
questions.First, was this reduction in royal power all 
planned?I am as sure as I can be that the answer is “No”.The 
British constitution evolves, and changes, in fits and 
starts.The monarchy, as part of that constitution, is no 
different.We can see a reason for each, specific, change in 
the Queen‟s position.Thus, for example, her discretion to 
appoint a Prime Minister was limited by the Conservatives‟ 
adoption of leadership election rules;and so on.There was – 
is – no master plan, to my knowledge, and in my 
judgement.Secondly, what is the Queen‟s view of these 
changes?Has she privately welcomed them, resisted them, 
embraced some, but not others?I don‟t know.But isn‟t it a 
reasonable inference that, in the main, an unelected 
monarch, fully attuned to the nuances of the constitution, 
would welcome politicians taking responsibility for their own, 
political, decisions?We shall have to wait for the publication 
of the Queen‟s diary to find out her opinion about all 
this.But, if we combine her robust good health, the longevity 
of her mother (who lived to be 101), and the time needed 
after the next Accession to make that diary available, we 
mustn‟t hold our breath to read it. 
Those of you who are still awake might be thinking that, 
while I‟ve droned on about the Queen and the constitution, I 
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haven‟t said very much about the “me” in the title of this 
lecture.I have published a lot about the monarchy.No doubt 
some people say that I write of little else – although even they 
must agree that it‟s all frightfully good.But I‟ve also enjoyed 
more personal experiences.They all began purely by 
chance.Late in 1995, on a whim, I sent a copy of an article of 
mine to the Queen‟s Private Secretary.In his delightful thank-
you note Sir Robert Fellowes asked whether, the next time I 
was in London, I might like to call in to Buckingham Palace 
for a chat (“call in”!).Well, I carefully pondered that query 
for all of 30 seconds, and decided that I would go to London 
as soon as I decently could.I first entered the Palace in 
January 1996.Why had he asked to see me?I must explain 
what the Queen‟s Private Secretary does.He – always a he, so 
far – is the Sovereign‟s most senior, permanent, adviser.Very 
briefly, and of relevance here, he advises the Sovereign on 
her rights and duties in relation to the constitution, the 
Government, Parliament, and the Commonwealth.He must 
keep abreast – from various people and places – of political 
and public policy issues, and of changes in constitutional law 
and practice.Of course, he is entirely impartial and politically 
neutral. Very kindly, Sir Robert wanted to feel able to consult 
me from time to time about constitutional issues, whether 
real, possible, or theoretical.All this would, of course, be in 
strict confidence.And so it all began.Sometimes meetings 
take place at Buckingham Palace, sometimes 
elsewhere.There have also been many written exchanges, 
usually initiated by me, in the form of unsolicited 
memorandums, and very occasionally phone calls, usually to 
me. 
Have my views, opinions, thoughts, suggestions, 
memoranda, jests – for there is always fun at Buckingham 
Palace – actually made any difference?Here I am in a 
difficulty.What has passed between me and Buckingham 
Palace (and indeed more widely in government) is, and 
always will be, completely confidential.The relationship 
couldn‟t exist on any other basis.But let me say this.Possibly 
now and again my opinion on some constitutional matter – 
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given as impartially as I can – might confirm a view already 
held at Buckingham Palace, and I suppose that may be 
useful.I can‟t recall a Private Secretary ever saying to me, 
“That‟s a good idea – we‟ll do that”.Rather, he absorbs my 
views, and mulls on them later, along with all other 
considerations.And that‟s all I‟ll say about that.Save to add 
this.I once had to postpone a seminar because it clashed with 
a visit to the Palace.The very next day after my visit, the 
official, public, announcement was made of William and 
Kate‟s engagement.The rumour spread around the Law 
School that I had gone to the Palace to confirm that this 
would be OK from a constitutional point of view.Sad to say, 
in fact the announcement was as much news to me as to any 
other member of the public. 
To end, I return to the beginning.Since 1952 the 
monarchy has slowly altered.That has enhanced 
parliamentary democracy.Formal royal power, still possessed 
by the Queen‟s dad, has been reduced.The Sovereign in 
2013 retains some constitutional authority.This is seen in 
particular in the tripartite convention.And the Queen might 
one day have to be the final arbiter if ever politicians could 
not resolve some constitutional crisis.Now there is, and has 
been for a long time, a case that the United Kingdom should 
become a republic.That case is logical and weighty. But it has 
very little popular support while the Queen is on the 
Throne.What might happen to the republican cause in the 
future must wait for the Accession of the next King, many 
years ahead.I wonder where, and how old, I will be when I 
hear that news. 
 
   
 
 
